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Oil remains one of the most important resources for the operation of New Zealand’s economy 
and society. Having an accurate perception of the country’s oil supply security and the 
effectiveness of security-improving policies is therefore vital. Noting this importance, the aim 
of this thesis is to determine whether geopolitical uncertainty over the long-term is 
appropriately addressed within New Zealand’s current oil security assessments and 
policymaking. 
This study examines New Zealand’s current oil security assessments through document 
analysis and utilising a scenario-based approach. It identifies a number of assumptions within 
New Zealand’s current assessments regarding the capacity and capability of the market to 
respond to significant disruptions caused by geopolitical events, and existing policy viability 
and effectiveness. It also identifies limitations within these assessments, including that the 
analyses are limited to short time horizons. The study concludes that New Zealand’s current 
oil security assessments and corresponding policy recommendations do not adequately address 
geopolitical uncertainty. Furthermore, it identifies a number of related variables that are also 
not adequately considered. To help address these identified shortcomings, this study presents 
a schedule of recommendations to improve the efficacy of New Zealand’s oil security 
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On 14 September 2019, state-owned Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and 
Khurais in eastern Saudi Arabia were targeted in a drone attack. Houthi rebels in Yemen 
claimed responsibility for the attack, but officials from Saudi Arabia, the United States (US), 
and other nations asserted that Iran was responsible.1  
The scale of disruption from the above attack was significant: oil production from the world’s 
leading oil exporter was cut by half, representing approximately 5% of global oil production 
and the largest production disruption in history.2 This resulted in the biggest surge in global oil 
prices since the 1990 invasion of Kuwait with oil futures spiking almost 20%.3 Nevertheless, 
global markets quickly calmed as the Saudi oil facilities returned to operation and oil reserves 
were drawn upon to meet the production shortfall. 
Although the Saudi Aramco attack constituted a significant geopolitical event, the shock to oil 
markets was low compared to some geopolitical events in the past. During the Yom Kippur 
War, members of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) placed 
an oil embargo on nations perceived to have supported Israel, reducing petroleum supply to the 
market – dramatically so for embargoed states. The ensuing 1973 oil crisis saw numerous oil-
importing countries - including New Zealand - experience significant economic and social 
disruption from fuel shortages and subsequent fuel rationing efforts, as well as from oil prices 
increasing more than four-fold.4  
Both events, while different in scale and consequence, demonstrate the impact that geopolitical 
events can have on the global oil market. Yet despite providing stark evidence to nations of 
their shared interest in maintaining secure oil supplies, it is equally clear the market has not 




1 Edith Lederer and Jill Lawless, "UK, France Germany Blame Iran for Saudi Oil Attacks," AP News, 24 
September 2019, https://apnews.com/ee973164333e44f4b94ea590590f4ed2? 
2 5.7mb/d of oil processing capacity was temporarily lost: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2019 (Paris: IEA, 2019), 
167, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2019. 
3 IEA, Oil Market Report - October 2019 (IEA, 2019), https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-october-
2019. 
4 Ministry for Culture and Heritage, "1973 - Key Events," updated 9 May, 2018, 
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/the-1970s/1973; C. John McDermott and Rishab Sethi, "Balance of Payments - 




attack and contemporaneous attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) warned market participants not to shrug off the attacks as being of little 
consequence, stating that further incidents in the Gulf region could occur and cause even 
greater disruption.5 However, it is not just the Gulf region that presents geopolitical risk to oil 
security in the future.  
There is growing evidence to suggest that the world is moving from a period of relative 
geopolitical stability towards a new phase of geopolitical uncertainty, and that this change 
could bring with it new risks.6 Arguably one of the more compelling signs of this shift is the 
decline in the influence of the US in international affairs relative to other large economies like 
China and India, making global governance more complex.7 As the scale and complexity of 
international challenges increase, global institutions are finding it increasingly difficult to 
respond to them.8 With these multilateral rules-based approaches seen to be fraying, many 
countries regard re-establishment of the nation state as the primary locus of power and 
legitimacy an increasingly appealing strategy.9 As a consequence of this growing prevalence 
in anti-globalist thinking, once widely accepted international norms and traditional security 
approaches are also being challenged. As Chipman observes: “As norms and institutions 
weaken, statecraft is back. Countries that relied on institutional arrangements, or on external 
security guarantees, are discovering that they need to revive their national strategic skills.”10 
Based upon the historical record, it seems likely the above geopolitical uncertainties have 
implications for the future oil security of nations. Therefore, the implications of supply 
disruptions will continue to shape national energy policy. Oil does not dominate the global 
energy mix to the extent that it did at the time of the 1973 crisis, and economic growth does 




5 IEA, Oil Market Report - October 2019. 
6 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2018 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2018), 7, 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf. 
7 Australian Department of the Environment and Energy, Liquid Fuel Security Review: Interim Report 




9 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2018, 7. 
10 John Chipman, "A New Geopolitical Challenge to the Rules-Based Order," (International Institute for 




of the global energy mix oil continues to be the largest single source of energy.11 As such, oil 
remains an essential and integral source in the energy systems of virtually all nations. 
Furthermore, many sectors of modern economies are significantly or totally dependent upon 
reliable access to oil-based fuels, as are the world’s militaries.12  Consequently, disruptions that 
result in oil price spikes or physical shortfalls in supply can have significant implications for a 
nation’s economy and national security. For states that rely on oil imports to meet domestic 
demand, oil market disruptions can be perceived as an even greater risk, given the reliance on 
supply chain elements beyond their borders.13 Therefore, security of oil supply is invariably a 
key objective of importing countries’ energy policymaking, typically manifesting as a raft of 
policies designed to reduce the risk of an oil supply disruption occurring - or at least mitigating 
the impacts should one occur.  
The above realities apply equally to New Zealand. The New Zealand Government considers 
secure and affordable access to oil as being critical to the nation’s economic performance and 
social wellbeing,14 and closely linked to overall national security.15 The criticality of oil 
security is further amplified by oil being the only non-renewable energy source of which New 
Zealand is a net importer. Therefore, as a geographically isolated and export-dependent country 
almost entirely reliant upon imports to meet its current domestic oil demand, a primary security 
concern for New Zealand is its status as a net consumer within the international oil market. 
New Zealand’s current oil security policies reflect this reality and have remained largely 
unchanged over the past 40 years.16 During this time, the country has not experienced any 




11 Oil as share of the global energy mix has declined from 44% in 1971 to 32% in 2017. Oil consumption per 
unit of economic output has decreased by a third since 2000. IEA, World Energy Balances 2019 (IEA, 2019), 
ix-x, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-balances-2019; Tim Gould and Tae-Yoon Kim, "The World 
Can’t Afford to Relax About Oil Security," (IEA, 19 September 2019). https://www.iea.org/commentaries/the-
world-cant-afford-to-relax-about-oil-security.  
12 J.G. Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics (The Hague: Clingendael Institute 
for International Relations, 2004), 31, 
https://www.clingendaelenergy.com/inc/upload/files/Study_on_energy_supply_security_and_geopolitics.pdf. 
International Security Advisory Board, Energy and Geopolitics: Challenges and Opportunities (U.S. 
Department of State, 2014), 8-9, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/229409.pdf. 
13 This includes petroleum production, refining and international transportation. 
14 Ministry of Economic Development, New Zealand Energy Strategy 2011-2021 (MED, 2011), 12, 
https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/142-nz-energy-strategy-lr-pdf. 
15 MBIE, Review of New Zealand’s Oil Security (MBIE, 2012), 15, 
https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/2829-review-of-nz-oil-security-discussion-paper-pdf. 
16 Barry Barton, "Reaching the Limits of What the Market Will Provide: Energy Security in New Zealand," in 
Energy Security: Managing Risk in a Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment, ed. Barry Barton et al. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 374. 
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Government actions to date suggest that this past success is considered a strong predictor of 
future success, and continuation of the current oil security policies is therefore deemed 
appropriate. 
Nevertheless, in light of the recent geopolitical events and larger geopolitical trends described 
earlier, significant questions emerge as to the efficacy of New Zealand’s current domestic and 
foreign policy approach to maintaining external security of oil supply in an increasingly 
dynamic global environment. This study therefore proceeds from the premise that robust 
policymaking demands careful examination of the continued effectiveness of these policies in 
relation to the geopolitical context of the coming decades. Understanding how the future may 
unfold enables policymakers to respond appropriately, particularly given the timeframes 
associated with some policy responses.  
1.2 Purpose of Study 
There are several approaches used in the literature and by governments to determine energy 
security and inform policy. Medium-term quantitative model-based energy scenarios are 
almost universally used to play out possible futures, options, and policy effects, and invariably 
focus on technical and energy-economic dimensions such as changes in demand and supply, 
greenhouse gas emissions, and supply costs.17 While these scenarios are often beneficial for 
comparative purposes, they are prone to oversimplifying the determinants of oil security. As 
Weimer-Jehle et al. observe: “Determinants of the energy future located outside the immediate 
energy system, such as demographic and economic developments, innovation dynamics, 
changes in public attitudes, social values and consumer behaviour are, despite their deep 
uncertainty in the long term, mostly treated as fixed framework assumptions.”18 This 
observation on the persistent exclusion of social parameters in establishing the context-
uncertainty of energy security scenarios equally applies to changes in the geopolitical 
environment. This brings into question the extent to which these conventional models can 
adequately inform sound oil security policymaking. 
Existing oil security reports that guide the New Zealand Government’s policymaking on oil 




17 Wolfgang Weimer-Jehle et al., "Context Scenarios and Their Usage for the Construction of Socio-Technical 




and do not assess or account for the potential impact of a changing geopolitical environment 
on risk, market operation or the performance of existing security policies. Perhaps more 
surprising is that there has been very little in-depth research examining the exposure and 
vulnerability of each element of New Zealand’s oil supply chain beyond its borders. In contrast, 
the Australian Government has highlighted geopolitical uncertainty as part of its justification 
for an ongoing review of its oil supply chain and the appropriateness of its policy settings,19 
given Australia’s dependence on specific regions for fuel supplies and potential exposure to 
disruptions.20  
Recognising the limitations described above, the purpose of this thesis is therefore to determine 
whether geopolitical uncertainty over the long-term is appropriately addressed within New 
Zealand’s current oil security assessments and policymaking. This purpose constitutes a new 
perspective with respect to New Zealand’s current oil security policymaking and policies, in 
that it adopts a long time-horizon in which it is accepted that significant geopolitical changes 
are possible. The findings of this study are intended to inform New Zealand’s oil security 
assessment approach through identification of issues and appropriate responses. This in turn 
will assist policymakers to make more nuanced assessments of future geopolitical risk, thereby 
strengthening the energy policymaking process. While this thesis is primarily oriented toward 
the domain of policy, it also seeks to advance the broader academic literature within the energy 
and oil security field, utilising an existing framework and findings from within the literature 




19 Australian Department of the Environment and Energy, Liquid Fuel Security Review: Interim Report, 58. 
20 Ibid., 42. 
21 This field of research is well established. See for instance: Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply 
Security and Geopolitics; Vlado Vivoda, "Diversification of Oil Import Sources and Energy Security: A Key 
Strategy or an Elusive Objective?," Energy Policy 37, no. 11 (2009); M Mohsin et al., "Assessing Oil Supply 
Security of South Asia," Energy 155 (2018); Bert Kruyt et al., "Indicators for Energy Security," in The 
Routledge Handbook of Energy Security, ed. Benjamin Sovacool (London: Routledge, 2011); Llewelyn Hughes 
and Austin Long, "Is There an Oil Weapon?: Security Implications of Changes in the Structure of the 
International Oil Market," International Security 39, no. 3 (2015). 
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1.3 Focus & Constraints of Study 
Energy systems are often described as having three core goals, or ‘pillars’: affordability, 
reliability and sustainability.22 Each of these pillars are central to robust energy policymaking. 
Moreover, these pillars are closely interlinked and policymaking may require trade-offs 
between them; improving one pillar often involves reducing performance in another. For 
example, implementing some energy reliability policies may negatively impact energy 
affordability, while energy affordability policies may run counter to sustainability goals such 
as reducing New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions. Policymakers must therefore strike a 
careful balance between these system goals. The domain of this study is limited to the pillar of 
reliability. Due to this singular focus, the findings should therefore be considered in the context 
of New Zealand’s broader energy-related goals.  
In this study, energy reliability encompasses security of oil supply and mitigation of risk. While 
a number of variables can affect oil supply security, this study focuses solely on risks to New 
Zealand’s external supply security arising from geopolitical events. Furthermore, the focus is 
not on quantifying or predicting those risks, but rather on exploring how some of the underlying 
assumptions in current oil security assessments and policymaking might be challenged by 
future geopolitical developments. Given the uncertainty and unpredictability of those 
developments, this study does not set out to prescribe a definitive policy mix for ensuring 
reliability of oil supply into the future.  
The findings and associated research of this study were concluded in early 2020. Since then, 
the world has been and continues to be impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. While the long-
term impacts of this event are still unclear, the pandemic and its associated effects could have 
a significant and long-lasting impact on the trajectory of global politics and the development 
path of global energy systems. As such, the relevance of this study’s conclusions may 




22 For more information, see: BusinessNZ Energy Council, New Zealand Energy Scenarios: Navigating Energy 
Futures to 2050 (BusinessNZ Energy Council, 2015), 11, 
https://www.bec.org.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/110309/BEC-Report.pdf; Erik Gawel et al., Political 
Economy of Safe-Guarding Security of Supply with High Shares of Renewables: Review of Existing Research 





1.4 Research Question 
Consistent with the purpose and focus outlined above, this study seeks to answer the 
following broad question: 
How might changes in the geopolitical environment affect the efficacy of New 
Zealand’s current oil security assessments and policies out to 2040? 
1.5 Definitions 
Throughout this study, a number of technical terms are frequently used, sometimes 
interchangeably. For the sake of clarity, key terms are defined below.   
Petroleum [technical term for oil or crude oil]: a naturally occurring liquid hydrocarbon 
found beneath the earth’s surface. Petroleum and oil are used interchangeably throughout 
this report. 
Petroleum industry [also oil industry]: the global exploration, production, transportation, 
storage, refining and distribution of crude oil and oil products. 
Oil products: a diverse range of distinct products refined from petroleum; includes petrol, 
diesel, plastics, asphalt and fertiliser.  
Oil security [also security of oil supply]: “…the uninterrupted availability of [oil] at an 
affordable price.”23 In the context of this study, possessing oil security refers to nations that 
are not at risk of experiencing physical supply constraints or significant and damaging price 
movements.  
Oil crisis: situation where in the short term there is either: 
i. disruption of oil supplies and/or sudden price increases that have significant 
economic effects on consumer countries; or 
ii. supplies are suddenly greatly expanded resulting in a drastic price decline that 
has significant economic effects on producer countries. 
Prolonged price collapse can put the continuity of national energy systems at stake, 




23 IEA, "Energy Security," accessed 6 June, 2018, http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/. 
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producer nations that see export and government revenues fall below sustainable 
levels.24 
Risk [to oil security]: likelihood of adverse events affecting continuity of oil supply. Risk 
results from the interaction of exposure and vulnerability to such events.  
Geopolitical risk [to oil security]: a change or deterioration in the international political or 
economic order, or part of that system, that threatens availability and affordability of oil 
supply.25  
Dependence: reliance on external sources for oil supply. 
Exposure:  Being exposed to events that have the potential to affect continuity of oil 
supply. 
Vulnerability: propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected by disruption to oil 
supply; includes concepts of susceptibility to disruption and capacity to cope and adapt.  
Volatility: significant instability in oil prices for suppliers as well as consumers. Volatility 
confuses or inhibits investment.26 
1.6 Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 2: Methodology & Method 
This chapter presents the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of this study. It describes the 
qualitative methods used and introduces the narratives about alternative futures that are adopted 
in this study. Finally, a policy instrument-based analytical framework to guide secondary data 
analysis is presented. 
PART I: PRESENT 
The first part of this study focuses on the geopolitics of oil security in the present day, both at 




24 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 36. 
25 Ibid., 84. 




Chapter 3: Geopolitics and Global Oil Security 
The geopolitics of global oil supply is explained in this chapter. The oil supply chain is 
described sector by sector, and the nature of global oil markets analysed. The chapter then 
discusses the inherent exposure and vulnerabilities of nations to geopolitical supply disruption 
in the supply chain and markets. 
Chapter 4: New Zealand’s Oil Security 
This chapter describes New Zealand’s present-day dependency upon oil. It follows with an in-
depth examination of the country’s reliance upon oil exporting nations and vulnerabilities in 
the upstream, midstream and downstream segments of its oil supply chain. The risks associated 
with these factors are shown to be fundamental to the level of reliability of New Zealand’s oil 
supply system. The implications for government policy are also introduced.  
Chapter 5: Security of Oil Supply Policy 
This chapter revisits the policy instrument component of this study’s analytical framework. 
Core instruments are described in relation to security of oil supply objectives, with particular 
emphasis on those most relevant to New Zealand. Finally, the chapter discusses the potential 
geopolitical consequences of nations adopting either a market-based or strategic approach to 
their oil security objectives.  
Chapter 6: New Zealand’s Current Security of Oil Supply Policy 
This chapter examines New Zealand’s primary reliance upon a particular policy instrument to 
maintain its oil security. The current government approach to assessing oil supply security and 
the links to its adopted policy mix are described. The chapter then discusses the underlying 
core assumptions of these assessments in detail and argues the implications for the efficacy of 
present-day oil security policymaking.  
 PART II: FUTURE 
The second part of this study focuses on the significance of the geopolitical environment in oil 
security out to 2040 and the implications for New Zealand. 
 
Chapter 7: Oil Demand and Supply Forecasts 
This chapter explores global energy forecasts from leading international and domestic 
organisations out to mid-century. It identifies likely changes in oil supply and demand at 
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international and New Zealand scales. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the oil 
security implications of global energy system mega-trends.  
Chapter 8: Geopolitical Storylines and Policy Options 
The study’s full analytical framework is applied. The chapter examines a contrasting pair of 
possible future geopolitical environments, and how these might influence security of oil supply. 
The chapter then discusses the efficacy of a range of policy instruments in relation to these 
futures, along with the implications for oil security assessments and policymaking.   
Chapter 9: Discussion 
This chapter integrates the findings of the previous chapters. The complexity of oil security is 
integrated with geopolitical uncertainty to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of New 
Zealand’s current approach to oil security assessments and policymaking. Potential 
enhancements and improvements for future oil security resilience are discussed.  
Chapter 10: Conclusion 
The final chapter revisits the research question, reflecting upon the research undertaken and 
the study’s findings. It then presents a schedule of recommendations for improving security of 
oil supply assessments and policymaking. Limitations of the study and opportunities for further 






2 Methodology & Method 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether geopolitical uncertainty is appropriately 
addressed within New Zealand’s current oil security assessments and policymaking. This 
necessarily involves analysis of the assessments and policies themselves in relation to a range 
of possible geopolitical contexts over the next two decades. Maintaining rigour in that analysis 
requires the researcher to inhabit those future contexts in a logically consistent and systematic 
manner. Achieving this requires that any future study be underpinned by relevant theoretical 
and conceptual frameworks. These frameworks in turn require the application of appropriate 
research methods and tools. The methodology and method that inform the assessment central 
to this study is introduced next. 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Theoretical & Conceptual Frameworks 
Addressing the research question requires an understanding of the future - or futures. 
Inayatullah maintains this understanding must be built on cogent theoretical and conceptual 
frameworks. He identifies four theoretical approaches as being crucial to studying the future. 
This study adopts the qualitative ‘interpretive’ approach, which is based upon understanding 
competing images of the future, not forecasts of the future.27  
Progressing from this theoretical framework, Inayatullah presents the ‘Six Pillar’ conceptual 
framework for understanding the future. The fifth pillar, ‘Creating alternatives’, along with its 
most important method, scenarios, is consistent with the purpose of this study.28 
2.3 Methods 





27 Sohail Inayatullah, "Futures Studies: Theories and Methods," in There’s a Future: Visions for a Better World, 





Scenarios are the most commonly used descriptive method for creating a picture of how events 
may unfold in the future. Different types of scenarios are used for different purposes, and it is 
therefore important to identify the most suitable type for framing the analysis in this study.  
Börjeson et al introduce a typology comprising six types of scenario distributed evenly across 
three categories. The categories are based on three principal questions that may be posed about 
the future: 
i. Predictive scenarios answer the question ‘What will happen?’ 
ii. Explorative scenarios answer the question ‘What can happen?’ 
iii. Normative scenarios answer the question ‘How can a specific target be reached’?29 
This study explores New Zealand’s oil security in the context of ‘what can happen’ to the 
geopolitical environment. Explorative scenarios should therefore be used to examine possible 
geopolitical futures.  
Explorative scenarios typically adopt different perspectives to explore future situations or 
developments considered to be possible. Explorative scenarios play out over long time-
horizons “…to explicitly allow for structural, and hence more profound, changes”30, and are 
well-suited to situations where the functioning of a system is well understood, but the 
consequences of alternative developments may not be.   
Explorative scenarios are of two types: 
i. External scenarios answer the question ‘What can happen to the development of 
external factors?’ 
ii. Strategic scenarios answer the question ‘What can happen if we behave in a certain 
way’?31 
Typically qualitative in approach, external scenarios are consistent with the purpose of this 
study in that they focus solely on factors beyond the control of the affected entity; in this case, 




29 Lena Börjeson et al., "Scenario Types and Techniques: Towards a User's Guide," Futures 38, no. 7 (2006): 
726. 




incorporate policies, but instead provide a framework for developing and assessing policies 
and strategies.32 Therefore, qualitative external scenarios were deemed the most suitable 
scenario type for this study.  
Several methods are used for developing qualitative external scenarios, with storylines - or 
scenario storylines - the most commonly used.33 Storylines are qualitative narratives that 
describe how events may unfold in the future, and the consequences of those events. They are 
frequently used to explore global scale change in fields such as climate change,34 biodiversity 
loss,35 and energy markets.36 While storylines do not incorporate quantitative variables, they 
provide a descriptive framework upon which quantitative explorative scenarios can be 
subsequently developed. This study uses scenario storylines. 
Developing scenario storylines typically involves a facilitated process that brings subject 
matter experts and multiple stakeholders together to engage in an iterative elicitation of 
different futures.37 Conducting such a process was beyond the constraints of this study, 
necessitating the use of pre-existing storylines to imagine contrasting geopolitical futures. 
Consequently, this study adopts and adapts storylines developed by Van der Linde et al. in 
Study of Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics,38 a notable and frequently cited report within 
the energy security literature.  
2.3.2 Document Analysis 
This study constitutes secondary research. It involves the collation and synthesis of a diverse 
and large number of qualitative and quantitative source documents. Documents are logically 
and systematically analysed using the analytical framework described in this chapter to produce 
a descriptive narrative about the nexus of oil security and the geopolitical environment in 






34 Nebojša Nakićenović et al., IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES), Working Group III, 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
35 The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, "Storylines or 
Scenario Storylines," accessed 25 April, 2020, https://ipbes.net/glossary/storylines-or-scenario-storylines. 
36 Van der Linde et al., "Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics,” 
37 Mark D. A. Rounsevell and Marc J. Metzger, "Developing Qualitative Scenario Storylines for Environmental 
Change Assessment: Developing Qualitative Scenario Storylines," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate 
Change 1, no. 4 (2010). 
38 Van der Linde et al., "Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics,” 
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This study analyses various oil security assessments, along with additional relevant supporting 
and explanatory texts such as government policy briefs and white papers, commercial forecasts 
and strategies, and academic papers and presentations.   
2.4 Analytical Framework 
An analytical framework is adopted to inform the secondary research. The framework 
comprises two core components: storylines and policy instruments.  
2.4.1 The Storylines 
Van der Linde et al.’s Study uses two storylines, each describing alternative geopolitical 
futures, to assess the effectiveness of European Union (EU) security of supply policies in 
relation to other countries and regions.39 The storylines were developed in 2004, looking 
forward to 2020. While many of Van der Linde et al.’s specific findings are not relevant to this 
study given their focus and date of publication, the report’s storyline logic nevertheless 
underpins a valuable and largely unchanged explanation of general state behaviour within 
different geopolitical contexts.  
Scenario storylines describe the qualitative assumptions about the underlying causes - or 
drivers - of change. The assumptions and relationships between different drivers in a storyline 
are organised and described in a ‘logic.’ The storyline logic brings order and internal 
consistency to a diversity of issues and variables, thereby enabling structured comparisons 
between different narratives.40  
The storylines’ logic in Van der Linde et al.’s study is based upon the following qualitative 
assumptions about the drivers of change in oil security: increased global oil and gas 
consumption; greater importing of the resources; and concentration of supplies in a few 
countries.41 The relationships between these drivers differ across the two storylines in two 




39 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics. A condensed and slightly updated 
version of this report was published as a journal article by Aad Correlje and Coby Van der Linde, "Energy 
Supply Security and Geopolitics: A European Perspective," Energy policy 34, no. 5 (2006). Both of these papers 
shall be drawn from to form the scenarios used here. 
40 Rounsevell and Metzger, "Developing Qualitative Scenario Storylines for Environmental Change 
Assessment: Developing Qualitative Scenario Storylines," 609. 
41 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 82. 
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coordinating device for industry and state behaviour in relation to supply and demand in the 
oil sector; and the scale of the geographical areas these coordinating devices encompass.42  
Since the 2004 release of the Study of Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics and the arrival 
of its 2020 time-horizon, significant geopolitical events have occurred, including notable 
changes in the main oil producer and consumer countries. Yet despite these events, the logic 
of the scenario storylines as originally developed is deemed still viable today for imagining 
how the major geopolitical actors will act in the face of a potentially more concentrated market 
for oil out to 2040.43  
The two storylines are predicated upon the accepted relationship between the political and 
socio-economic order, and in part reflect contrasting ideas posited within international relations 
theory.44 The first storyline, Markets and Institutions, sees an intensification of globalisation 
and cooperation within international political and economic institutions. The second storyline, 
Regions and Empires, sees the world divided into integrated political and economic blocs with 
satellite regions, competing for markets and resources. In other words, the storylines can be 
represented as occupying either end of a theoretical continuum45 in order to explore the 
spectrum of possible impacts from broader geopolitical changes. The storylines are revisited 
in more detail in Chapter 8. 
It is worth noting that these storylines have parallels in present-day reports from two global 
energy institutions. The scenario used by the IEA in its market forecasts closely resembles the 
Markets and Institutions storyline. In contrast, the World Energy Council’s (WEC) newly 
developed ‘Hard Rock’ scenario is more aligned with the reality portrayed in the Regions and 
Empires storyline. Arguably more reflective of current circumstances, the WEC scenario is 




42 Ibid., 85. Van der Linde et al. note that “…a mixed system in which a government coordinates its (security) 
interests with private companies is also possible. However, this will be a local variation within a wider, global, 
context in which either ‘the market’ or the ‘state’ is the dominant coordinating devices of the economy.” 
43 Correlje and Van der Linde, "Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A European Perspective," 536; Van 
der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 82-86. As noted in this research, the 
international economic and political system is influenced by national, inter and intra governmental and non-
governmental organisations and institutions. However, this study primarily focuses on the role of states. 
44 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 84. The authors note that Markets and 
Institutions to some extent reflects the regime building concepts of Joseph Nye, while Regions and Empires 
partly reflects the neo-realist concepts of state-security centred competition for power. See: Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 
Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Kenneth N. Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 
45 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 84. 
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2.4.2 The Policy Instruments  
A key purpose of the storylines is to enable an assessment of the effectiveness of different oil 
security policy instruments under widely divergent geopolitical contexts. Van der Linde et al. 
identify 21 different instruments available to state actors. They then categorise these policy 
instruments according to four security of oil supply objectives to provide a policy assessment 
framework. The categories are: 
i. Prevention - creating a political environment where there are fewer grounds for oil 
supply disruptions; 
ii. Deterrence - preventing or deterring producer states from disrupting oil supplies for 
political reasons; 
iii. Containment - reducing the impact of an oil supply disruption on national security and 
the economy; 
iv. Crisis Management - mitigating harm during an oil supply disruption. 
Specific policy instruments may help to achieve several oil security objectives.46 A more 
detailed description and discussion of the predominant policy instruments is provided in 
Chapter 5. 
2.4.3 The Analytical Framework 
Following Van der Linde et al., this study integrates the core components of storylines and 








Figure 1: Analytical Framework.47  
Figure 1 shows a graphic representation of the final analytical framework used in this study. 
The framework illustrates the distribution of oil security policy instruments across the four oil 




47 Adapted from Van der Linde et al., p.115. 
 
 24 
2.5 Summary  
The methodology for a ‘future study’ requires consistent and cogent theoretical and conceptual 
foundations. Understanding competing images of the future is central to this study, and 
scenarios are identified and adopted as the theoretically consistent method for generating these 
futures. From a typology of scenarios, this research selects explorative external scenarios in 
the form of storylines as the specific qualitative approach most consistent with answering the 
research question.  Two storylines with a shared organising logic provide the contrasting future 
geopolitical contexts necessary for this research to be undertaken. These storylines are 
combined with four oil security objectives to create an analytical framework. This framework 
constitutes the analytical tool used in this study to undertake a rigorous assessment of 
secondary data sources. It will be used to produce a qualitative narrative on the efficacy of New 




3 Geopolitics and Global Oil Security  
3.1 Introduction 
The geopolitics of oil stems from the supply-demand balance between countries active in the 
petroleum sector. This balance not only influences energy security and the military strength of 
world powers, but also exporter-importer power relations.48 This power is rooted in the reliance 
of net oil importing countries upon oil exporting countries for uninterrupted supply of oil at an 
affordable price, and the consequent vulnerability to economic and social harm from 
disruptions to that supply.49 For net oil importing countries, it is these two inter-linked concepts 
of oil exposure and vulnerability to oil supply disruptions that form the basis for oil security 
concerns.50 The geopolitics of global oil supply is addressed below.  
Petroleum is the most traded commodity by value in the world, and the largest single source of 
energy at 32% of global total primary energy supply (TPES).51 The size of the crude oil market 
is substantial; global oil demand averaged 97 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2018,52 a volume 
equivalent to 15.4 billion litres per day. As with other commodities, a mature and expansive 
petroleum industry meets this demand, with oil production occurring across the globe, and 
petroleum exploration and production companies alone numbering in the hundreds. However, 
from a geopolitical perspective the global supply of oil has a unique combination of constraints 
that differentiate it from other commodities.  
Firstly, oil demand is inelastic in the short term; it is difficult for consumers to reduce demand, 
making a country’s consumption largely unresponsive to changes in price. Secondly, oil is 
extracted from underground, and if available production or supply is insufficient to meet 
demand, production capacity cannot immediately be increased to meet the shortfall; production 
only becomes flexible in the long term. Finally, unlike many other strategic resources, 




48 Indra Overland, "Future Petroleum Geopolitics: Consequences of Climate Policy and Unconventional Oil and 
Gas," in Handbook of Clean Energy Systems, ed. J. Yan (Wiley, 2015), 1. 
49  Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 86. 
50 Bassam Fattouh, How Secure Are Middle East Oil Supplies? (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2007), 7, 
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d8bd3302-c023-49aa-bcf8-3d6b94a183c4/. 
51 2017 TPES Figures.IEA, World Energy Balances Overview 2019 (IEA, 2019), 5, 
https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/8bd626f1-a403-4b14-964f-
f8d0f61e0677/World_Energy_Balances_2019_Overview.pdf. 
52 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2019, 129. Oil volumes are typically measured in barrels. A barrel converts to 
approximately 159 litres. 
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oil. The ability to stockpile oil is limited by a number of factors, including the high cost of 
storage infrastructure and the sheer quantity of oil countries would have to stockpile to cover 
demand over the long-term.53 
The above constraints do not necessarily pose concerns for states in and of themselves if each 
were capable of meeting their own demand through domestic production. However, unlike 
manufactured goods, geology determines where oil is produced. Furthermore, that geology is 
not uniformly distributed around the world, with oil production and reserves concentrated 
within certain countries and regions. As a result, some countries, notably in the Middle East, 
are able to produce oil relatively cheaply and at levels surplus to requirements. Conversely, 
some of the largest consuming countries do not have sufficient quantities of economically 
recoverable oil reserves to meet their domestic demand, and therefore must rely on oil imports 
from these surplus producers.54 Consequently, if a major supply source were to be disrupted 
the effects would be felt widely. As Gholz and Press illustrate, “…the immediate effect of a 
major supply disruption in the [Persian] Gulf would leave one or more consumers wondering 
where their next expected oil delivery will come from.”55  
Given the above realities, much of the discussion surrounding oil and geopolitical risk to oil 
security centres on oil production. However, production is only one sector of the first link of 
the oil supply chain, and each link and the sectors within must function for supply to reach 
consumers.  
3.2 Geopolitics and the Oil Supply Chain  
The physical oil supply chain encompasses all the activities of the petroleum industry. It is 
commonly described as comprising three broad but distinct inter-connected market links or 
 




53 Anand Toprani, "A Primer on the Geopolitics of Oil," War on the Rocks, 17 January 2019, 
https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/a-primer-on-the-geopolitics-of-oil/. 
54 Overland, "Future Petroleum Geopolitics: Consequences of Climate Policy and Unconventional Oil and Gas," 
1. 
55 Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, "Protecting  ‘the Prize’: Oil and the U.S. National Interest," Security 
Studies 19, no. 3 (2010): 457. 
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segments: upstream, midstream and downstream. Each segment in turn comprises two core 
industry sectors as shown in Figure 2. At the beginning of the supply chain is the upstream 
link, covering core sectors of oil exploration and its subsequent production from underground 
via drilling and extraction. This is followed by the midstream segment, which includes the 
international transportation and storage of crude oil. Finally, the downstream link includes the 
refining sector, where crude oil is transformed through various processes into usable products 
for distribution to the final consumer.56   
Each of these links is vital for the oil supply chain to function, and each sector has its own 
substantial and established global market, such that the oil industry overall comprises multiple 
markets for related goods and services. Each of these sectors across all links have proven to be 
vulnerable to disruption by geopolitical events to a greater or lesser degree. These geopolitical 
disruptions to the oil supply chain are examined here, link by link. 
3.2.1 Upstream Geopolitical Disruption 
The potential geopolitical causes of oil supply disruption discussed within the literature 
frequently focus on the production sector of the upstream supply chain segment. This focus is 
not only because of oil importers’ reliance on certain countries and regions for supply, but also 
because of the level of state control and interference within the upstream sector. This 
interference is possible because the vast majority of global oil reserves are controlled by nation 
states and their national oil companies (NOCs), rather than by the private sector. A 2010 World 
Bank report estimated that 90% of proven57 oil reserves are controlled by NOCs.58 Some of 
these NOCs are for the most part autonomous and operate like private companies, but many of 
the largest have strong political and strategic links to their governments. Consequently, they 
are often subject to significant government interference and do not necessarily pursue market-




56 The oil supply chain can be further separated into smaller constituent sectors. For the purposes of simplicity 
and relevance to this research, discussion is organised herein around the major supply sectors and supply chain 
links. Due to the limitations of this research, risk to domestic distribution is not examined here.  
57 Proven oil reserves are generally considered to be quantities that information indicated with reasonable certainty 
exists and can be extracted from known reservoirs under existing operating and economic conditions: BP, BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2019 (BP, 2019), 14, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-
sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2019-full-report.pdf. 





Furthermore, the global oil market is dominated by the world’s largest oil producing and 
exporting nations. Few in number, these nations wield disproportionate influence over supply, 
with many coordinating their influence through membership of an international cartel - the 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).60 Each of the 13 OPEC member 
nations61 has at least one NOC,62 with OPEC countries collectively accounting for 42% of 
global crude oil production and 72% of global oil reserves in 2018.63 The six Middle East 
member countries alone account for three quarters of OPEC production and two thirds of its 
reserves.64 While OPEC members do not dominate the market to the extent that they have in 
the past, collectively member states nevertheless still hold significant market power over 
supply and prices. OPEC’s objective has been to manage members’ production to maintain oil 
prices at desired levels through production quotas or by utilising its spare capacity.65 The cartel 
also acts collectively to coordinate and unify policies that determine the pricing of oil, as well 
as coordinating with notable non-OPEC oil exporters to ensure steady revenues and 
effectiveness of policy choices.66  
The sizeable role of NOCs and OPEC within the global oil market show that, unlike many 
other commodities, oil supply is not simply a function of demand. Political and strategic issues 
play a significant role in how the oil market operates.67 The global price for oil is not just 
shaped by cost of production; rather, it is a market distorted by the decisions of the governments 
of producer countries. In other words, the global oil market is “…strongly influenced by ‘rent-




60 This organisation was initially formed as members wanted greater control over their oil industries and oil export 
incomes. See: Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 71. 
61 Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates, Venezuela. 
62 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, 14. OPEC puts their share of proven world oil reserves at 
closer to 80%: OPEC, "Oil Data: Upstream," accessed 1 April, 2020, https://asb.opec.org/index.php/interactive-
charts/oil-data-upstream. 
63 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, 15-16. 
64 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2019, 141; OPEC, "Oil Data: Upstream." 
65 Member countries recognise that it is also not in their interest to have prices increase to levels where global 
economic growth is harmed. The organisation’s stated aim is to provide a steady supply of oil to consumers while 
ensuring prices remain at a level which provides a steady revenue for producers: OPEC, "Our Mission," accessed 
20 April, 2020, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm. 
66 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 73. This larger group is collectively 
referred to as OPEC+ and notably includes Russia, the world’s second largest net-exporter. 




Given the upstream realities highlighted above, geopolitical causes of supply disruption often 
of greatest concern include: oil exporting countries restricting access to their resources to 
coerce importers into concessions or for ideological reasons - i.e., using the ‘oil weapon’; 
conflict or instability reducing production or harming an exporter’s oil sector over the long 
term; and other countries imposing sanctions or embargoes on key oil exporters.69  
Geopolitical disruption of upstream sectors can be driven by the internal context of producer 
countries, or by their external agendas and objectives. 
Internal Drivers of Supply Disruption 
Disruptions to the oil supply chain can arise from instability or conflict within producer states 
affecting exploration or production. Perversely, the presence of oil resources and production 
potential can itself be a factor influencing the degree of instability within a country,70 with 
scholars often interlinking oil with civil unrest and intra-state conflict.71 Conflicts over oil and 
gas exploitation more commonly arise in countries where oil is the principal source of income, 
and where exploitation of the resource has not delivered the expected level of welfare to the 
citizenry.72 Disputes over the control of oil and gas resources are also often present within 
conflicts involving economic struggle, ethnic and religious hostility, and political 
competition.73 Political instability within oil exporting countries therefore threatens security of 
supply, with civil wars, terrorism and local conflicts having often caused temporary damage to 
energy infrastructure and facilities.74  
These same political economic structures can also mean the stability of oil producing nations 




69 See for instance: Fattouh, How Secure Are Middle East Oil Supplies?, 9; Anthony H Cordesman and Khalid R 
Al-Rodhan, The Changing Risks in Global Oil Supply and Demand: Crisis or Evolving Solutions? (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 7-13, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/050930_globaloilrisks.pdf; Giacomo Luciani, Geopolitical Threats to 
Oil and the Functioning of the International Oil Market, CEPS Policy Brief no. 221 (Brussels: Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 2010), https://www.ceps.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2010/12/Policy%20Brief%20221%20Luciani%20Secure%20ed.pdf; Arianna Checchi, Arno 
Behrens, and Christian Egenhofer, Long-Term Energy Security Risks for Europe: A Sector-Specific Approach, 
CEPS Working Document no. 309 (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009), 3, 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1785.pdf. 
70 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 86. 
71 Jeff D. Colgan, "Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War," International Security 38, no. 2 (2013). 
72 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 86. 
73 Ibid. 




dependent on this single commodity for their export revenues. These states often have 
centralised government structures with immature political institutions and weak civil society, 
and to maintain support are pressured to spend oil revenues on benefits for the population or 
select groups, through subsidies, job creation, and other social programmes.75 Consequently, 
the ruling structures of these countries rely on oil prices being sufficiently high to fund 
socioeconomic welfare and ensure their long-term political survival.76 Therefore, to a greater 
or lesser extent the level of ‘rent’ that producer states seek for their oil is often determined 
more by state budgets than the cost of production. Furthermore, this need to retain oil revenues 
effectively constrains these states’ pricing flexibility.77 As Fattouh explains, low oil prices can 
deplete government revenues, inducing economic and social unrest and in turn resulting in 
production or supply disruptions.78   
The political economic structures of these countries also have the potential to negatively impact 
security of supply over the long term. Underinvestment in exploration and production projects 
by NOCs can often occur as a result of governments’ non-profit maximising priorities. NOCs 
operate as extensions of their respective governments or government agencies, and as such 
their access to capital may be determined more by government budgetary requirements than 
the financial viability of available investment opportunities.79 Furthermore, this can be 
compounded by a reluctance of a considerable number of oil producing countries to accept 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in their NOCs.80 Consequently, underinvestment by NOC’s 
has the potential to become a longer-term destabilising factor in the oil market.81  
Finally, while the internal drivers of production disruption discussed above may affect 
producer state actions, they can also influence the actions of external actors. For example, the 
wider oil industry’s willingness to invest in countries and regions with oil producing potential 




75 Correlje and Van der Linde, "Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A European Perspective," 534; Robert 
L Pirog, The Role of National Oil Companies in the International Oil Market (US Congressional Research 
Service, 2007), http://research.policyarchive.org/19433.pdf. 
76 Overland, "Future Petroleum Geopolitics: Consequences of Climate Policy and Unconventional Oil and Gas," 
9. 
77 Coby Van Der Linde, The State and the International Oil Market: Competition and the Changing Ownership 
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78 Fattouh, How Secure Are Middle East Oil Supplies?, 22. 
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80 Correlje and Van der Linde, "Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A European Perspective," 534. 
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considerations of political and social stability.82 Social and political issues, including elite 
power structures and widespread corruption can make these countries less appealing to 
potential FDI.  
External Drivers of Supply Disruption 
Compounding the above, internal instability can in some cases be closely interlinked with 
external instability.83 Internal instability and conflict, and the nature and degree of the state’s 
role in generating or responding to it, can lead to external supply disruption through the 
imposition of economic sanctions by other countries and institutions. Sometimes referred to as 
the ‘reverse oil weapon’, unilateral and multilateral sanctions have historically been widely 
used against oil exporting nations,84 with the effectiveness determined by the scale of 
restriction. Long-term production capacity can also be impacted if sanctions restrict FDI in 
these countries’ oil sectors over long periods.85 Past events show how energy resources 
including oil can create conflict, insurgencies and generate grievances, and in some cases such 
disputes can quickly turn into international economic or national security crises.86 For example, 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent intervention by the international 
community not only demonstrates the impact on production that interstate conflict between 
petrostates can have, but also the concern of oil importing countries at the idea of a single 
producer gaining oil market dominance.87 Fattouh notes that war and destructive events like it 
can have a dual impact on oil supply: damaging a state’s ability to produce or export oil in the 
medium to long-term, and hindering investment thereby impacting long-term productive 
capacity.88  
Direct conflict between states is not the only external driver of supply disruption. The most 
notable oil supply disruptions in recent history have been the result of deliberate reductions in 
oil supply to market from producer countries. The 1973 OAPEC oil embargo resulted in the 
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the ‘oil weapon’ - i.e., the disruption of oil supplies being used against them to achieve a 
geopolitical end - was an experience not to be forgotten. Consequently, the prospect of their 
vulnerability to supply disruption yet again being used as a political weapon against them is 
touted as a strong reason to reduce oil imports.90 However, the likelihood of the oil weapon 
being used, or its effectiveness given current market settings, is debated in the literature.91 
Although such action would likely reduce oil producers’ revenue, it is often argued that such a 
reduction would asymmetrically harm consumer states. Furthermore, suppliers can supposedly 
offset the reduction in income from reduced exports if the oil price increases sufficiently in 
response to the supply reductions, assuming exports are not completely stopped. Nevertheless, 
any deliberate reduction in exports from one or more large producers would have significant 
effects on supply. 
3.2.2 Midstream Geopolitical Disruption 
The possibility of damaging supply disruptions is not limited to the oil production sector of the 
upstream supply chain segment. The mid-stream sector of oil transportation is the essential 
common link between upstream production and downstream refining sectors and is also 
vulnerable to significant disruptions from geopolitical events.  
Oil is predominantly transported and distributed via two modes: pipeline and maritime tanker. 
The literature on security in this sector often focusses on countries with near total dependence 
upon pipeline transportation from a single producer nation; for example, land-locked central-
European countries dependent upon Russian oil exports transported directly or transiting 
through other states. This dependency upon pipeline infrastructure makes these nations 
particularly vulnerable to geopolitically driven supply disruptions such as sabotage, pipeline 
closures by transiting nations, or cessation of oil shipments by supplying countries.92 In 
contrast, countries that receive oil via maritime tanker shipments are not locked into a single 
source or single transportation route. These importers are free to source petroleum from 
multiple suppliers, and both exporters and importers can reroute their exports and imports if 
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with the geopolitical risks associated with pipeline delivery that transits through other states.93 
Given New Zealand’s total dependence upon tanker transport for its oil supply, only 
geopolitical disruptions of this mode are examined further.  
The size of the maritime petroleum tanker fleet is substantial: approximately 4,800 tankers 
equalling a combined capacity of around 500 million deadweight tonnes,94 transporting over 
two thirds of global crude oil and refined product demand to every region on earth.95 Maritime 
petroleum tankers are separated into two categories: crude tankers and product tankers, with 
total capacity split approximately 70% and 30% respectively.96 Product tankers are generally 
smaller vessels with specially coated tanks to enable product transport. While product tankers 
can be reconfigured for crude shipments in times of capacity shortage, the same does not apply 
to crude tankers. Although petroleum products have traditionally been transported intra-
regionally, the shipping of product has become increasingly global.97 
Participants in the tanker industry include NOCs and transnational oil companies (TNOCs), 
specialised petroleum trading companies, and public and private companies shipping 
petroleum as a segment of their broader involvement in the shipping market. Each participant 
is also diverse in the number and mix of tankers they own or control;98 most shipping 
companies own approximately half their fleet, with the balance being chartered.99 It should be 
noted however that determining which party actually controls a tanker is notoriously difficult 
to discern, and that this may have implications for security of service during times of 
geopolitical turmoil. The nationality of the vessel’s owner may differ from the shipping 
company that charters it, and the ship itself may be registered in yet another country; over 70% 
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The above notwithstanding, transport of oil in the shipping sector is generally considered to be 
globalised.101 While some of the largest tanker fleets are controlled by state-owned companies, 
it is a highly competitive market with the top 30 tanker companies representing only 50% of 
market capacity, and the largest single tanker operator representing less than 4% of capacity.102 
At present, disruption related to any specific tanker market participant therefore appears 
unlikely. However, this is not to say that geopolitical events affecting specific market 
participants cannot affect the tanker transportation of oil. For example, the 2019 US 
sanctioning of four Chinese tanker operators - including  the world’s largest shipping company 
- for ignoring sanctions on transporting of Iranian oil exports103 led to a nearly 350% increase 
in oil shipping rates.104 Nevertheless, when examining tanker ownership, the commercial 
tanker market appears to have insufficient concentration of ‘control’ to confer the potential for 
a single actor to coerce others.105  
In contrast, the locations to which oil tankers must travel to pick up crude deliveries are largely 
concentrated close to where oil is produced. For nations dependent upon tanker delivery of 
their oil imports, security of oil transport is therefore necessarily dependent upon the security 
of international sea lines of communication (SLOCs) - the primary maritime supply routes 
linking oil exporters and refiners to importing countries. SLOCs can be disrupted by regional 
instability, non-state violence, and armed maritime conflict. Although the flexibility of 
maritime transport may allow oil tankers to avoid disruptions to SLOCs, vessels invariably 
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due to their strategic locations. The highly strategic nature of choke points arises from the 
inability of shipping to detour around them, or where doing so requires the use of significantly 
 
Figure 3: Oil Supply Chain Maritime Choke Points - Ranked by Daily Volume.106 
longer sea routes. Figure 3 shows the primary chokepoints of the global oil supply chain. 
SLOCs are especially vulnerable at choke points relative to the open seas due to the 
comparative ease with which a malign actor can use sea and land-based military assets on 
proximate coasts to disrupt shipping.107 For example, belligerent state actors may declare a 
blockade, a war zone or a maritime exclusion zone centred on a choke point.108 Non-state actors 
engaging in piracy and terrorism typically target choke points for the same reasons.109 Even 
temporary blocking of a chokepoint can result in significant increases in global oil prices.110  
Notable geopolitical disruptions to maritime transportation of oil have occurred in the past, 
often as the result of interstate conflict. The disruption to global oil supplies as a result of these 
events has at times been profound. The 1967 Six Day War between Egypt and Israel resulted 




106 Brett Wetzel, "Oil in Motion: Visibility into Crude Oil Transportation," (Breakthrough, 1 November 2019). 
https://www.breakthroughfuel.com/blog/oil-in-motion-visibility-into-crude-oil-transportation/. 
107 Tim Sweijs et al., The Maritime Future of the Indian Ocean (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2010), 
38, https://hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/HCSS_FI-13_09_10_Indian_Ocean.pdf. 
108 Gautam, "Mapping Chinese Oil and Gas Pipelines and Sea Routes," 604. 
109 Checchi, Behrens, and Egenhofer, Long-Term Energy Security Risks for Europe: A Sector-Specific 
Approach, 9. 




impacts on oil markets at the time, and permanent changes to maritime trading patterns.111 
Furthermore, while there is generally less risk on the open sea, tanker transportation is not 
immune from disruption away from SLOC choke points. The blockade of Japan during WWII 
led to nearly all the country’s tanker capacity being disabled or destroyed and its oil imports 
dropping to virtually zero.112 Therefore maritime transport – and choke points in particular – 
present a perpetual concern for oil supply security. 
3.2.3 Downstream Geopolitical Disruption 
Unlike the upstream exploration and production sectors, oil refining is not constrained to or 
concentrated in regions where oil reserves are present. Refineries are located in all regions of 
the globe, and this absence of high geographical concentration suggests that direct interruption 
of refining infrastructure serious enough to significantly reduce global capacity could only 
occur in the most extreme circumstances. 
Furthermore, global refining capacity is held under diverse ownership structures, and 
consequently disruptions arising from a concentration of supply in this sector appear unlikely. 
A 2015 assessment of concentration within each segment of the international oil supply chain 
finds that no state or firm in the refining industry is sufficiently large enough to impose a 
sustained reduction in supply of crude products on others, nor does the market exhibit cartel-
like behaviour such as that seen in the upstream sectors. Therefore, at present there is minimal 
potential for an oil refining market player or players to effectively coerce a state.113  
While a significant reduction in global oil refining capacity is unlikely, this does not mean that 
access to refining services is assured. For countries that import refined product as well as 
petroleum, delivery to the end consumer is reliant upon international transport. It is the 
potential for disruption in this midstream sector of the supply chain described earlier that 
represents the most likely geopolitically induced disruption to downstream supply chain sectors 
of refining and distribution. The above notwithstanding, it should be noted that while market 
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higher at times in the past.114 Although less likely considering current market conditions, a 
marked increase in concentration and state control of refining capacity could create additional 
oil security concerns. 
 
The above examination of the oil supply chain shows that geopolitical events can significantly 
disrupt oil supplies to states in a myriad of ways. Furthermore, those disruptions are not just 
limited to upstream sectors; they can also occur both midstream and downstream in the oil 
supply chain.  
3.3 Industry Response to Supply Disruption  
As already noted, the concerns of net importer states largely centre on their exposure and 
vulnerability to large disruptions in the production sector, and much less so with respect to 
disruptions in midstream and downstream sectors of the supply chain. Responses to disruptions 
are typically the domain of oil industry markets, but when disruptions become crises state 
intervention may be necessary. The capacity of markets to respond to disruptions is discussed 
below; state responses are discussed in Chapter 5.  
3.3.1 Petroleum Market Overview 
The structure of oil industry markets is fundamental to their ability to respond to routine 
disruptions. The petroleum market is both substantial and established. Market participants can 
sell and buy oil either via long-term supply contracts or through the spot market. Long-term 
contracts account for approximately two thirds of all exported oil, and tend to lock in supply 
and terms for two to five years.115 These contracts generally base their pricing on the prices 
reported in the spot market for crude or refined product.116 Spot markets provide for ‘on-the-
spot’ one-off trades of large physical consignments - or parcels - of oil for near-term 
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reliability and flexibility of supply.118 Crude oil futures markets operate in parallel with the 
physical market, providing market participants a means to manage pricing risk.119 
A complicating factor in the petroleum market is that crude oil produced across the world is 
not homogeneous; it comes in hundreds of different grades.120 The quality characteristics of 
the grade determine the difficulty of the refining process and the yields of the respective refined 
petroleum products, which in turn influences the market value of the oil grade. Select 
‘benchmark’ crude oils121 are regularly used as a pricing reference for other crude types. A 
further complicating factor is that trade in petroleum is paralleled by trade in petroleum 
products. There are also substantial and established commodity markets for each of the major 
refined fuels – petrol, diesel, and aviation turbine fuel – and product is readily available for 
purchase from refineries across Asia, the Middle East, North America and Europe. 
It is the size and maturity of the international crude and refined petroleum markets that makes 
them sufficiently robust to reliably balance global supply and demand, as well as provide a 
level of protection from disruption.122 It is for this reason that having access to a functioning 
international oil market is identified in some security reports as the best tool for maintaining 
oil security.123  
3.3.2 Petroleum Market Responses 
The maturity and global reach of the petroleum industry markets makes them highly capable 
of resolving most disruptions with minimal impact on consumers, negating the need for 
intervention by governments in nearly all circumstances. Disruptions occur regularly within a 
country’s oil supply chain but are usually small, such as a delayed tanker shipment. These more 
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industry is generally considered robust and mature enough to respond to most of these 
commonly occurring supply disruptions. For TNOCs importing fuel, penalty clauses in 
contracts and reputational risk incentivise reliability.124 In the event of a disruption in their 
supply chain, these companies use their global networks to source alternative supplies to 
minimise disruption. If a company cannot resolve a shortage using its own supply chain, it will 
enter into commercial arrangements with other suppliers to fill contracts.125  
While the size of disruption in any oil sector - especially production - is clearly an important 
factor in determining the extent and distribution of market impact, so too is the timeframe over 
which disruptions both emerge and endure. Sudden extended supply shortages in upstream, 
midstream or downstream sectors may be beyond markets’ capability to ameliorate before a 
crisis manifests in one or more countries. By contrast, disruptions that emerge over time may 
allow markets to adjust and adapt, avoiding the need for state intervention. In addition to the 
size and likely duration of the disruption, a main determinant relates to the ability of the market 
to meet the supply shortfall. According to Smith, the smaller the supply buffer is, the higher 
the likelihood that a large disruption will result in a situation where demand exceeds supply 
and oil buyers cannot purchase sufficient product.126 Therefore, the impact of a disruption to a 
notable extent depends on the availability of existing commercial inventories, and unaffected 
spare capacity.127 Spare capacity is considered a particularly important response mechanism, 
given its ability to compensate for disruption over longer time periods.128 Leiby and Bowman’s 
assessment of oil supply disruptions since 1951 supports this conclusion, finding that a key 
factor determining the duration of disruption and impact on price is not necessarily the 
disruption volume per se, but the availability of undisrupted excess production capacity and 
the willingness of suppliers to bring this production capacity online.129 The tightness of supply 
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3.4 Assumptions of Markets 
Conventional market economics asserts that the global balance of supply relative to demand 
largely determines the severity of price impacts generated by a disruption to supply.131 The 
greater the imbalance, the more severe the impact on prices will be. In the case of petroleum, 
this argument is based on the proposition that oil is a fungible good; oil from one location can 
be substituted with oil from another location. Additionally, the petroleum market is generally 
characterised as a globally integrated market – “…one great pool”132 or ‘bathtub’ of oil – rather 
than a large but unconnected network of buyers and sellers. This characterisation means that 
any additions to, or subtractions from, one part of the bathtub will affect the total pool and thus 
prices for all market participants, with oil flowing to the highest bidder. Balance between 
supply and demand is thereby restored. In summary, in a functioning ‘free’ market the global 
sum of oil demand relative to the global sum of oil supply largely determines the price of oil, 
with all buyers paying the same price once transport costs and crude quality characteristics are 
accounted for.  
This description of the petroleum supply chain and industry markets, and their 
interconnectedness in relation to supply security, can be regarded as constituting a widely held 
conventional economic perspective often adopted in oil security assessments, including those 
focussing on New Zealand.133 Inherent in this perspective is a fundamental assumption about 
the structural integrity of oil markets, and underlying assumptions about the physical 
characteristics of oil, and the constraints of oil logistics. The veracity of these assumptions is 
examined here. 
3.4.1 Integrated Oil Market 
A review of the oil security and energy economics literatures reveals significant and ongoing 
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asserts.134 Similar questioning of the integrated market assumption is also found in foreign 
policy discussions.135 The integrated and regionalised perspectives incorporate differing 
positions on which factors influence market responses to disruption, how they influence it, and 
to what extent. As such, whichever perspective is adopted has major implications for oil 
security and the importance of related policies.  
An integrated oil market operates as one great pool, where the source of oil is of no 
consequence and the price mechanism effectively resolves disruptions to supply. Any supply 
disruption would simply lead to higher prices for all, and the market would then provide all 
importing countries their desired demand at this higher price.136 For countries with open 
markets such as New Zealand, disruptions in an integrated oil market are therefore likely to be 
reflected through higher prices rather than physical shortages, given purchasers are able to bid 
as high as necessary to procure scarcer supply.137  Furthermore, an integrated market likely 
affects the overall distribution of impacts from any disruption. Gholz and Press argue that, 
compared to a fragmented oil market, countries’ oil security is enhanced by an integrated 
market. This is because supply adjustments are spread globally in response to a disruption, and 
markets, firms and consumers therefore have a greater ability to adapt than if adjustments had 
to be concentrated in a single country or region.138 Only in the most extreme circumstances 
would a country or countries experience a physical shortage of oil or prices reach unacceptable 
levels.  
The degree to which the oil market is integrated has implications for the efficacy of a state’s 
interventions in pursuit of increased oil supply security.  Devices such as long-term contracts 
between importers and exporters, increased supplier diversification, or procurement only from 
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where the source of oil is of no consequence.139 By extension, any country developing 
additional oil sources would be beneficial to its supply security only in that it increases supply 
for the global market, rather than to the country itself.  Similarly, the degree of market 
integration can also affect the efficacy of inventory sharing agreements. The more regionalised 
the market is, the less likely a large stock release from one country will have spill over benefits 
to other oil importing countries in different regions. Thus, the storage location of emergency 
petroleum reserves becomes more important.140 
Arguments in the energy economics literature supporting the case for an integrated global oil 
market often rely on quantitative comparisons of crude prices.141 In contrast, Chanis adopts a 
qualitative approach to critique oil market integration. His in-depth explanation of how, in 
practice, oil is physically traded on the market lends strong support to the notion that, at the 
very least over intermediate time periods, the petroleum market is not integrated.142  
Fungibility of Oil 
Chanis firstly points out that although there are elements of fungibility between some types of 
crude oil, petroleum cannot be considered fungible for practical purposes due to the variability 
in crude characteristics described earlier.143 This is because oil refineries are configured toward 
processing certain grades of crude, and it can take months or years for a refinery to convert to 
using different grades. As the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2019 notes: “Asian refineries are 
configured to use crude oil grades produced in the Middle East…If a sudden disruption in the 
Middle East were to occur, these supplies in theory could be replaced by increased output from 
other regions…Asian refiners could switch…but this would take time [and] would also require 
a careful assessment of a number of technical and economic factors.”144  
Furthermore, because the number of crudes currently produced and traded has increased 
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previous decades.145 Now constituting a large proportion of deliverable supply, these new 
crudes vary significantly by their processing characteristics and quality. As a result, they are 
not easily substituted except within the most advanced oil refineries. In circumstances where 
substitution is possible, there can nevertheless be undesirable changes in both the value and 
mix of the refined products yielded. Blending of different grades can alleviate some of these 
issues and allow refiners to use suboptimal crudes, but the significant differences in the types 
of crudes means that there are additional limitations on the crudes that can be blended and in 
what quantities. Similarly, while refined petroleum products can be considered more fungible 
than crude within a region, even then there are limits given differing product specifications 
between countries.146  
Conditional Trades 
Chanis also poses a further challenge to the notion of integrated oil markets by highlighting 
that states’ interference often impedes free trade between producers and consumers, and that 
these actions of major suppliers can drive regional fragmentation. This is particularly true of 
Saudi Arabia which has significant market power through its long-standing position as the 
largest player in the maritime trade of petroleum. It uses this position to further the Kingdom’s 
long-term interests by extracting the highest price from each customer rather than keep prices 
aligned between them and will often demand higher prices from some customers than from 
others. Furthermore, it will impose import destination and resale restrictions on its crude which 
enforces this selling approach, ultimately restricting market allocation mechanisms.147  
Constraint of Logistics  
Chanis further substantiates his claim that markets are more regionally fragmented than many 
believe by arguing that oil is neither as mobile nor cheap to transport as commonly 
suggested.148 While it is relatively cheap to transport oil by tanker, only about half of all crude 




145 Chanis, "Crude Oil Is Not Fungible, Where It Comes from Does Matter, and Global Markets Are More 
Fragmented Than Many Think." 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid., 147. 
148 Ibid., 146. 




much oil can be delivered to port, regardless of what price the oil would sell for.150  In addition 
to the above, oil supply and demand patterns generally change faster than changes in delivery 
logistics and pipeline infrastructure. These limitations of logistics can result in supply 
bottlenecks and inhibit producers and traders from shifting large volumes of petroleum between 
regions. This results in regionalisation of petroleum markets over intermediate time periods, in 
turn limiting the size of producers’ customer bases, and thereby affecting the price crude sells 
for. These logistics limitations do not mean a region is completely isolated from the global 
market, and can often be resolved over the long-term, but in the interim there can be significant 
differences in price dynamics between each market.151  
The above notwithstanding, the inherent flexibility of tanker transport means this midstream 
sector functions as an integrated market. However, like the upstream production sector, the 
supply of tanker capacity is inelastic in the short run.152 Consequently, scholars disagree on 
how effectively the tanker market would respond to a situation where an important sea lane 
had to be detoured, or what the subsequent impact on cost and capacity would be, but levels of 
spare capacity in the market would be a key determinant.153  
In addition, the limitations of logistics can result in price increases being unequally distributed 
during an oil supply disruption.154 The friction costs of an oil transaction – that is, the total 
direct and indirect costs associated with the purchase of a barrel of oil – include transportation 
and refining costs. Griffin notes that the friction cost differentials that contribute to price 
differences between crudes are minimal during stable market conditions, but that this is not 
necessarily the case during a disruption to oil supply. If a supply disruption requires crude to 
be shipped further from unaffected regions to consumer countries leading to shortages in tanker 
capacity, or disrupts the flow of particular crudes that a refinery’s configuration is optimised 
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Chanis concludes that the integrated market perspective is an oversimplification of physical 
market realities; oil is not fungible, nor is the petroleum market integrated.156 
3.4.2 Off-market Trades 
An additional reality of oil trading that also impedes allocation of supply between consumers 
is the phenomenon of off-market trading. As a result of some states’ policies, a significant 
portion of the world’s current oil production is not allocated through markets. While trades of 
this nature are opaque, Chanis estimates that 20% of oil traded in 2012 was done outside 
commodity markets. These quantities cannot be considered available for global consumption 
and consequently have no influence on market liquidity and oil price.157 While Chanis finds 
that this oil production bypassing the market has not had sufficient impact on trade volumes to 
substantially affect the liquidity of the market,158 this is but one more factor that can impact the 
free flow of oil. 
 
The above discussion suggests that the assumption about market integration - along with 
subordinate assumptions about the fungibility of oil and unconstrained oil logistics - are far 
from being givens, at least in the short run. This has significant implications for assumptions 
regarding oil security. The conclusion drawn is that the petroleum market tends toward 
fragmentation rather than integration, especially during large supply disruptions. Therefore, 
factors impacting cumulative global oil supply or demand levels do not determine the severity 
of a disruption on their own. This conclusion is supported by the IEA, which notes that the 
grade of crude oil lost to the market and associated logistics issues can play a role in 
determining the severity of a disruption.159 These other factors must therefore also be 
considered when determining the impacts of disruptions and the ability of market participants 
to adequately respond to them without state intervention. A fragmented market also means that 
in the event of a significant disruption, some oil importing countries or regions could be 
impacted disproportionately more than others, and instances of physical shortages become 
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The geopolitics of global oil supply can be understood through the lens of supply-demand 
balance. This balance constitutes the underlying dynamic of exporter-importer power relations, 
which are rooted in the reliance of oil importing countries on exporting countries and the 
exposure to harm or coercion arising from that reliance. This reality exposes the oil market and 
the global oil supply chain to geopolitically induced disruption, particularly the upstream 
production sector. The vulnerability of an importer state arising from this reliance is a function 
of the resilience of its entire oil supply chain. While oil sector markets are well able to respond 
to small-medium scale disruptions to production and supply and thereby maintain oil security, 
this is less the case as disruptions become larger and more enduring with complicating factors 
increasingly coming to bear. A robust assessment of a state’s external oil security therefore 




4 New Zealand’s Oil Security 
4.1 Introduction 
The security of a nation’s oil supply is a function of exposure and vulnerability throughout its 
entire oil supply chain. As discussed in the previous chapter, along with all net importer states, 
New Zealand’s reliance on foreign exporters exposes its petroleum and refined product supply 
chains to potential disruption within the upstream, midstream and downstream sectors. Any 
assessment of the efficacy of oil security policymaking therefore requires an understanding of: 
the significance of oil in a nation’s energy mix; the scale of reliance upon oil imports; and the 
nature and distribution of exposure and vulnerability within the supply chain that must be 
accounted for.  
Analyses using quantitative metrics are a common approach in the literature to compare a 
country’s energy and oil security with that of other countries.160 Most of these comparative 
studies assess the security of larger states or regional groups like the EU, although New Zealand 
has been a country examined at times.161 Studies of this type can be very useful in that they can 
focus on a particular aspect of security of supply to indicate a direction of change or relative 
position between countries.162 However, this approach is limited in its ability to determine a 
country’s objective level of security.  
Given the complexity and somewhat subjective nature of the problem, there is no agreed upon 
approach within the literature for measuring energy security, or oil security specifically. As an 
example of this complexity, Sovacool and Mukherjee identify 320 simple indicators and 52 
complex indicators across multiple fields that can be used to measure a country’s energy 
security.163 However, some variables that influence supply security, such as geopolitical 
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which to assign weightings to quantitative variables.164 Finally, and perhaps most importantly 
from a policymaking perspective, determining a country’s security of supply through indicators 
alone and in isolation from a country’s context inevitably leads to oversimplification.165  
Acknowledging the above limitations of quantitative analyses, this study adopts a different 
approach to describe the security of New Zealand’s oil supply. A review of the literature reveals 
there are sectors of the oil supply chain that are generally regarded as deterministic of a 
country’s oil security, and assessments at this scale are commonly qualitative or mixed method. 
Sector-specific variables that introduce risk into the supply chain include: domestic production; 
political stability of supplier states; resilience and diversity of transportation infrastructure; and 
domestic refinery capacity and flexibility. These elements are used below to frame an 
examination of New Zealand’s petroleum supply chain.  
4.2 Oil in New Zealand’s Energy Mix 
Demand-side indicators are metrics often used in relation to security of oil supply, as they are 
relevant for determining the impact of a supply shortage on a country’s overall energy 
supply.166 Metrics including the share of oil in the total primary energy supply (TPES), total 
final consumption (TFC) of fuel in an economy, and the transport sector’s share of total oil 
consumption are used here to illustrate New Zealand’s reliance on the uninterrupted and 
affordable supply of petroleum and refined products. 
New Zealand’s TPES167 has followed an upward trend over the last four decades, growing 21% 
between 2005 and 2015. In 2017, TPES reached 20.7 million tonnes of oil-equivalent 
(Mtoe),168 with oil and oil products accounting for 6.8 Mtoe, or approximately one third of this 
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Zealand’s  TPES over  the same  time period.170 However, total oil consumption continues to 
grow, and to date oil remains New Zealand’s dominant energy source.171 Oil products 
 
Figure 4: New Zealand energy supply and demand 2015.172 
accounted for approximately 45% of Total Final Consumption (TFC) in 2015 as shown in 
Figure 4.173  
New Zealand’s total oil demand is comparatively small on the global scale, with 2017 oil 
consumption of 6.8 Mtoe constituting just 0.15% of global consumption. This figure is dwarfed 
by the amount consumed by the largest consumer, the US, at 790.3 Mtoe.174 New Zealand’s 
overall per capita oil consumption is also relatively moderate when compared with other 
developed countries.175 Unlike some other countries, oil is not used as a fuel source within New 
Zealand’s electricity generation sector.176 By contrast, petroleum products meet virtually all 
energy demand within New Zealand’s transport sector, and also account for a notable 
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Mtoe of petroleum products were also supplied in New Zealand in 2017 for use in international 
maritime and aviation transport.178 New Zealand’s per-capita transport energy consumption is 
relatively high compared to other large energy consuming states. Of the 25 countries that make 
up the large energy user group index in 2014, New Zealand ranks poorly in transport energy 
use per capita beating only Canada and the US.179 As well as an energy intensive transport 
sector powered almost entirely by petroleum-based fuels, New Zealand also has one of the 
oldest and therefore least fuel-efficient vehicle fleets, combined with one of the highest vehicle 
ownership rates in the developed world.180 Petroleum product consumption is split 
predominantly between petrol and diesel, both at similar levels of total consumption, with 
aviation jet fuel/kerosene consumption a distant third place.181 Petrol is predominantly used in 
light passenger vehicles, whereas diesel consumption predominates within the commercial 
transport, agriculture, forestry and fishing, industrial, and commercial sectors.182  
As previously noted, oil demand is notoriously inflexible and price inelastic. New Zealand is 
no exception, with petrol, jet fuel and diesel consumption highly price inelastic.183 One study 
finds that New Zealand’s petrol demand is particularly price inelastic compared to many 
countries: a 100% increase in price would only result in a 10% reduction in demand over the 
short-term (1 year or less), and a 13% reduction over the medium term (2 years or more). These 
figures indicate that New Zealand’s consumers have a limited ability to reduce their fuel 
consumption when faced with significant price increases,184 and that influencing demand for 
transport fuel through price-based measures would be a difficult task.185 Samuelson notes this 
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to other countries, due to factors including limited public transport and cities less suited to 
walking and cycling.186  
New Zealand’s tourism export sector along with exports of bulk primary goods including dairy, 
meat, and timber all rely on affordable international transport. Smith argues that New Zealand’s 
dependence on these industries for a large portion of export earnings, coupled with its reliance 
on oil imports, makes the country highly vulnerable to oil price shocks.187 Another study comes 
to similar conclusions, finding that the country’s demand for oil imports is price-inelastic both 
over the short and long term, and that New Zealand’s economy is vulnerable to shocks in the 
world oil market.188 These figures show that oil is clearly a critically important energy source 
for New Zealand’s social and economic prosperity. 
4.3 Supply Chain Exposure & Vulnerability 
4.3.1 Upstream Exposure & Vulnerability 
Generally, domestically sourced oil is preferred over imports as this avoids geopolitical risks 
to supply.189 However, New Zealand has historically been a net-importer of oil, and while it 
does have some domestic production, the contribution of domestic oil sources to the country’s 
TPES has been relatively small. New Zealand has therefore always had to rely on imported oil 
to ensure security of supply.190 Notably, domestic oil production and self-sufficiency has been 
in decline, with self-sufficiency dropping from 44% in 2010 to 25% in 2019.191 Furthermore, 
while these figures are technically correct, they understate the extent of New Zealand’s import 
dependence. In reality, 99.5% of all petroleum produced in New Zealand was exported in 
2019,192 with domestic crude accounting for less than 1% of annual feedstock to the country’s 
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Domestically extracted crude is not generally used by Refining New Zealand (RNZ) at its 
Marsden Point facility because it is not an optimal feedstock for the refinery’s configuration.194 
The refinery is specifically configured for refining grades of crude oil from the Middle East, 
the longstanding primary source of New Zealand’s oil imports. Middle East crudes are 
predominantly medium API gravity195 with high sulphur content, otherwise known as 
‘medium-sour’ crude, whereas the oil extracted domestically has a relatively high API gravity 
with low sulphur content, or ‘light-sweet’ crude.196 Oil companies purchase crude oil based 
upon price and the quality, mix and yield of refined product that can be produced from each 
barrel – a combination of these factors is the reason why oil companies operating in New 
Zealand avoid purchasing domestic crude.197 Imported crude is thus essentially the only 
feedstock used at RNZ’s facility, while domestically produced crude is largely shipped 
overseas where it usually earns a premium on international markets.198 Greater domestic 
processing of New Zealand crude is therefore not commercially viable under normal market 
conditions. 
Under abnormal market conditions however, commercial viability may be less of a 
consideration. A 2005 assessment of New Zealand’s oil security notes that the refinery is 
capable of processing domestic crude in an emergency.199 While technically accurate that 
larger volumes of domestic crude could be refined, the crude’s characteristics nevertheless still 
present some limitations. New Zealand crude is high in petrol-making components but 
generally has poor cold properties for making diesel to New Zealand specifications. 
Furthermore, these cold properties restrict some grades of domestic crude to summer 
delivery.200 Therefore, to meet the nation’s transport requirements domestic crude must be 
blended with imported crudes possessing complementary properties and product yields. 
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requirements, it can be concluded that even in an emergency New Zealand’s oil self-sufficiency 
would be lower than current net import values suggest.  
Supply concentration 
As noted, refineries configured to use one type of crude are either incapable of refining other 
types of crude, or have the capability to do so but would entail economically sub-optimal 
 
Figure 5: New Zealand crude oil imports by origin (Mt).201 
operation.202 Refinery configurations therefore determine to a major extent which countries are 
viable suppliers, and thereby are an important determinant of a state’s resilience to supply 
shocks and ability to minimise the related costs.203 The crudes refined at Marsden Point come 
from numerous sources, with quantities purchased from producer countries varying each year. 
Figure 5 illustrates that New Zealand has historically sourced crude predominantly from the 
Middle East, and South-east and Central Asia, consistent with the Marsden Point refinery’s 
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Malaysia, Indonesia, the Russian Federation and Australia have been common sources of crude 
oil over the past two decades.204 Nevertheless, continuing this pattern, over the last five years  
 
Figure 6: New Zealand 2018 crude oil imports by origin (Mb).205 
more than half of annual crude oil imports have been sourced from countries in the Middle 
East, particularly the Persian Gulf countries.206 Furthermore, supplies  from  this  region have 
consolidated since 2015, with Figure 6 showing 76% of crude imports in 2018 coming from 
Gulf states.207 Notably, crude oil imports from Australia – New Zealand’s closest external 
source and once a prominent supplier – have fallen substantially over time, accounting for just 
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In the event of a major disruption to Middle East supply, petroleum sourced from other 
countries and regions can be used where available, but again New Zealand’s options are limited 
by the compatibility of the crudes these suppliers produce with the configuration of Marsden 
Point. RNZ reports that its refinery’s current crude diet is lighter than in the past, but the diet 
is still blended to be optimal for the existing facility. However, changing to an even lighter diet 
would require major investment in refinery upgrades that RNZ would struggle to justify on a 
commercial basis.209 Consequently, some lighter grades of crude on today’s market may not 
constitute suitable alternatives to the refinery’s usual feedstock. For example, the US might be 
considered an alternative source given the significant flows of ‘tight’ shale oil now being 
extracted within the country. However, many of these tight crudes are relatively light,210 and 
therefore may not constitute a viable alternative source of supply for New Zealand.211 
Therefore, like many other oil importing countries in the Asia Pacific, New Zealand remains 
highly dependent on supplies of Middle East petroleum. Thus, any sizeable disruption in 
exports from its suppliers in this region will have a comparatively large impact on the nation’s 
oil supply. While the internal stability of each Middle East supplier varies, the region as a 
whole has historically been unstable, with a number of the drivers of that instability still present 
today.212  
4.3.2 Midstream Dependency & Vulnerability 
Transportation 
As a geographically isolated island nation, New Zealand has a comparatively greater reliance 
on shipping within its oil supply chain than the global average. The integrity of New Zealand’s 
SLOCs is therefore critically important for the country’s security of oil supply and economic 
security overall. However, maritime trade is far from risk free, and threats to shipping such as 
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Flexibility of crude transport routes can be an important consideration when determining a 
nation’s supply security as it influences the ability of a state to mitigate some disruptions. With 
maritime transport, greater supply line flexibility is generally considered a security advantage 
as it allows disruptions to SLOCs to be managed by sailing different shipping routes.214 While 
modelling of responses to maritime transport disruption does not appear within New Zealand’s 
existing fuel security reports, the country’s island geography provides flexibility through 
greater choice of shipping routes. Open sea interdiction of petroleum or refined product bound 
for New Zealand waters would therefore be relatively difficult to achieve. However, while 
 
Figure 7: New Zealand crude and product supply.215 
New Zealand’s geography may offer flexibility in theory, in practice the nation’s dependency 
on sources of supply from the Indo-Pacific region means the diversity of standard transport 
routes is low. The majority of crude and refined product bound for the country travels via key 
shipping routes through the Indian Ocean as shown in Figure 7; a primary transit region for 
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Supply Chain Length 
The length of New Zealand’s petroleum transport routes is also of significance to its security 
of oil supply. New Zealand is geographically isolated and at the very end of global crude and 
refined product supply chains. Shipments departing from Middle East oil terminals take 
approximately 25-30 days to reach New Zealand, while crude and product shipments from 
South East and East Asia take 15-20 days.217 The length of New Zealand’s supply chain 
necessitates there be numerous vessels at any one time on route to New Zealand. In 2012, 
Marsden point required a vessel carrying 105-145 million litres every 7-10 days to meet 
demand.218  
From one perspective, shipments in transit could be considered additional crude and product 
reserves stored on the high seas. As such, in the instance of a significant disruption to exports 
from supplier nations, New Zealand may be one of the last countries to feel the effects, thus 
offering time to respond to a supply disruption. Conversely, it may take longer for supplies to 
recommence delivery to New Zealand once the disruption has been resolved. Moreover, it is 
also isolated from other countries that New Zealand might expect to receive additional supplies 
from in an emergency.219 Regarding crude or product on water as additional supply also requires 
there be no possibility these shipments could be interdicted or diverted to an alternate country 
en route - an assumption remaining to be tested.220 A longer supply chain may also mean a 
higher likelihood of supply disruption in certain circumstances,221 and an amplification of 
impacts if the maritime supply line itself is compromised. Regardless of whether stock on sea 
can be relied upon, it is clear New Zealand’s security of supply is largely predicated on 
uninterrupted functioning of the SLOCs through which the country sources the majority of its 
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remoteness and physical distance from its primary supply sources necessitates the country be 
highly resilient to sudden changes in supply and demand.222 
Chokepoints 
New Zealand’s imported petroleum and refined product transport routes contain a number of 
chokepoints, with the vast majority of imports transiting through either the Strait of Hormuz, 
the Strait of Malacca, or both. These chokepoints rank one and two in the world respectively 
in volume of oil transits, and thus are the most strategically important maritime chokepoints 
for petroleum transportation.223 Any partial or total closure of either of these Straits would 
therefore lead to significant interruption of New Zealand’s tanker shipments, and those of many 
other countries. Both chokepoints are highly vulnerable to disruptive attacks from state and 
non-state actors, including through terrorism or piracy.224 Furthermore, Tunsjø notes that the 
Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca are also vulnerable to collisions, oil spills or 
grounding – deliberate or otherwise – which could force either strait’s closure and interrupt oil 
shipments.225  
The Strait of Hormuz between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman is the largest chokepoint 
by volume of petroleum and refined product transit in the world, with the vast majority of 
exports from Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE passing through the Strait. 
Approximately 16 mb/d of crude and 4 mb/d of products shipped through the Strait in 2018,226 
accounting for approximately 30% of global maritime trade in these commodities.227 While the 
Strait at its narrowest point is 34 kilometres wide, the shipping lane in either direction is only 
3.2 kilometres wide.228 There has been a history of significant geopolitical incidents both in 
the Strait and the broader region, with the most recent noteworthy disruption to oil transport 
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Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be particularly disruptive, as unlike many other 
chokepoints there is no alternative shipping route. Any closure would therefore effectively trap 
in the bulk of Arabian Gulf producer exports and OPEC spare capacity.230 Alternative pipeline 
routes are available but their capacity only enables the transport of a fraction of the volumes 
that normally transit the Strait; pipeline capacity stood at 6.6 mb/d at the end of 2018.231 
Furthermore, only Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pipelines that bypass the Strait to the Red 
Sea and the Gulf of Oman respectively.232 The IEA estimates that in the event of a total closure 
of the Strait of Hormuz, 16 mb/d of oil would be blocked in even if all existing pipeline spare 
capacity was utilised.233 A petroleum supply disruption of this size would be almost three times 
greater than the largest global disruption to date.  
With three quarters of its petroleum imports coming from Gulf producers, any restriction of 
tanker shipments through the Strait of Hormuz would likely impact New Zealand’s supply. 
From a regional perspective, oil supplies to the Asia-Pacific would be particularly hard hit 
given that approximately 80% of the oil heading through this chokepoint is destined for the 
region.234 Were a significant disruption of oil flows through the Strait to occur for an extended 
period of time, the Asia-Pacific would also face particular difficulty regarding tanker capacity. 
As Mitchell notes, there would be logistical constraints to the shifts in trade required to respond 
to such a disruption, because alternative sources of oil from Africa and South America take 
longer to ship to the Asia-Pacific than from the Middle East. In addition, many tankers could 
be trapped in the Gulf and others might be in the wrong locations. The initial result would be 
a period of acute tanker capacity shortage before substitute oil supplies could be redirected 
from the Atlantic market, even in the case where the U.S. or Europe released emergency oil 
stocks.235 Therefore, given the importance of Gulf oil exports as a proportion of global supply, 
a closure of the Strait of Hormuz would lead to a severe spike in petroleum and product prices 
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The Strait of Malacca is the second largest oil trade chokepoint in the world, and at only 2.8 
kilometres wide at its narrowest point, generates one of the world’s largest maritime traffic 
bottlenecks.237 It is the shortest sea route between Arabian Gulf oil suppliers and Asian 
consumer markets, with approximately 16 mb/d of crude and petroleum products transiting the 
strait in 2016.238 Given their dependence on Middle East exporters, a significant proportion of 
crude used by the Asian refineries that supply petroleum products to New Zealand travels 
through the Strait. Compared to the Strait of Hormuz, the region surrounding the Strait of 
Malacca has been relatively stable. While piracy in the Strait has been an issue in the past, 
incidents have declined notably since the 1990s and 2000s as a result of intensive enforcement 
programmes by the region’s littoral states.239 In the broader maritime region there are ongoing 
tensions over competing territorial claims within the South China Sea, raising maritime 
security concerns.240 In recent years, tensions have risen further as a result of China’s land 
reclamation and island building activities in the area, and subsequent building and placement 
of military assets on the new landmasses.241 These developments are in addition to wider 
regional security issues,  such as Taiwan’s independence and a nuclear-armed North Korea.   
A disruption in the strait of Malacca poses less risk to New Zealand than a closure of Hormuz 
as there are several ways to circumnavigate it. However, tanker rerouting would result in longer 
journeys and thus shipping costs, which would be reflected in oil prices.242 By one estimate, a 
Malacca strait closure would lead to shipping times between the Middle East and East Asia 
increased by 4 to 16 days one-way depending on the alternative route available,243 and would 
result in much higher shipping costs.244 As a result, any disruption of maritime traffic within 
the Strait and surrounding area would add significant transport time and distance to New 
Zealand’s already lengthy petroleum and refined product supply chains. Rerouting around the 
Strait of Malacca would also tie up global shipping capacity, further increasing shipping costs 
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extreme scenario if shipping access to the South China Sea was restricted and tankers were 
forced to a detour around the Philippines.246  
In contrast to the above, fears of closure of either Strait through deliberate state actions are 
thought by some to be exaggerated, as most states have a shared interest in continual flows 
through them.247  Fattouh for instance notes that a closure of the Strait of Hormuz would only 
occur in the most extreme scenario, given the damage from a closure would be indiscriminate; 
all exporters would suffer. Moreover, if a state actor were to do so it would face alienation, 
retaliation or retribution from many consuming countries.248 But while states may have 
significant shared interest in maintaining trade flows through either chokepoint, non-state 
actors could also cause significant disruption, and the motivation of such actors engaged in 
piracy or terrorism could be very different.249 Moreover, despite a generally shared interest in 
freedom of navigation between nations, Neel and Barnes note that this does not mean that there 
is a consensus on how to cooperate to ensure this outcome.250 At present there remain 
significant and ongoing questions as to who should be responsible for maintaining SLOC 
security between the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and who should bear the costs.251  
4.3.3 Downstream Dependency & Vulnerability 
Refining 
Refining capacity is also regarded as a factor influencing oil security.252 As with crude oil 
import dependence, a lower reliance on other countries for refined product is considered to be 
a more secure position.  
RNZ’s Marsden Point refinery is generally considered capable of meeting the majority of 
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intake of 42.7 million barrels of crude oil equates to approximately 87% of nominal processing 
capacity.255 In 2018, the refinery produced 85% of the country’s jet fuel, 67% of diesel, 58% 
of petrol and all fuel oil for maritime vessels,256 with 2019 combined fuel product volumes 
equivalent to 70% of all fuel consumed in New Zealand.257  
The balance of demand is satisfied by imported refined product. The main suppliers in the Asia 
Pacific able to meet New Zealand’s quality standards are located in South Korea, Singapore, 
Japan and Taiwan,258  with refined product being predominantly imported from Singapore and 
Korea in recent years.259 Sourcing from Asian refineries as close as possible to New Zealand 
generally makes sense economically as this reduces shipping costs, but more distant locations 
can be economical from time to time.260  
The reason a portion of New Zealand’s fuel requirements are imported relate to the capacity 
and capabilities of the refinery and commercial decisions, but also because of the refinery’s 
ownership structure. RNZ is a tolling refinery company, charging a fee to process crude oil 
delivered to it by customer shareholders. Z Energy, BP and Mobil own a combined 65% stake 
in the refinery, with the remainder owned by the public. A processing agreement in place since 
the refinery was built dictates that only these three companies are entitled to take products from 
the refinery.261 This leaves New Zealand’s independent wholesaler, Gull, in the position of 
relying on imported oil products.262 All the refinery customers also meet some of their demand 
by directly importing finished product cargoes from refineries in Asia, and occasionally further 
abroad, when it is economical to do so.263  
Given that the majority of New Zealand’s demand is met by fuel refined domestically, 
disruption to overseas refining capabilities is less of a consideration for New Zealand than 
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suppliers to meet a much greater proportion of their refined product demand.264 Nevertheless, 
New Zealand imports a notable portion of its petroleum-based fuel needs. A significant 
disruption to refining within Asia could therefore have a sizeable impact on New Zealand’s 
product supply.  
A significant reduction in regional availability to refined product would almost certainly impact 
companies operating in the Asia-Pacific market in addition to oil companies operating in New 
Zealand, be it directly through loss of expected supply or indirectly through price spikes.265 In 
their assessment of Australia’s fuel supply chain, Hale & Twomey note that a higher price 
would incentivise product flows from other markets such as the Atlantic Basin or Europe, but 
Australian importing companies could experience a lag in availability particularly if there was 
a need to switch to new supply points.266 Companies operating in New Zealand would likely 
face a similar situation. In New Zealand’s case, refined products from some alternative sources 
may be usable but not meet New Zealand fuel specifications, and so may require certain 
specification requirements to be waived in an emergency.267 
Fuel importing companies operating in New Zealand therefore have options to procure refined 
product should a significant disruption to product supply occur. New Zealand’s ability to 
purchase from alternative sources and the level of price increase would depend on the scale of 
the disruption to regional supply, as well as the level of unaffected spare refining capacity 
available and spare capacity within the product shipping market.  
Regional uncertainties aside, the Asian countries from where New Zealand predominantly 
sources refined product are generally considered politically stable.268 Refining capacity in 
Japan, Singapore and South Korea is also split between multiple refineries. Sustained and 
significant loss of refining capacity in one or more of these countries would likely only occur 
in the most extreme circumstances. However, like Marsden Point, the vast majority of refinery 
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and often at levels higher than New Zealand.269 Many Asian refineries are configured to process 
grades of oil sourced from the Middle East, and would face difficulties in converting to using 
alternative grades.270 
4.4 Summary 
Despite consuming a moderate amount of oil per capita when compared to other developed 
countries, oil remains the dominant energy source within New Zealand’s energy mix. New 
Zealand’s domestically produced crude is not suited to the country’s current refining 
capabilities nor is it produced in sufficient quantities to satisfy national demand. New Zealand 
is therefore almost entirely dependent upon petroleum imports. The critical role that oil plays 
in New Zealand’s wellbeing and in conjunction with the country’s highly inelastic demand, 
leave it particularly vulnerable to oil price shocks and physical supply disruptions. New 
Zealand relies solely on the international oil market to source crudes in the volumes and grades 
required. While participation in this market offers access to multiple suppliers, New Zealand’s 
imports have historically been, and remain, heavily concentrated on Middle East producers. 
Consequently, New Zealand’s only refinery is specifically configured for Middle East 
petroleum grades, as are the refineries in Asia from which the country sources refined product. 
Importing petroleum from the Middle East and refined product from Asia introduces more 
complex and longer maritime supply lines that in the event of geopolitical turmoil could be 
subject to significant disruption. These disruptions could impact both New Zealand and Asia, 
and because of the country’s geographic isolation be disproportionately impactful on New 
Zealand. These factors are fundamental to the reliability of New Zealand’s oil supply system, 






269 Australian Department of the Environment and Energy, Liquid Fuel Security Review: Interim Report, 23. 
This report states that over 80% of feedstock for refineries in Singapore and Korea and Japan are sourced from 
the Middle East. 
270 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2019, 168-69. 
 
 65 
5 Security of Oil Supply Policy  
5.1 Introduction 
As has been demonstrated, risks to the integrity of the oil supply chain and oil markets are 
beyond the capacity of nation states to eliminate, either individually or collectively. However, 
a country’s dependence on imported oil supplies and vulnerability to disruptions of that supply 
can be minimised and mitigated by the energy policies adopted. Oil importing states currently 
adopt a mix of security policies, and any assessment of policy mix efficacy requires an 
understanding of both each policy’s instrumentality, and the specific actions entailed. 
The field of energy policy is complex; there are a range of policy elements that can directly or 
indirectly relate to oil security objectives. Furthermore, energy policy is inextricably 
intertwined with other key state policy agendas, including resource management, economic 
competitiveness, environmental well-being, technology investment, research expenditure, 
export competitiveness, tax regimes, and export competitiveness.271  
Borrowing from Van der Linde et al, Chapter 2 introduced a schedule of 21 oil security policy 
instruments available to state actors. These instruments can be used to achieve four security of 
oil supply objectives:272  
i. Prevention - creating a political environment where there are fewer grounds for oil 
supply disruptions; 
ii. Deterrence - preventing or deterring producer states from disrupting oil supplies for 
political reasons; 
iii. Containment - reducing the impact of an oil supply disruption on national security and 
the economy; 
iv. Crisis Management - mitigating harm during an oil supply disruption. 
Specific policy instruments can often help achieve prevention and containment, and sometimes 
even deterrence objectives. In addition, they may also represent necessary precursors to 
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to the security objectives – including those that involve changing relevant energy system 
characteristics over time – are examined below. 
5.2 Import Substitution 
Adopting policies to promote domestic energy production and limit import dependence is 
perhaps the most effective method for a country to reduce the risk associated with dependence 
upon external oil supply. Developing and using domestically produced energy rather than 
relying on imports from other countries can greatly increase security,274 reducing external 
supply risks while also potentially increasing diversification by providing alternative supply 
sources.275   
Such security-boosting policies include incentivising the use of domestic petroleum sources 
and refining infrastructure. If domestic sources are not internationally competitive, 
governments can encourage their use or development by enacting supporting policies including 
subsidies or tariffs.276  A heavier handed approach may be to implement an export ban on 
domestically produced oil, as the US did to reduce vulnerability in response to the 1973 oil 
crisis.277 If there are insufficient domestic supplies a country can compensate to some extent 
by instead substituting with other domestically produced energy sources where possible; for 
example, through use of renewables or nuclear power.278 
Reducing oil import dependency through expansion of domestic sources can be an expensive 
approach, and one that may not necessarily provide a net benefit. Policies promoting domestic 
energy production may not be beneficial if it results in consumers paying stable yet consistently 
higher domestic supply costs that are cumulatively over and above the cost associated with 
disruptions and price spikes.279 Furthermore, domestic energy supplies are not always safer 
than imported sources. Domestic risks may lead to shortages - the UK industrial action of the 
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reducing import dependency does not necessarily lead to a proportional drop in the importance 
of external security of supply: “The assumption that security of supply is less an issue with an 
import dependency of 30 or 40 percent of domestic demand than with 50 percent or 60 percent 
can be false, when the ability to switch fuels is almost absent in the first situation and when 
one particular sector, for example transport or electricity generation, is entirely dependent on 
certain supplies.”281  
5.3 Diversification  
Policies to improve diversification relate to the range of available fuel types and sources and 
technology types and sources.282 Generally, improving diversification of oil source and energy 
type are considered to increase supply security the most.283 
5.3.1 By Source 
The greater the national and geographical diversification of petroleum supplies, the lower the 
risk associated with losing supply from any one source.284 By extension, a diversified supplier 
base also hedges against market power.285 This applies even where the oil market is considered 
fully integrated, given the majority of oil is sold on a term contract basis and is not immediately 
available even when higher prices are offered.286 Diversification of supply toward more 
politically stable countries can also shield an importing country from some geopolitical risks.287 
Diversification of oil sources can be encouraged in a number of ways. A state may impose 
limits on the quantities of oil that importing companies can acquire from certain regions or 
countries and thus force purchases from other suppliers. Alternatively, economic policies can 
be used to incentivise widening the corporate or regional supplier base, as some countries like 
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exposure to Middle East supply, China and India have bought crude oil from more distant 
sources in the Atlantic basin, with the differential in delivery costs regarded as an ‘insurance’ 
premium.289 Pursuing diversification policy may also require modification to the technological 
configuration of a country’s refineries, which allows the state a broader range of crude oil to 
import in both normal operation and in a crisis to substitute lost supplies.290 
For NOCs with government backing and sufficient economic power, diversification of source 
may include FDI in development of new sources of oil, and pursuing horizontal and vertical 
integration. Some countries use their NOCs to address or at least mitigate security of supply 
concerns, as well as to balance against the power of exporting countries and their NOCs as well 
as prominent private oil companies.291 For example, the Chinese government has explicitly 
supported and set targets for Chinese NOCs to secure overseas production and long-term 
supply contracts.292 This policy has been  accompanied by an expansion and upgrading of 
refining capacity to enable the processing of a wider range of oil grades from different 
regions.293 Diversification of source approaches like the above can therefore entail significant 
cost and risk and thus are generally restricted to large economies, although even for these 
countries success is not assured; Japanese oil companies’ prior failings with similar policies 
show the cost and risk associated with this approach.294  
5.3.2 By type 
Diversification of energy types to reduce a nation’s dependence upon petroleum can improve 
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options available - for example, to heat buildings or to transport people and goods - the impact 
of oil supply disruptions can be reduced.296  
Again however, diversification of energy types is not inherently positive. Security is not 
improved if less reliable sources of energy are introduced into the mix;297 for example, wind 
and solar generation are intermittent, creating different energy security challenges.298 Attempts 
at diversification of fuel types can also be difficult and take time, particularly in the case of oil. 
The costs of diversification and making substitutes available in sufficient quantities must also 
be measured against the cost of disruption. 299 
5.4 Flexibility 
Improving energy system flexibility can significantly enhance energy security. Improving 
flexibility requires enacting measures that allow for alternative fuels or an alternative energy 
mix to be temporarily used when necessary, such as in the case of an oil supply disruption. The 
greatest opportunity for improving flexibility is within the electricity sector; for example, 
thermal generators having dual or multi-fuel firing capacity for electricity.300 Building spare 
capacity and storage capacity into an energy system also improves system flexibility. 
Governments can incentivise energy companies to increase and maintain system flexibility.301 
In contrast, there is generally minimal opportunity to fuel switch within the transport sector, as 
very few vehicles have the technology to accommodate such changes. 
5.5 Crisis Management 
There are various policies governments can implement that are designed to mitigate harm 
caused in the event of an energy crisis.  
5.5.1 Strategic Reserves  
Perhaps one of the most effective and widely used crisis management policy instruments within 
developed importing countries is the maintenance of strategic reserves of oil; emergency stocks 
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to the external supply chain, domestically held stocks become critically important. If new 
supply is unable to be secured before domestic stocks deplete, then rationing and shortages 
would occur.302 Holding emergency oil stocks is therefore the only way to avoid these impacts 
in some circumstances.303  
The effectiveness of strategic oil reserves as a response to a disruption is not just dependent 
upon the volume of the stockholding, but also upon the availability of transport and oil 
processing facilities when the shortfall occurs. Supply disruptions may also coincide with a 
decline in transport and refining capacity in the market, a situation faced by the US in 1990 
when Kuwait’s refining capacity was unavailable following the Iraqi invasion, and the US had 
insufficient domestic refining capacity for its strategic petroleum reserve.304 As such, possible 
crisis management policies may also include strategic reserves of refining and  transportation 
capacity.  
Strategic Transportation Reserve 
While strategic reserves of oil are typically held within a country’s borders, eventually these 
stocks will need to be replenished. The guaranteed availability of transportation capacity then 
becomes a critical strategic consideration. There are a variety of policy instruments used to 
secure strategic reserves of oil transport capacity for access in an emergency. States may 
achieve this by maintaining transport capacity separate from the international market, as is the 
case with the US National Defense Reserve Fleet.305 An alternative approach is to integrate 
state-controlled shipping capacity within the international shipping market that can then be 
called upon by the state when needed. China is the most notable example of this strategic 
approach,  successfully enacting a 2005 policy to develop its own large state-owned tanker 
fleet and have the majority of its imported oil transported in Chinese flagged tankers.306 The 
aim of building this domestic tanker fleet is to insure against future threats to oil shipments and 
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industry.307 China has approached this by integrating state-owned tanker capacity with the 
international shipping market through NOCs and tanker operators, while maintaining a standby 
arrangement to ‘call on’ such capacity for domestic requirements if needed.308  
Such an approach may not necessarily improve security in all circumstances, however. Some 
authors have suggested that given the realities of a massive and highly internationalised oil 
shipping sector, and practices relating to oil on-selling while at sea, relying on private third-
party tankers would be a more secure option in circumstances where a country is involved in a 
conflict. This is because it would be difficult for a hostile state to identify and intercept oil 
shipments bound for an adversary when carried by private tanker.309  
On the other hand, access to state-controlled tanker capacity can be a strategic advantage during 
a conflict in which the country is not involved, or as a way to deal with peacetime risks. 
Governments can direct state-owned shipping companies to cooperate with specific oil 
companies or to operate in a war exclusion zone to access terminals during times of crisis. Such 
emergency measures have not been taken in recent history, although China implemented a 
similar policy in 2008 that involved diverting shipping capacity for domestic coal needs during 
a power shortage.310 State-flagging also provides the legal predicate for providing military 
protection of maritime vessels.311 
A country can also use its tankers to work around sanctions or embargoes of one of its major 
suppliers, as in the above case of China.312 By having a state-controlled tanker fleet, the country 
therefore gains access to oil supplies by having the ability to operate where other countries and 
ship owners refuse to or are prevented from doing so.313 Furthermore, in times of an emergency 
or wartime, commercial shipping prices can escalate sharply as operators extract a premium; 
having state-controlled companies could conceivably allow nations to forego paying such 
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5.5.2 Price Policy 
Price policy can provide the consumer with protection for a short period of time in the event 
of a supply disruption.315 It is possible for a price ceiling to be an efficient crisis management 
tool in instances where the market fails to absorb a shock, as long as there is a strict and 
transparent definition of when controls come into effect to avoid unnecessary uncertainty for 
market players. A maximum price can be used to temporarily protect consumers and can be 
gradually increased according to an agreed schedule if the shortage becomes prolonged.  
Minimum price policy can also be enacted if energy prices fall so low that it endangers 
producers’ investments and the security of the energy system. In the case of oil prices, 
producers are often able to absorb shocks temporarily as long as variable costs are recovered, 
however they can be hurt by prolonged low prices.316 
5.6 Foreign Policy 
Foreign policy can be an important part of safeguarding the security of a nation’s energy 
system.317 By maintaining positive political and economic relations between consuming and 
producing countries, foreign policy can play an important part in crisis prevention and 
discouraging states from engaging in hurtful acts.318 These policies can be bilateral or 
multilateral in nature.  
5.6.1 Bilateral relationships  
Major oil producers willingly or unwillingly receive special attention from major oil 
consumers, including China and the US. Van der Linde et al. state it is evident that these 
relationships between large producer and consumer countries can clearly have a benefit on 
energy security. One prominent example includes the US-Saudi Arabia strategic alliance which 
improved US security of supply in exchange for providing Saudi Arabia protection from 
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5.6.2 Multilateral cooperation 
There are a significant number of multilateral organisations and initiatives that operate within 
the energy sphere. Three of the organisations that are considered to have the most relevance 
within oil security issues will be discussed here. 
International Energy Agency 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) sits at the centre of developed countries’ oil security 
initiatives. It is an international energy organisation comprising 30 industrialised countries – 
including New Zealand – established under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Established in 1974 following the 1973 oil crisis, the 
IEA’s original mandate was to coordinate response measures in the event of an oil supply 
emergency.320 Today, it is an intergovernmental organisation with expertise in energy 
modelling and research, and is an important source for energy information sharing.321   
The legal basis for the IEA is the International Energy Programme (IEP), an international 
agreement on oil crisis management which gives the IEA authority to coordinate collective 
actions of member states in response to a supply disruption.322 Central to the implementation 
of this crisis management instrument is the activation of an oil sharing mechanism and demand 
management measures, and the establishment of strategic oil reserves.323   
The strategic stockholding portion of this agreement has been described as the “backbone” of 
OECD member states’ international energy cooperation.324 IEA members are required to hold 
reserves of crude or refined product equivalent to 90 days of their prior year’s average net oil 
imports, excluding bunker fuel used by international shipping.325 Members meet their 
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thereof. Oil stockholdings can be released on to the international oil market for use in the event 
of a supply emergency in order to stabilise the oil price.326 The IEA monitors the market and if 
concerned can call on members to release additional supply when needed. Since its inception, 
the IEA has initiated three such collective actions to stabilise oil prices following international 
events: 1991 in the build-up to the Gulf War; 2005 following the damage to offshore and 
onshore oil infrastructure caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; and 2011 as a response to 
prolonged disruption of Libyan oil supply resulting from the Libyan civil war.327 The strategic 
stockholding also mitigates the market-power of oil producing countries, being described as 
“…an important policy tool to constrain OPEC in its price ambitions.”328 
The IEP’s allocation procedures are designed so that member states collectively share the 
impact of a disruption. In an instance of an IEP triggering event,329 members may be required 
to release or share stocks, implement demand management, and where possible, increase 
domestic oil production and activate energy system flexibility measures to encourage the 
switch to other fuels if necessary. All IEA members are required to have procedures in place 
that allow such transfers to be undertaken if called upon by the IEA.330 While the emergency 
allocation procedures have been in place from inception, the IEA’s rules for triggering the 
release and sharing of stocks between members have proven to be unworkable and have yet to 
be used, despite large disruptions occurring since their establishment.331  
Acknowledging these issues, the IEA instead developed the Coordinated Emergency Response 
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risks and guaranteeing oil supplies.332 Members are able to have different national responses, 
as all members do not have to release their emergency stocks or in equal proportions.333  This 
is the approach that was used in each IEA intervention, and is considered the main way that 
the organisation responds to serious risks to supply.334 Although CERM allows for a more 
flexible response to supply risks, it has relatively weak enforcement mechanisms, as illustrated 
when some member countries failed to meet their demand constraint obligations during the 
Hurricane Katrina intervention, yet suffered no sanctions as a result.335 One European 
Parliament report noted that the absence of an enforcement mechanism could result in CERM 
struggling to be effective during a prolonged supply crisis.336  
To provide further context, during the three instances of IEA intervention crude and refined 
product were still available to those willing to pay higher prices, and none of the collective 
actions drew upon all of the emergency stocks.337 These facts could be interpreted in two ways: 
firstly, the level of emergency stocks are excessive given the size of disruptions presently 
experienced; and secondly, the IEP has not yet been tested to a meaningful extent in a full 
crisis. The conclusion drawn is that while the IEA undoubtedly provides insurance against 
supply disruption, it remains in question to what extent it does so.338  
In terms of its ongoing utility as an oil security policy instrument, there are increasing concerns 
the collective power of the IEA may be declining as its members begin to account for a smaller 
proportion of global oil consumption. IEA membership is restricted to OECD countries, and 
non-OECD countries like China and India that have grown to be among the largest oil 
consumers are therefore excluded. As a result, the IEA membership’s cumulative oil 
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cumulative stockholding has declined from approximately 40% of the 90-day global oil 
demand in 1974 to 20% today.340 The IEA’s ability to mitigate or prevent disruptions via 
coordinated stock release or demand control measures may therefore be in decline.  
Some non-OECD countries such as China have become IEA ‘Association Countries’,341 but 
this status entails no obligation to follow IEP stockholding requirements or to coordinate with 
IEA efforts in a crisis. The response of these high-demand non-IEA countries to a significant 
disruption is therefore unknown, and there is no guarantee that countries will follow suit with 
the organisation.342 As an example of this possible reluctance, Griffin argues that China’s 
domestic price controls on petroleum products signal an unwillingness to let prices rise in the 
event of a disruption and thereby participate in necessary demand reductions.343 One report 
concludes that, in the event of a global oil disruption, IEA members would likely be unwilling 
to endure the pain of implementing demand restraint measures if the rest of the world did not 
do so as well.344  
OPEC 
As a multilateral cooperation policy instrument, OPEC’s market influence is not inherently 
negative for supply security. While the cartel’s ability to stabilise the oil market has been 
mixed,345 it is often argued that the market would have been much less stable without OPEC 
members acting as swing producers and absorbing supply shocks.346 This is largely made 
possible through the flexibility provided by the spare production capacity of the wealthier 
Arabian Gulf member states.347 In particular, the largest net exporter of oil - Saudi Arabia - 
often acts as swing producer, maintaining the largest share of spare production capacity at 
significant investment cost.348 Consequently, market power - and hence economic and political 
power - is particularly concentrated within Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait as these 
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In contrast, poorer OPEC member states rely on maintaining maximum production and high 
prices to balance state budgets.349 For these countries, multilateral cooperation provides greater 
economic security through stabilisation of their petroleum export revenues. Conversely, 
Overland argues the benefits of this policy are not uniformly shared, asserting that were these 
oil resources not controlled by OPEC NOCs but instead by western-based TNOCs pursuing 
revenue maximisation, it is likely that global oil prices would be much lower.350  
International Energy Forum 
The International Energy Forum (IEF) is an intergovernmental organisation comprising 72 
producer, consumer and transit states - including New Zealand - that collectively account for 
over 90% of global oil and gas supply and demand.351 Acting as a neutral facilitator of dialogue, 
the Forum aims to foster communication and understanding between its members on energy 
issues to ensure global energy security by finding solutions in the common interest. The IEF 
was established as a Secretariat in 1991, with its members participating in biennial Ministerial 
Meetings.352 
While there has historically been tension between large producer and consumer states 
(particularly during the 1970s), relations between these groups began to normalise in the late 
1980s.353 During the 1990’s and 2000s, the producer-consumer dialogue was institutionalised 
in the IEF.354 Consumer countries aim to create security of supply, while producers aim to 
create security of demand. These priority objectives have increasingly brought these two 
groups closer together, as both groups have a common interest to stabilise markets.355 In time, 
Van der Linde et al. notes that “…the IEF has become an important channel for co-operation 
and creating a far better understanding of the vital interests and problems of the participating 
countries.”356 Nevertheless, the IEF has struggled to facilitate agreements between groups on 
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members’ willingness to communicate and cooperate; a more confrontational environment 
between consumer and producer countries may therefore leave the IEF less effective.  
5.6.3 Security Policy 
Security and military policies are a close companion of foreign policy, but also of energy policy 
for major powers. Energy security is vital for these states, and if superpowers’ energy security 
is jeopardised then military intervention is always an option.357 This policy instrument is 
usually reserved for larger powers, although smaller states can benefit from such interventions 
through actively or passively supporting same. 
The threat of military force can be a strong tool for influencing inter-state relations. Military 
power can influence oil security in a number of respects. The first is through providing security 
to oil producing countries in exchange for supply, sometimes formally codified in a strategic 
alliance. By the same token, military power can be used by major powers to deter purposeful 
supply disruptions and to procure new sources of petroleum. In situations where these policies 
increase global oil supply and secure the related transport network, less militarily powerful 
states can stand to benefit from access to these public goods without necessarily supporting the 
policies that delivered them. However, in other circumstances where the benefits are 
excludable, larger powers may not let other states benefit from their costly foreign and security 
policies if they do not contribute.358  
Other security policies that have improved oil security have centred upon security of transport. 
This includes military capability and actions to ensure security of SLOCs, or escorting tankers 
through insecure areas. Given shared vulnerabilities to disruption of shipping, it is in most 
circumstances mutually beneficial for maritime powers to cooperate to ensure security of 
SLOCs. The responsibility and associated cost of maintaining shipping lane security largely 
falls on larger states, particularly the US which has the greatest naval power projection and 
control over SLOCs.359 Multilateral actions are also used to secure transport routes. The most 
recent example is the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), an alliance of 
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is tasked with maintaining maritime security in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, 
particularly regarding oil shipments.360  
Strategic Alliances 
Oil security relationships can take the form of a more comprehensive strategic alliance formally 
acknowledging and aligning the broader mutual interests that exist between producer and 
customer countries. The already highlighted US-Saudi Arabia strategic alliance is arguably the 
most significant and long-standing oil security relationship in the world. The 1951 Mutual 
Defense Assistance Agreement formalised this relationship between the two states, and 
effectively guarantees oil security in exchange for military security.361 It promises US military 
intervention in the event of an attack on Saudi territory, particularly one that disrupts Saudi oil 
and gas supplies, and is given credibility by investments in major US military bases in the 
Kingdom, as well as elsewhere in the Gulf and around the world.362 Similarly during the Cold 
War for example, producing countries were pressured to align with one power bloc or the other, 
and in so doing fell under the protective military umbrella of one of the global superpowers.363 
5.7 Policy Choices and Consequences 
The mix of policy instruments that consumer states can choose to implement to best advance 
the four security of oil supply objectives are diverse. However, it should be noted that these 
policy choices do not occur in a vacuum and can have consequences for the security of other 
consumer states. Certain policies like strategic reserves or diversification through development 
of new oil sources can prove beneficial for the security of others. Conversely, some policies 
may offer no benefit, or in some cases even reduce the security of other consuming countries. 
While importing countries have the shared goal of maintaining security of oil supply, this does 
not necessarily mean they will cooperate to achieve this goal; in some instances, these states 
may actually compete. Therefore, countries may choose to pursue a mix of security policies 
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5.7.1 Petro-nationalism & Market Integrity 
It is a common opinion that there is continuous geopolitical competition for petroleum 
resources between large consuming countries.364 The various forms of US political and military 
involvement in the Middle East is regarded as one example of this,365 as is the competition 
between Indian, Chinese and Western oil companies within Latin America and Africa.366 While 
most of the oil that is secured by these countries and companies makes its way onto the 
international oil market, some countries – most notably China – have pursued a more strategic 
approach using certain policy tools to guarantee state control over these resources. These 
policies have the potential to affect the security provided by the oil market.  
The effectiveness of the market to respond to disruptions depends on the extent that oil is being 
traded via the international market versus other mechanisms. This factor is largely determined 
by state policy choices. Over the last 30 plus years, most consumer countries have generally 
preferred international trade in oil via the market, reducing their state control over oil and gas 
supply.367 However, as noted earlier, approximately one fifth of the world’s oil production is 
not allocated through markets and has no market price.368 It is instead allocated through other 
mechanisms including bilateral agreements between governments, and cannot be considered 
available for global consumption.369 These off-market trades are the result of the policy choices 
of producing and consuming countries. Griffin highlights the relatively new form of petro-




364 Roy Allison, "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy," International Affairs 80, no. 2 (2004): 
277; Michael T Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: How Scarce Energy Is Creating a New World Order 
(New York: Oneworld Publications, 2008), 7.  
365 Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008); Mohammed Shareef, The United States, Iraq and the Kurds: Shock, Awe and Aftermath 
(Routledge, 2014); Donette Murray, US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations since the Islamic 
Revolution (Routledge, 2009). 
366 Pádraig Carmody, The New Scramble for Africa (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011); Steven Woehrel, Russian 
Energy Policy toward Neighboring Countries (US Congressional Research Service, 2009), 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a506412.pdf; Alex E Fernández Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom, eds., 
Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations Beyond the Washington Consensus (n.p: Berghahn books, 
2010). Yet another example is competition between China and Japan to secure resources within Africa, Central 
Asia and the Middle East: Yoichiro Sato, Lining up a Persuasive Friend: Japan's Expectations of How New 
Zealand Can Contribute to Asian Security (Asia NZ Foundation, 2011), 7, 
https://www.asianz.org.nz/assets/Uploads/Japans-expectations-of-how-New-Zealand-can-contribute-to-Asian-
security.pdf; Mikkal Herberg, "Energy Cooperation and Competition in Northeast Asia," in Energy Security 
Cooperation in Northeast Asia, ed. Bo Kong and Jae H Ku (London: Routledge, 2015), 22-23. 
367 Tordo, National Oil Companies and Value Creation, 19-20. 
368 Chanis, "Crude Oil Is Not Fungible, Where It Comes from Does Matter, and Global Markets Are More 




circumventing market institutions by ‘locking up’ oil supplies in producer states, either through 
bilateral agreements or via the actions of China’s NOCs.370   
The level of oil that is being traded outside of the market is an important factor determining 
the market’s ability to respond to disruption. If oil supplies are being predominantly traded 
through the market, then in the event of a disruption the market can respond to the shortfall by 
allowing the allocation of unaffected supply between consumers. The market price mechanism 
mediates the disruption (albeit limited, at least in the short term, by the factors identified in 
Chapter 3). However, if substantial quantities of oil were no longer being traded on the open 
market but were instead being channelled to consumer states via bilateral contracts 
(government-government, state company-government or state company) then liquidity in the 
global oil market would decline heavily.371 In a disruption, unaffected oil production would be 
mostly locked in. The market would therefore have less capability to meet a shortfall, and states 
suffering disruptions to their supply would likely have difficulty procuring oil from other 
sources.  
At present, countries like China that have chosen to take a more strategic approach to the 
market do not have a significant enough impact on trade flows and have not substantially 
changed the liquidity of the market.372 Nevertheless, a country’s decision to secure oil outside 
of the market – especially large oil consuming countries –  has the potential to affect the ability 
of the oil market to respond to disruption. Thus, it can also affect the security of other states 
that rely on the market to provide a steady and secure supply.373 This point is illustrated in a 
recent assessment of potential challenges to Australia’s energy supply. The report highlights 
the dominance of NOCs from importer countries using the same suppliers in the Arabian Gulf, 
and notes that Australia’s confidence in the stability of the global supply chain could be “sorely 
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States respond to the level of security they believe the market provides. If a state considers the 
market to provide insufficient levels of security, it may attempt to procure supply through other 
means. Griffin argues that oil consuming countries pursuing petro-nationalist polices – 
including exclusive bilateral contracts – implicitly believe that markets do not provide 
sufficient oil security or might not do so in the future.375 A state may therefore take a 
competitive approach to accessing supply if it believes that changes in the market or changes 
in the geopolitical environment could harm supply security.376  For example, in a situation 
where import dependence and supply concentration is increasing, competition and conflict 
between states to control oil and gas resources would occur more often.377  States may also take 
this approach believing it provides a security advantage relative to their rivals, even if relying 
on the market would provide greater security overall.378  
Consumer states’ petro-nationalist policies could also ultimately result in oil consuming 
countries attempting to adopt similar policies. Such a situation could occur if states taking a 
strategic approach to the oil or broader energy market begin to dominate trade, leading to a 
cascade of other states adopting a similar approach in response.379 For this reason, Griffin 
concludes that the petro-nationalist approaches currently adopted by some countries could 
potentially lead to an undermining of the international oil markets, and thus global oil 
security.380 
Should both a market approach and a strategic approach fail to provide sufficient oil security, 
states might resort to taking physical control of resources through military means, at least 
temporarily, to create conditions necessary for the oil industry to effectively function. If a 
government preferred a market approach, it would allow access for international oil companies 
to develop oil resources, whereas a government favouring a strategic approach would ensure 
state companies gained resource access.381 Van der Linde et al. argue that a scenario like those 
above are not considered far-fetched, as demonstrated by the establishment in the 1980s of the 
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oil supply disruption in the Persian Gulf.382 Despite such possibilities, most consumer states 
today favour cooperation between one another, even though more powerful states continue to 
want to maintain military capability to defend their interests, “…hidden behind the veil of a 
market orientated approach.” 383 
5.7.2 Security and crisis response 
Equally, a state’s absence of appropriate oil security policies can shape their crisis response, 
which can affect the oil security of other countries. Mitchell notes that the resilience and 
exposure to a major Middle East disruption varies widely among Asian importing countries, 
highlighting that Japan and Korea are the only two major importers in the region that are part 
of the IEA’s emergency response mechanisms. Given this variation of resilience and exposure, 
he predicts that conflict between government interventions could occur if countries fail to 
adequately account for the interests of others in the region.384 In response to a large supply 
disruption, governments might even adopt policies that impede the flow of oil and products to 
other countries.385 
 
It is clear the oil security policy choices of importing countries can therefore have 
consequences for the oil supply security of other states. Furthermore, policy changes affecting 
the oil market and geopolitical environment are not only capable of increasing the likelihood 
and severity of an oil supply disruption, but can also erode states’ willingness to cooperate on 
maintaining supply security. Yet many of the above policies intended to prevent or mitigate 
disruptions require cooperation between states. Therefore, geopolitics shapes the level of 
cooperation or competition between states, and also plays a part in the viability and 
effectiveness of policy responses.  
 
5.8 Summary 
States can choose from a framework of policy instruments to achieve several interrelated 
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occurring, to contain the expected damage from a crisis, and to more effectively manage the 
crisis when one occurs. Many of the policy instruments can be highly effective but may be 
difficult and expensive to implement or may require long-term strategies to properly execute. 
The policy instruments that states choose may have positive, neutral or negative consequences 
for the supply security of other states, with some also requiring a certain level of cooperation 
between consuming nations - although this cooperation is not a certainty. The mix of policy 
instruments that states choose is influenced by both the perceived integrity of the petroleum 
market, and the geopolitical environment. Effective oil security policymaking relies on 
identifying the optimal mix of policy instruments.   
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6 New Zealand’s Current Security of Oil Supply Policy  
6.1 Introduction 
As has been shown, countries have a mix of different policy instruments available to enhance 
the security of their oil supplies. However, not all policy instruments are available to or viable 
for a country to use, and this is particularly so for smaller states such as New Zealand.  For 
example, New Zealand does not have the military capability to pursue a suite of deterrence 
policies, and this is highly unlikely to change in the future. Small states in general depend upon 
organisations like the United Nations (UN) and the International Maritime Organization to 
preserve international norms of behaviour.386 Similarly, New Zealand does not have sufficient 
market power to have any discernible influence on international oil market prices.387 
Nevertheless, countries often have a number of different policies available to support security 
of their oil supplies. 
Generally, the specific mix of instruments chosen largely depends upon the degree of 
confidence a country has in the resilience of the oil markets; essentially countries either rely 
on the market to maintain energy security or take a more strategic approach.388 In the case of 
New Zealand, the government has consistently pursued a singular approach to oil security that 
focusses on mitigating some vulnerabilities rather than eliminating any of them, and on reacting 
in the event of an oil supply crisis rather than reducing exposure to such events. It can be argued 
that the current approach has remained largely unchanged because it has proven to be ‘fit for 
purpose’.  The question remains however, whether the current mix of oil security policy 
instruments is optimal given New Zealand’s particular combination of dependence upon oil 
and oil imports, and vulnerabilities in the upstream, midstream and downstream sectors of the 
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6.2 Oil Security Policy 
The New Zealand Government’s approach to oil security can be characterised as largely 
laissez-faire for several decades. There is minimal state intervention and participation within 
the domestic oil market; decisions on where to source New Zealand’s oil supplies are left to 
private sector petroleum importing and distribution companies. Similarly, security of oil 
supplies is not a significant focus within New Zealand’s bilateral foreign or trade relations.389 
The only exceptions are multilateral cooperation through the IEF and an international 
agreement in the form of the IEA’s IEP. These constitute the country’s formal security of oil 
supply policy instrument mix.  
Having joined in 1976, the IEA now forms the foundation of New Zealand’s approach to 
maintaining oil security. The New Zealand Government considers IEA membership to be the 
“…principal mechanism for mitigating the effects of international supply disruption,”390 
characterising it as valuable ‘insurance’ against disruption to international energy supplies.391 
As explained in the previous chapter, through its IEA membership New Zealand is a signatory 
to the IEP, an agreement that obliges the country to maintain strategic reserves as well as 
implementing a schedule of responses in the event of an IEA emergency collective action.  
These obligations are central to the New Zealand Government’s Oil Emergency Response 
Strategy (OERS), which details the country’s official crisis response policy and associated 
operational framework. Last updated in 2008, the OERS has the objectives of minimising the 
impacts of a disruption to New Zealand’s petroleum supplies in a non-IEA declared oil 
emergency, and to ensure the country can meet its IEA obligations. Importantly, the OERS 
details the Government’s statutory power to implement the suite of IEP collective action 
responses under an IEA declared emergency. 392  While New Zealand is limited in its ability to 
implement the responses of increasing domestic oil production and switching to other fuels, it 
can restrain demand and release stocks to the market, as well as theoretically share oil in the 
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remains the maintenance of strategic reserves equivalent to 90 days net crude and refined 
product imports. 
Notably however, New Zealand does not meet the stockholding portion of the IEP through 
physical in-country stocks.  As described earlier, the majority of countries meet their 
obligations through a mix of government, industry and agency stocks. New Zealand does not 
have any government-owned strategic reserves onshore; all oil stocks held in-country are 
owned by TNOCs and domestic oil companies. Furthermore, the government places no 
stockholding obligation upon industry, such that privately held onshore stocks typically only 
constitute approximately two thirds of New Zealand’s 90 days’ obligation.393 In fact, New 
Zealand and Australia are the only two net importing countries that are signatories to the IEA 
that do not have industry-mandated or government-owned stocks; other members in this 
position being net-exporters.394  
Instead, since 2007395 the New Zealand Government has met its stockholding obligations by 
routinely purchasing oil stock ticket contracts from industry and agency companies operating 
within other IEA countries. In exchange for an annual fee, these tickets provide New Zealand 
with the contractual right to purchase specified quantities of petroleum and refined product at 
market prices in the event of an IEA mandated drawdown on reserves. The other party to the 
contract guarantees the stock will be held in reserve, and the country in which the reserves are 
held guarantees the reserves will be released. Oil stock tickets therefore require New Zealand 
to  establish bilateral agreements with other IEA countries specifying these countries will not 
impede the release of stock in the event of an IEA emergency. To date New Zealand has entered 
into such agreements with Australia, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Japan.396 
Based on these contractual and bilateral commitments, the IEA allows these ‘paper’ stocks to 
count toward New Zealand’s stockholding obligation.397 During 2016, the government held oil 
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These public stocks in other countries are both crude and refined product, the majority of which 
is petrol.399 Tickets consistently account for a major portion of New Zealand’s strategic oil 
reserve: as of February 2020, more than one third (34 days’) of the country’s 94 days’ of net 
imports comprised government-owned ticket reserves held offshore.400  
In the event of an IEA coordinated emergency action, the New Zealand Government may 
exercise the purchase rights contracted in the oil stock tickets, and release the stock onto the 
global market. This would be done without New Zealand ever taking physical delivery of the 
oil or refined product. On the other hand, should New Zealand itself need these stocks due to 
supply shortfalls, it can in theory purchase and take delivery of the stocks for transportation 
directly from the supplier nation, or exchange same for stocks closer to New Zealand to reduce 
transport costs and delivery times.401 While clearly less secure than physical in-country stocks, 
the New Zealand Government has persisted with the stock ticket approach to meeting its IEP 
strategic reserve obligations on the basis of cost. Quarterly stock ticket fees are of significantly 
lower cost when compared to the costs associated with both building and maintaining greater 
domestic storage capacity, and owning the physical stock to be stored within it.402  
In summary, for all practical purposes IEA membership and the associated IEP agreement 
constitute the entirety of New Zealand’s current external security of oil supply policy. To meet 
its IEP strategic oil reserve obligations, the Government leaves it to the commercial sector to 
determine appropriate physical stocks to hold onshore, and tops these up to the 90-days’ net 
imports level with contractual stocks held offshore. 
6.3 Oil Security Assessments 
The New Zealand Government has commissioned a series of assessments of New Zealand’s 
oil security in recent years as shown in Table 1, and each has, for the most part, supported New 
Zealand’s existing oil security policy settings described above. The first report in the current 
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updated in 2017.403 Although the aims of these reports differ slightly, each undertakes their 
respective assessments of New Zealand’s present or short-term oil security using cost-benefit 
analyses; that is, they aim to determine the best policy settings by calculating the cost of 
security policies against the benefit to security they are expected to provide.  
Table 1: Schedule of New Zealand Government Oil Security Assessments 
Year Method Time 
Horizon 
Core                    
Assumptions 
Security of Supply 
Policy Mix 
2005 • Quantitative only 
• Cost-benefit  & 
risk analyses 
• Short term • Integrated market 
• Oil is fungible 
• Logistics is constant 
• International 
Agreements (IEA) 
2012 • Quantitative only 
• Cost-benefit  & 
risk analyses 
• Short term • Integrated market 
• Oil is fungible 
• Logistics is constant 
• International 
Agreements (IEA) 
2017 • Quantitative only 
• Cost-benefit  & 
risk analyses 
• Short term • Integrated market 
• Oil is fungible 
• Logistics is constant 
• International 
Agreements (IEA) 
The aim of the 2005 report was to determine the best approach for New Zealand to meet its 
emergency oil reserve stockholding commitments as a member of the IEA. In addition, the 
report also aimed to determine whether the country had sufficient domestic stockholding to 
maintain an adequate level of oil security. Although the first report is somewhat limited by its 
research framing and now less relevant given its publication date, it nevertheless provides some 
valuable insights into New Zealand’s supply security. It details the elements within New 
Zealand’s oil import supply chain, including New Zealand’s international supply regions, and 
the nature and length of the corresponding supply chains. The report hypothesises several 
disruption events and their risk of occurrence using information gathered from market 
participants.404 Informed estimates of the likelihood and economic cost of each disruption are 
then compared against the expected cost of oil stockholding to derive an optimal level of 
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The report also examines a number of internal disruption scenarios affecting different domestic 
downstream sectors, including refining and distribution of refined product.406 However, a less 
granular approach is used to examine risks of disruption external to the country. Rather than 
examining the impact and likelihood of disruption on a supply chain sector by sector basis, the 
report instead examines a generic external disruption scenario where a set proportion of global 
oil supply is interrupted. Furthermore, this reduction in supply is assumed to affect each market 
participant to the same extent. The scale and duration of this international oil supply shortfall 
adopts probabilities from a diversity of assessments compiled in an Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory report titled The Value of Expanding the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve.407 The 
economic cost of such a disruption is then quantified for use in the stockholding cost-benefit 
analysis, taking account of anticipated international oil market responses which are expected 
to minimise the impact somewhat.  
The 2005 report justifies its sole use of a generic supply disruption scenario to determine 
external supply risk. It argues that New Zealand is reasonably secure against minor isolated 
external events - for example, the loss of a single tanker - because of the country’s diverse 
range of suppliers, and its practice of importing crude for domestic refining and supplementing 
this with imports of refined product.408 However, the underlying reasoning behind this 
argument is not provided; specifically, the degree of diversification of suppliers or the ratio of 
domestic refining to imported product necessary to confer ‘security’ is not elaborated upon. 
Based on the above assertion, the report proceeds on the assumption that New Zealand’s supply 
would likely only be significantly impacted by an event that was also affecting many other 
countries; for example, the loss of production from a major global oil supplier such as Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, a supply disruption on this scale is considered likely to trigger an IEA 
collective action, requiring a response from members.409 The report also finds the IEA 
emergency stockholding measure to be a reasonable indicator of how long onshore stocks 
would last;410 however, this finding is necessarily predicated on the IEA’s emergency response 
mechanism working as intended. The above limitations notwithstanding, the 2005 report 
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socially efficient level of supply security. Notably, the singular external event examined in the 
report is considered by orders of magnitude more likely than any internal disruption, and while 
acknowledging the difficulties associated with accurately determining all of the associated 
costs of a disruption,411 the report nevertheless calculates an external supply disruption to be 
the most economically damaging.412 
The subsequent 2012 assessment is directly framed around the question of whether New 
Zealand’s current security policies are sufficient.413 The assessment effectively adopts the same 
approach as the 2005 report, while using updated probabilities and a more comprehensive 
approach to the cost-benefit calculations. The 2012 assessment determines external risk by 
modelling the impact of a large disruption to global oil supplies. Disruption risk is derived 
using estimated probabilities taken from a 2005 Energy Modelling Forum (EMF) report that 
considered events of a certain size over a specified time period.414  The 2012 New Zealand 
assessment borrows these EMF report data to represent a range of likely events for modelling 
purposes.415 It then determines the cost of such a disruption to New Zealand, accounting for 
the anticipated market responses and the release of IEA emergency stockholdings on the 
international market, both of which are expected to minimise the impact of a disruption.416 
Ultimately, any international supply chain disruption is expected to be mediated through the 
oil market price mechanism.417 The report states this finding clearly: in an integrated global oil 
market, the price mechanism mediates any fluctuation in supply.418  
While the 2012 report does not explicitly discuss the reason for adopting the 2005 approach to 
measure external risk, it nevertheless expects that an international disruption will cause a sharp 
increase in international prices rather than a physical shortage of oil. While the report does 
acknowledge circumstances where deep quantity constraints exist and customers are unable to 
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not assess this further.419 This conclusion is made despite the fact that between the 2005 and 
2012 assessments the New Zealand government had met its IEA stockholding obligations not 
by holding physical stocks onshore, but by taking out stock ticket contracts with suppliers in 
other IEA countries.420 This effective dismissal of a specific supply risk is reflected in the 
assessment’s deliberations, with New Zealand’s IEA-mandated demand restraint measures and 
net 90-days of imports stockholding the only policy instruments relating to external security 
that are discussed. The report asserts that New Zealand is not a large enough player to influence 
the international oil market on its own, and must therefore rely on collective agreements like 
the IEA to mitigate the effects of significant international disruptions and manage the 
consequences.421 As international disruptions are mediated primarily through the market price 
mechanism, the conclusion is that there is little New Zealand can do in the short term to 
ameliorate the effects of such disruptions.422  
In contrast to the 2005 assessment, the 2012 report determines that New Zealand has sufficient 
oil stockholding volumes to maintain an efficient level of oil security. While this determination 
is due to the New Zealand Government addressing the stockholding shortfall highlighted in the 
2005 report, the fact that a large proportion of those stockholdings comprises stock ticket 
contracts with overseas suppliers is not found to be problematic. The reasons are twofold: 
domestic stocks are found to be at an acceptable level given the likelihood and impact of 
internal events that might cause physical disruption to supply; and in the event of an external 
disruption like the one assessed, the IEA member stockholdings would be released onto the 
international oil market to lessen price spikes and mitigate the impact on members. For the 
latter reason, it is argued that it is irrelevant where the reserve stockholding is physically held. 
Offshore ticket contracts are therefore considered optimal because they constitute the lowest 
cost option.423 Of note, external disruptions are once again considered to be by far the most 
damaging. In total, the international disruption scenario examined is calculated to cost New 




419 Ibid., 12. 
420 Ibid., i. 
421 Ibid., 29. 
422 Ibid., 12. 
423 Ibid., i. 
424 Ibid., 21. 
 
 93 
The third and final New Zealand oil security assessment in 2017 comprises a partial update of 
the 2012 assessment, with the 2005 methodology, assumptions and proscriptions remaining 
essentially unchanged. The benefits of stockholding are discussed in the update for the first 
time, but done so in the context of global rather than New Zealand-specific security given the 
research cited examines stockholding benefits globally.425 
6.4 Assessments & Policymaking  
The three government-commissioned assessments of New Zealand’s oil security described 
above are used to substantiate the mix of policy instruments ultimately adopted, and currently 
enacted through the OERS. The scope and foundational assumptions of the assessments 
therefore have a profound influence upon their findings, and consequently the policy mix 
eventually chosen. This raises the question as to what extent the pre-existing mix of policy 
instruments determined the framing and therefore the findings of the 2005, 2012 and 2017 oil 
security assessments, as distinct from the assessments influencing the policy mix itself. It is 
therefore necessary to understand the limitations of the assessments in order to reach any 
conclusions on their efficacy for policymaking.  
The assessments provide cost-benefit frameworks necessary for policymakers to in-part 
determine the best mix of oil security policy instruments for New Zealand to maintain an 
acceptable level of energy security. Approaching external disruptions as a percentage reduction 
in total supply to the global oil market does provide a quantifiable metric to determine the 
associated costs. Furthermore, it tests the impacts of the most common form of external 
disruption New Zealand is currently likely to experience – the manifestation of increased 
supply insecurity in the form of less affordable prices. However, while the underlying 
assumptions adopted for these frameworks likely give a robust estimation of present-day risk, 
that risk is assessed solely with respect to the upstream production sector of the supply chain. 
While affordability is a factor of security, the assessments do not undertake a comprehensive 
examination of the second element of security - availability. Although considered less likely, 
physical disruption of New Zealand’s external supply lines are not addressed. Such events that 
disrupt or interrupt the transportation of oil may result in the country not just having to pay a 
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and refined product at any price. By the same token, the assessments do not examine the 
capability of New Zealand to second-source oil supplies in the event of a significant upstream 
and midstream disruption. The 2012 report highlights this point, acknowledging that a wider 
indication of New Zealand’s oil security could be gained from supplementing ‘days cover’ with 
other indicators, including the ability to second-source imports in the event of a disruption of 
normal supply.426  
Further to the above, the assessments are predicated on the notions that the oil market is 
integrated, and that oil is fungible. These assumptions are that the oil market is fluid and 
fungible enough to ensure shortfalls and thus price rises would be shared across the market 
equally, regardless of the disruption or underlying circumstances. As the 2012 report notes, 
disruptions are regular occurrences in the international market, and the price variations that 
result are spread across the international market. It takes exceptional circumstances for the 
equilibrating function of the market to be put under real stress.427 However, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, this understanding of the market is an oversimplification that hides the complex 
conditionality of oil markets’ reliability and predictability. In addition, changes to the structure 
of the oil markets themselves have the potential to weaken their ability to equilibrate prices 
during disruptions to supply. The above notwithstanding, confidence in the ability of the 
markets to adequately respond to disruption is an element of any reliance upon certain security 
of supply policy instruments, most notably in New Zealand’s case being multi-lateral 
cooperation (IEA) and international agreements (IEF).  
The IEA and associated IEP stockholding obligations are a central focus of the three 
assessments, yet there is no discussion as to whether New Zealand should remain an IEA 
member, nor is there robust analysis of the benefits to oil security these policy instruments 
actually provide - these are accepted as givens. Similarly, the MBIE discussion document that 
accompanies the 2012 report states that IEA membership is the best mechanism for dealing 
with international oil security risks,428 and deems it unacceptable for New Zealand to withdraw 
from the agreement and rely on other IEA countries to maintain collective oil security; that is, 
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associated with the reputational damage to the nation that such a withdrawal would engender, 
rather than any impact to domestic oil security.429  
Finally, given the present or short-term focus of the assessments, there is no examination of 
the potential risks to New Zealand’s oil security over the long-term. As the 2005 report states, 
oil security is not a constant – it can change over time.430 By extension, changing the time 
horizon may influence the conclusions drawn on New Zealand’s oil import dependency and 
vulnerability. For example, a situation might occur where the international oil market is 
currently characterised as being stable, yet is forecast to experience significant production 
shortfalls in the coming decades. In such a situation, an import-dependent country considered 
adequately secure at present would likely be considered insecure over the longer term, all other 
things remaining equal.  
6.5 Policy & Security 
Given the limitations of the assessments discussed above, a question arises as to whether the 
current mix of oil security policy instruments substantiated by these assessments is optimal, 
given New Zealand’s particular combination of dependence upon oil and oil imports and its 
previously described vulnerabilities in upstream, midstream and downstream sectors of the 
supply chain. New Zealand relies solely on the international oil market to source its crudes and 
refined product. The country’s import dependency is heavily concentrated on Middle East 
producers. Its only refinery is specifically configured for these crudes, as are the refineries in 
Asia from which the country sources refined product. Transporting petroleum from the Middle 
East and product from Asia introduces long and complex maritime supply lines that are 
inherently vulnerable, especially at choke points. All these external factors constitute 
fundamental elements of New Zealand’s oil supply chain.  
Any robust assessment of oil security intended to inform policymaking should therefore ideally 
analyse these specific external factors directly, given they can materially impact the perceived 
nature and degree of risks that New Zealand is exposed to. By extension, this impacts the 
perceived viability and effectiveness of policies. For example, if New Zealand’s external oil 
transport network was found not to be adequately secure then the option of holding strategic 
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long-term stockholding agreements may no longer be considered appropriate if oil is expected 
to become a significantly less important energy source for New Zealand or if short-term 
substitutability is expected to improve. It is therefore clear that a more comprehensive 
understanding of New Zealand’s energy system, and awareness of the expected changes within 
areas that could affect this system, can impact conclusions regarding effectiveness and viability 
of different oil security policy instruments or mix thereof. However, for any assessment to be 
effective there needs to be an understanding of what the requirements actually are for policies 
to have the intended effect.  
This is particularly true when examining the long-term viability of policies, as policy-affecting 
elements of the geopolitical and energy spheres considered unlikely to change to any 
meaningful extent over the short-term may do so over longer periods. When energy security is 
assessed over a longer time horizon, new policy options become viable. From a short-term 
perspective, the assessment that New Zealand is too small to have any market or strategic 
influence over its external oil security is almost certainly correct. However, over the long-term 
it may not necessarily follow that the country has no control over the structure of its own supply 
chain, or that policy responses to external risks cannot be more comprehensive. While long-
term policy options are not addressed in existing assessments, the 2012 report indirectly 
highlights the existence of these options by noting that longer term exposure to risk can be 
reduced by lowering oil dependency in the transport sector.431  
6.5.1 IEA & IEP 
As noted above, IEA membership and the IEP agreement effectively constitute the extent of 
New Zealand’s mix of security of oil supply policy instruments. The IEP’s strategic reserve 
requirement of 90 days’ net imports is the core provision of security through its supposed 
ability to stabilise markets. However, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the IEA’s cumulative 
stockholding has declined as a proportion of 90-day global oil demand, potentially reducing its 
ability to mitigate or prevent disruptions via coordinated stock release or other measures. While 
there is broad agreement that maintaining strategic reserves is a crucial oil security policy 
instrument for crisis management, some reservations have been raised regarding New 
Zealand’s reliance upon oil stock tickets to meet its IEP obligations. As the IEA’s 2017 review 
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Zealand and the countries with which it has bilateral stockholding agreements means that 
repatriating stocks would take a number of weeks in shipping time. 432 MBIE estimates that it 
would take one to two months for stock to arrive in New Zealand, depending upon location.433 
The conclusion therefore is that strategic reserves in the form of offshore oil stock tickets do 
not improve New Zealand’s short-term resilience to disruption.  
There are also reservations regarding the efficacy of stock ticket contracts in practice. In their 
feedback on the 2012 Review of New Zealand’s Oil Security discussion paper, Z Energy (New 
Zealand’s only non-TNOC involved in petroleum importing, refining and distribution) argues 
that tickets are much less effective than physical stockholding. Z Energy notes that in the event 
of a substantial international outage it is uncertain whether oil supply would be available to 
honour the tickets. Moreover, they argue that in an event where other IEA members are also 
facing shortages, there are significant doubts that contracts would be honoured even if stocks 
are at hand: “…it is difficult to imagine the likes of Spain allowing product to be loaded to ship 
to New Zealand to meet our domestic ticket obligations.”434 Z Energy therefore concludes that 
publicly funded stock tickets alone cannot resolve the international oil security issue, and that 
ultimately there is no equally secure substitute for physical stock stored within the country.435 
Questions of whether current levels of domestically stored stockholding is sufficient have also 
been raised within recent Civil Defence documents, but have yet to receive further enquiry.436 
Further to the above concerns, it is also unlikely that the closest IEA partner country, Australia, 
would be capable of meeting the IEP commitment of stock sharing in the event of a disruption 
given that it has consistently fallen well below its IEA stockholding obligations for a number 
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their petroleum from similar sources and using similar transport routes to their New Zealand 
counterparts.438  
 
From the 1980s to the present, New Zealand has not experienced a disruption at the level of 
severity experienced during the 1970s oil crisis. In this regard, it may be considered that New 
Zealand’s oil security policy mix has been appropriate for the security environment over this 
time. However, it can be argued that this is likely less because of the security policies New 
Zealand has enacted, and more because of the relatively stable geopolitical environment and 
wider structural changes within the oil industry itself. Changes in the oil markets and 
geopolitical environment could therefore lead to a reconsideration. As one of New Zealand’s 
earlier reports notes, “…the fact that the existing system has been providing this level of 
security is no guarantee that it will continue to do so… it makes sense to periodically reconsider 
whether oil security is adequate for New Zealand as a whole.”439 The 2019 events in the Gulf 
described in Chapter 1 attest to the wisdom of this advice, with an Australian Department of 
Environment & Energy (DoEE) report stating that while a full cut of oil supply from Iran could 
be met with increased supply from Saudi Arabia, a large-scale Middle East conflict would 
likely impact oil markets far more severely.440  It can therefore be concluded that oil security 
policymaking based upon assessments that assume the geopolitical status quo will continue to 
prevail may be subject to failure due to a lack of imagination.  
 
6.6 Summary 
Countries have a mix of different policy instruments available to enhance the security of their 
oil supplies. The specific mix of instruments chosen generally reflects the degree of confidence 
a country has in the resilience of oil markets. The New Zealand Government has consistently 
pursued a largely laissez-faire and singular approach to oil security over several decades. IEA 
membership and the associated IEP agreement effectively constitute the entirety of New 
Zealand’s current external security of oil supply policy. The IEP obligates signatories to 
maintain a strategic reserve of specific volumes of crude and refined product. New Zealand 
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guaranteed by other IEA countries. New Zealand’s dependence on IEA membership essentially 
leaves it accepting the country’s current levels of exposure to supply disruption, and largely 
reliant on resilient markets. The ability of the IEP to maintain market stability has not yet been 
tested by a major disruption, nor the fidelity of stock ticket arrangements. The New Zealand 
Government has commissioned a series of assessments of the nation’s oil security that 
substantiates the mix of policy instruments ultimately adopted. These assessments are 
significantly limited by their common reliance upon cost-benefit analyses, short time horizons, 
and core assumptions about oil markets, fungibility and logistics. This results in a mix of oil 
security policy instruments characterised by a heavy reliance on IEA membership and the IEP 
agreement. The efficacy of oil security policymaking is fundamentally a product of the 








7 Oil Demand & Supply Forecasts  
7.1 Introduction 
As shown in Part I, the future stability and structure of the geopolitical environment represents 
a prominent driver of the risk to global and national scale petroleum supply. However, national 
energy systems do not remain static, and strongly influence states’ exposure to supply risk and 
the mix of security of supply policy instruments available to them. New Zealand is no different 
in this respect. Therefore, to reach a comprehensive understanding of the impact of geopolitics 
on oil security requires an equal understanding of the dynamics of the global and domestic 
energy system. 
The world’s energy system as a whole is undergoing change. The ratio of the various energy 
sources within the global supply has remained fairly stable since the 1960s, but energy mega-
trends suggest a comprehensive transformation of the sector may be underway.441  
Development within the fields of renewable energy, energy storage, AI and smart grid 
connectivity are changing the long-established structure of the global energy system.442 Means 
of producing and consuming energy that were formerly cost prohibitive for widescale use have 
become economically viable; new-found provision of alternatives to oil in turn enable adoption 
of a different mix of policy instruments for improving energy security. Nevertheless, the global 
substitution away from oil within energy systems has so far been slow, and this is the case for 
New Zealand. Furthermore, while there is significant uncertainty about the future scale and 
pace of this transition, evidence suggests that substitution away from oil is likely to increase. 
For example, although still a comparatively small amount of the global fleet, sales of EVs 
globally have increased substantially, largely due to favourable government policies.443 The 
substitution megatrend raises the question as to whether oil security will become less of a 
concern over the 2040 time horizon, rendering existing security policies excessive or obsolete.  
Paralleling this transformation of the energy system, the global oil market itself has also 
experienced some profound changes in the last decade. On the supply side, tight oil production 
technology has completely changed oil market dynamics, making some oil sources now 
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to become one of the largest global producers, bringing greater diversity to oil supplies. The 
corresponding change in market dynamics has led some to question whether the oil security 
concerns of importing countries are now less of an issue.444 This boom in tight oil has however 
been offset by declines in conventional crude production, which peaked in 2008 and is now in 
decline.445 Investment in more conventional sources has also declined, reinforcing this trend.446 
New oil discoveries have been declining as most prospective areas are already well explored, 
with levels of new discoveries at the end of 2017 being the lowest since the 1950s and 
accounting for only 10% of global demand.447 Within the Asia-Pacific, the region’s primary 
exporters Malaysia and Indonesia are facing a changing market as demand is outstripping 
production.448 
On the other side of the equation, demand for liquid petroleum-based fuels in other OECD 
countries in Europe and the Americas has begun to stagnate, whereas the level of oil demand 
within developing nations has continued to rise, particularly within Asia. This has over time 
changed the patterns of the global oil trade: while the Atlantic basin was the primary destination 
for Middle East oil in the 1970s, today approximately 80% of Middle East exports are destined 
for Asian destinations.449 The Asia-Pacific region’s growing dependence on fossil fuel imports 
has raised energy security concerns, not only because of a growing import bill.450 
Consequently, the immediate challenge of how to diversify suppliers and supply routes away 
from the Middle East is shared by countries in the region, including New Zealand.451  
The above changes to global oil production and within the broader energy system are likely to 
have significant implications for oil markets into the future. Furthermore, they have the 
capacity to change the geopolitical landscape. Overland highlights that past transitions, such 
as the introduction of the steam engine in the 18th century, or the shift from coal to oil with the 
invention of the internal combustion engine in the 19th century, have been associated with 
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anticipated to play within the world’s and New Zealand’s energy mix to 2040 will determine 
the priority of maintaining oil security regardless of what is happening in the geopolitical 
environment, and will impact the viability of oil security policy instruments, both individually 
and as a mix. The anticipated broad changes within the domestic and international oil markets, 
and how these may impact the risk of disruptions in the future and the effectiveness of the 
various security policy instruments, are addressed next.  
7.2 Forecasting Overview 
Changes in the petroleum market and supply chain are very difficult to predict. Factors that 
both directly and indirectly influence the size and location of future oil production are 
numerous, and the factors influencing future supply and demand are equally complex.453 
Adding to this complexity is how to weight the respective probabilities of various events, and 
which events to exclude from forecasts altogether. The consequences of these assumptions can 
be particularly profound in the event of so-called ‘black swan’ events, which are typically 
excluded from industry scenarios. For example, while futurists may have imagined a global 
pandemic in their scenarios, the implications of any regional or global response to such an 
event does not appear in any industry forecast, although this will now likely change.  
Even absent the pandemic, this difficulty in finding clarity in forecasting has led some to note 
that at there is currently a heightened level of uncertainty over what will happen within oil 
markets both over the short and the long term,454 and that the energy sector as a whole is 
changing faster than it ever has before.455 Changes within the geopolitical environment can 
also cause a notable impact on oil market trends. For example, the WEC’s World Energy 
Scenarios 2019 report predicts that in a context where there is comparatively greater 
nationalism and less cooperation and coordination between states, there will be much slower 
electric vehicle (EV) and alternative fuel use, and less investment in energy transformation 
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occur within the oil market, leading energy industry bodies regularly produce informed 
forecasts and scenarios based upon today’s realities, including policy setting trends.  
7.2.1 IEA Forecasts 
The analysis of the global market changes presented here are drawn from the IEA’s annual 
World Energy Outlook (WEO) – one of the most well-regarded forecasting reports. The report 
provides forecasts under three different scenarios, but only the primary forecast - the ‘New 
Policies Scenario’ (NPS) - is referenced here. This scenario generates forecasts of anticipated 
global energy market changes based upon continued growth in oil demand, moderated by 
states’ declarations of new and planned policies.457  
Limitations 
All petroleum forecasting exercises have limitations arising from the need to reduce the 
complexity of the system they are endeavouring to predict.  In the case of the NPS, limitations 
relate to the core assumptions of the scenario and significant uncertainties associated with oil 
production.  
There are two assumptions made in the NPS that are important to note for the purposes of this 
research. Firstly, the NPS should be considered ‘business as usual’ in geopolitical terms given 
it does not account for any significant changes in the structure of the political and economic 
system. The scenario does acknowledge that geopolitical changes are an important factor in 
determining the trajectory of oil markets, noting how the adverse political and security 
environments of some OPEC members are affecting oil production and investment 
Nevertheless, the forecast assumes a gradual improvement in the geopolitical context.458 
Secondly, the NPS assumes new oil supplies come online at the right time to meet demand and 
maintain system equilibrium. However, as has been shown this is often not how markets work 
in practice, with the report noting that in reality upstream oil investments may not materialise 
in time to meet demand.459  
In addition to the above assumptions, the NPS is also limited by significant emerging 
uncertainties relating to oil supply. This uncertainty does not arise from the sufficiency of 
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decline in demand, for oil. The WEC points to this predicted peaking of demand as a critical 
issue for industry participants in terms of both high uncertainty and high impact. It notes that 
this change will likely result in increased price volatility as NOCs and TNOCs reduce their 
capital investment in anticipation of falling demand, particularly in long lead time projects. 
Any decline in upstream investment in turn raises concerns about the possibility of oil 
producers being left with stranded assets.460 Similarly, the IEA has previously warned that 
current investment levels in new conventional production capacity are insufficient to keep up 
with anticipated demand, noting that one likely reason for this shortfall is because of oil 
producers’ concerns over the trajectory of oil demand.461 The IEA notes that if this mismatch 
between projected supply and demand is not rectified there will be a growing risk of damaging 
price spikes and increased volatility in the medium term.462 
A further significant uncertainty pertains to the forecasts of tight oil production in the US.463 
This uncertainty results from a number of factors, but many relate to the technical realities of 
the extraction method. Production from a tight oil well declines at a significantly higher rate 
than from conventional wells, meaning that in addition to output being capable of increasing 
relatively quickly using this technology, it can also decrease relatively quickly. To illustrate, 
40% of the tight oil wells drilled in the US in 2018 were needed just to maintain production 
levels.464 In addition, tight oil production generally has a higher break-even point for 
production costs than conventional projects, and as of 2018 the tight oil industry as a whole 
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experiencing bankruptcies that have been accelerated by recent plunges in crude prices 
associated with a Saudi Arabia and Russia production war, and the economic contraction from 
the COVID-19 pandemic.466  
Other significant uncertainties that could positively or negatively affect global oil production 
include changing demand patterns, assumptions regarding technology development, 
recoverable resource levels, infrastructure constraints and concerns over the social and 
environmental impacts.467  Short to medium-term demand patterns in particular are now 
especially uncertain. The COVID-19 pandemic has seen global oil demand plummet to 1999 
levels, throwing oil markets into turmoil and potentially bringing a paradigm-shift in 
consumption patterns, with the IEA not forecasting a return to pre-crisis demand until 2021 at 
the earliest.468 The choices of other producers could also affect production. For example, the 
NPS forecast assumes that OPEC continues to regulate production in an attempt to manage the 
market. However, the IEA notes that OPEC could take an alternative approach, attempting to 
maintain their production share by increasing production.469 This approach would lead to a 
marked fall in oil prices and subsequently production from other sources like tight oil. 
The extent to which the above assumptions and production uncertainties hold true or not will 
almost certainly affect the trajectory of oil markets, and in turn the oil security of New Zealand 
and that of other consumer nations. Nevertheless, underlying, and in some cases 
transformative, changes to long-term oil market dynamics are likely to occur regardless of the 
geopolitical context. These forecast developments, and their potential impact on petroleum 
supply risk and security of supply policy effectiveness are discussed next.  
7.3 Global Forecasts 
7.3.1 Demand 
Under the NPS, global demand for oil is expected to grow by around 1 mb/d year on year on 
average to 2025. Oil demand growth is expected to slow beyond this point, but global demand 
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Figure 8: Change in global oil demand by sector in the New Policies Scenario, 2017-2040471 
2040, demand is expected to very gradually decline. As Figure 8 shows, this growth is expected 
to come almost exclusively from developing economies, driven in large part by road transport. 
In contrast, demand from developed economies is expected to drop over the period to 2040, 
declining by 10 mb/d overall.472  
Table 2 shows oil demand becoming notably more concentrated in the Asia-Pacific, where 
consumption taking roughly two-thirds of global crude oil exports by 2040 compared with one 
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half today.474 China dominates demand growth to 2025, and then India and the Middle East 
dominate growth between the late 2020s and 2040.475 This growth results in China overtaking 
the US to become the world’s largest oil consumer, and the largest oil importer in history. The 
Middle East and India overtake EU demand around 2030,476 becoming the third and fourth 
largest oil consuming markets by 2040.477 Most net importer regions are expected to import a 
greater share of their demand, particularly the Asia-Pacific where oil production is expected to 
decline steeply, such that by the early 2020s there will be no country in the region that is a net-
exporter.478 Reflecting this, South-East Asia’s import dependence is expected to grow from 
approximately 60% today to 80% by 2040.  
The profile of consumption by sector is also expected to change. In advanced economies, oil 
demand for road transport declines notably between 2017 and 2040. However, demand in the 
trucking sector continues to grow alongside significant growth in demand for petrochemicals 
production. Similarly, aviation and maritime shipping grow as a proportion of global demand, 
with oil demand in aviation alone increasing over 50% by 2040. Oil is therefore forecast to still 
dominate in international transport to 2040, with minimal biofuels use over the same period.479 
Overall, aviation and shipping, trucks and petrochemicals grow from approximately one third 
of total oil demand in 2000 to one half by 2040.480  
7.3.2 Supply 
Under the NPS, the Middle East is forecast to remain the largest petroleum producing region 
by a significant margin.481 Production gradually declines in Europe, Africa, non-OPEC Middle 
East, Eurasia and Asia-Pacific regions as conventional production depletes. In contrast, North 
and South America are the only regions outside the Middle East expected to see increases in 
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and Brazil.483 While there are notable increases in oil flows from North and South America to 
Asia, the crude oil trade from the Middle East to Asia remains critical. 
The NPS forecasts fewer countries will remain surplus producers in the future. Over the long 
term, production is increasingly concentrated in Middle East OPEC members, with all these 
countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Iraq, expected to deliver production growth equivalent 
to an additional 6 mb/d combined; only 0.7 mb/d of additional production is expected from 
non-Middle East OPEC members.484 The US accounts for 75% of global production growth to 
2025, with tight oil production subsequently peaking at 9.2 mb/d before slowly declining 
through depletion of core areas. Tight oil production ramps up elsewhere after 2025, 
particularly in Argentina, Russia, Canada and Mexico, with Australia, China and the UAE also 
having tight oil potential.485 As a result, by 2040 a forecast 3.5 mb/d of tight oil production 
occurs outside of the US,486 and conventional oil continues to decrease as a proportion of the 
global supply mix from 72% in 2017 to 62%.487  
 
Figure 9: Change in global oil production in the New Policies Scenario.488 
Despite the forecast growth in tight oil supply, after 2025 OPEC nations remain essential to 
meeting increases in oil demand.489 Comprising many of the least-cost suppliers, under NPS 
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greater market share.490 This sees the cartel’s proportion of global supply dipping in the 
medium term before rebounding, but limiting itself to 45% of global oil supply by 2040 as 
shown in Figure 9. Finally, commensurate with the above growth in global crude supply, 17 
mb/d of new refining capacity comes online by 2040. This is located predominantly in Asia 
and the Middle East,491 continuing a recent trend of refining centres increasingly being 
concentrated in the Middle East, China and India.492  
7.4 New Zealand Forecasts 
While New Zealand’s petroleum supply and demand is not specifically covered within the 
IEA’s forecasts, there are alternative scenario-based demand forecasts that provide indications 
of what New Zealand’s future oil consumption might be. This study refers to publications from 
the New Zealand Government, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and 
BusinessNZ Energy Council (BEC) to discern the anticipated role oil will have in New 
Zealand’s future energy mix.  
The New Zealand Government’s report,  New Zealand’s Energy Outlook 2011, adopts a 
‘business-as-usual’ reference scenario that assumes a continuation of the then-existing broad 
trends of policy settings, core economic drivers, technologies and fuel choices.493 In this 
scenario oil demand continues to grow through to 2040, and still accounts for approximately 
44% of TFC. The transport sector remains dependent on oil through to 2030 with alternative 
fuels still meeting only a small proportion of transport energy demand. Notably, just six years 
after publication New Zealand’s oil and refined product consumption was already higher than 
predicted in the reference scenario.494 A subsequent 2017 New Zealand Government report, 
Transport Outlook: Future State, sheds light on possible oil demand, although it does not 
specifically address oil consumption. In the report’s ‘base case’ scenario495, given New 
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make up only 40% of the light vehicle fleet by 2040, with petrol and diesel vehicle numbers 
falling from 3.8 million in 2015 to 2.4 million.496  
Similarly, the APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook 7th Edition 2019 report adopts a 
‘business as usual’ (BAU) model that forecasts a 20% increase in New Zealand’s TFC by 
2050.497 This growth is driven primarily by the transport sector, with its share of TFC 
disproportionately growing by 34%, largely through expansion of freight and aviation activity. 
Consequently, despite the BAU model forecasting increasing transport sector fuel efficiency 
and uptake of EVs, petroleum-based products continue to dominate, with demand over this 
period forecast to increase by 26%.498 
Two scenarios that examine future oil consumption in more detail developed outside of the 
state government sector come from BEC’s 2015 report, New Zealand Energy Scenarios.499 
These scenarios are based upon two quite different futures to 2050. The ‘Kayak’ scenario is 
one where markets drive supply chain decisions and innovation, and consumers make their 
decisions in their own interests based on price and quality. ‘Waka’ is a scenario where 
businesses, consumers and the government are driven to make decisions in the national interest 
due to environmental considerations and changing global circumstances. Under the Kayak 
scenario, oil consumption peaks in 2030 and begins to decline, accounting for 38% of TFC by 
2050.500 Diesel and petrol still dominate land transport, and aviation fuel consumption 
increases by 87% between 2010 and 2050. Alternative fuels make up 13% of total fuel use in 
transport.501 By contrast in the Waka scenario, oil consumption is reduced further to meet 
environmental commitments, with oil-based fuel use declining by 31% between 2010 and 
2050. While the majority of the light vehicle fleet is using alternative fuels, other transport 
types still rely on petroleum-based fuels. Aviation fuel still sees a significant 70% increase in 
consumption between 2010 and 2050.502 In both scenarios, domestic petroleum production in 
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The variations in the scenarios examined above illustrate two things. Firstly, the scenarios 
demonstrate the importance of government policies in shaping New Zealand’s future energy 
system and level of dependence upon oil. Secondly, and of more relevance for this research, 
the switch to alternative fuels in the transport sector will likely be a long process.504 
Consequently, petroleum is expected to remain the predominant fuel source for New Zealand’s 
domestic transport sector to 2040 and beyond. A significant government intervention in the 
energy market could reduce this domestic dominance, but even then, oil security will still be 
of high importance if international transport – on which the country relies – remains powered 
by oil in the absence of viable alternatives in sufficient volumes. This reality is reflected in the 
BEC scenarios, where a greater proportion of the oil consumed will be used in heavy and 
international transport - a development that could have implications for flexibility of 
consumption. Security of external oil supply will therefore remain an important objective for 
New Zealand into the future.  
7.5 Mega-Trends  
The trajectory of the oil market is unlikely to exactly follow the IEA outlook presented here.  
However, an analysis of this scenario reveals some broader energy ‘mega-trends’ that are likely 
to occur over the next two decades regardless of the context. A number of these trends are 
relevant for New Zealand’s oil security. 
7.5.1 Oil Demand 
Perhaps the most important conclusion is that petroleum is expected to remain a highly 
important energy source for the world over the next two decades. In fact, none of the IEA 
scenarios paint a picture where oil is no longer an essential energy source. Technological 
advances are providing alternatives to oil but will not immediately replace it. To the contrary, 
oil consumption is likely to increase further, albeit at a slower pace. Moreover, once decline of 
demand occurs it is likely to be a gradual process. Therefore, not only will oil security remain 
a priority for countries across the world generally, so will continued investment in the 
exploration and development of new sources, the aforementioned issues relating to stranded 
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The anticipated changes in consumption profile by sector is also of note here. Oil consumption 
appears set to become proportionately more concentrated within trucking, international 
transport (maritime shipping and aviation) and petrochemicals. This change in the future 
consumption profile may suggest less global demand flexibility to respond to a disruption, a 
comparatively greater economic impact relative to the disruption magnitude, or both. 
Alternative fuels are also unlikely to replace petroleum’s dominance within international 
transport over this time. 
Future Demand in the Asia-Pacific 
The current and expected future demand growth coming from Asia will, as one commentator 
describes, “…change the global geography of energy.”505 The market influence of large 
consumer countries in this region will continue to grow, and refining capacity is expected to 
expand further in Asia and the Middle East, allowing New Zealand to affordably diversify its 
imported refined product supply sources. However, as previously shown many net-importing 
regions and large consumer countries are expected to import a greater proportion of their 
supplies or maintain already high levels of import dependence, as is the case with New Zealand. 
The Asia-Pacific is most notable in forecast demand figures, with the region seeing an increase 
in its import dependency as demand significantly grows while at the same time its oil 
production declines. A greater import dependence necessitates a heavier reliance on certain 
exporting countries into the future, with commensurate implications for the supply security of 
the region, and New Zealand’s crude and refined product security specifically.  
7.5.2 Oil Supply 
The trends described within this outlook hold both reassurance and concern for future oil 
exploration and production. The emergence and successful adoption of tight oil production 
indicates that peak supply is unlikely to occur within the next two decades, with economically 
viable reserves expected to be available in sufficient quantities to meet global demand. To the 
contrary, it appears far more likely that peak demand will occur over this timeframe. 
Nevertheless, these changes should not be interpreted as New Zealand’s supply security 
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Emerging Exporters & Tight Oil Production 
The above indicates that tight oil production will play a lasting role in global oil supplies. 
Despite the boom witnessed in shale production, the outlook also shows that unconventional 
oil will not be replacing crude production from traditional exporting countries in the time 
period examined, with US tight oil production expected to peak in the medium term. The 
outlook also shows that the shale boom in the US is unlikely to be replicated at similar scales 
within other states,506 and that many of the identified shale reserves are within countries that 
are already major oil and gas exporters.507 It should also be noted that growth in tight oil 
production within the US is expected to be accompanied by production declines in other non-
OPEC countries. Therefore, while tight oil production technology may revolutionise oil 
production, it is unlikely to affect market structures to the same extent. Long-term, given its 
concentration of spare production capacity OPEC will continue to play a central role within 
the oil market and in maintaining market stability.508 Finally, the majority of production and 
reserves will almost certainly remain state controlled; unconventional sources will not be an 
issue in an era of pure economically-driven oil prices devoid of state-driven strategic pricing. 
The above notwithstanding and as the IEA states, crude grades need to be kept in mind when 
considering the country-level oil security benefits of the US becoming a net-exporter; most 
US-produced oil is light and sweet, with only 20% being light and medium-sour.509 From a 
regional perspective, these light sweet grades do not constitute a one-to-one substitute for the 
light and medium-sour grades primarily coming out of the Middle East – the very grades that 
many Asian refineries are precisely configured to process.510 In addition to logistical 
limitations, this means that it will likely be a slow process for Asian refineries to reconfigure 
on their own accord to enable processing of US tight oil. As already mentioned, Marsden Point 
would similarly face obstacles switching to an even lighter crude diet.511 Some commentators 




506 Although other countries have shale reserves, they may not be as economically viable to extract. A 
combination of upstream factors in addition to the characteristics of the fields themselves could impact the 
economic viability of a shale play. Overland, "Future Petroleum Geopolitics: Consequences of Climate Policy 
and Unconventional Oil and Gas," 14. 
507 Ibid., 23. 
508 Ibid., 10. 
509 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2019, 64. 
510 Light and medium sour grades account for over 70% of the oil that Japan and Korea’s refineries process. 
China and India also have substantial appetites for these grades but process a slightly more diverse range of oil 
grades: ibid., 168-69. 
511 Personal communication with Refining New Zealand. 
 
 115 
sweet tight crude overseas, given its comparatively lower yield of the middle distillates for 
which there is more of a demand globally.512 
Despite the limitations above, the US shale oil boom has nevertheless resulted in another large 
exporter emerging on the market, presenting consumer countries with a potential large source 
of petroleum from a politically stable free-market economy with which to diversify their 
supply. Tight oil production has a comparatively short investment and production cycle, which 
the IEA claims provides somewhat of a safety net for global markets in the event of supply-
demand imbalances.513 Given the expected shorter lead-times of shale oil production compared 
to conventional projects, new unconventional production may also make global production 
more flexible in responding to disruption. It is however unclear how rapidly tight oil production 
could respond to a significant disruption;514 at present, tight oil production increases in the US 
are constrained by infrastructure limitations.515 While the US could theoretically meet a large 
proportion of any Middle East supply shortfall given its ability to ramp up tight oil production 
relatively quickly, this would also cause significant short-term issues given the aforementioned 
differences in crude characteristics.516 Furthermore, Asian refiners’ ability to switch to tight oil 
feedstock would lag significantly behind any supply increase, and doing so would also have 
major impacts on product mix and yield, adding additional costs and affecting the economics 
of refining operations.  
Regardless of how much more flexible tight oil production is to traditional sources, making 
additional oil available to the global market may be seen as improving global oil security 
overall. Nevertheless, it does not appear that US tight oil production alone will resolve or the 
Asia-Pacific region’s or New Zealand’s dependency on Gulf oil supplies. 
Traditional Exporters and Conventional Production 
The NPS indicates the majority of conventional production increases are expected to come 
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Middle East members, with minimal cumulative export growth from members outside of this 
region. To the extent that this proves to be the case, global oil security will depend even more 
on stability within these Middle East producer countries, and the availability of spare capacity 
within the region. The oil consumption levels within OPEC member countries is also relevant 
here. Growing consumption in traditional exporter regions could have security implications. 
Overland highlights that many OPEC countries have rapidly growing populations, and as a 
result the export capacity of some OPEC members is dwindling as more product is consumed 
domestically.517 The IEA expects that growing domestic demand within the Middle East will 
limit the region’s ability to meet the growing demand of other countries.518 
The anticipated market changes highlighted above may also have implications for the oil 
industries and economies of traditional exporters. The IEA notes that some traditional 
producers and exporters are facing an increased pressure on their oil revenues as the dynamics 
of the oil market change. Significant growth in tight oil production poses a serious challenge 
to many of the world’s producers as oil incomes are squeezed, especially those heavily reliant 
upon oil and gas revenues.519 This pressure on petroleum revenues may be compounded as 
OPEC reduces market share making market management efforts more difficult to achieve.520 
The anticipated slowing of demand growth and ultimate decline casts further doubt on future 
revenues. As the 2019 WEO states: “[Traditional producers] face the prospect of a world where 
markets for their ample oil resources are not guaranteed, and where reduced income from 
hydrocarbons hampers their ability to maintain upstream spending and constrains the 
investments necessary to diversify their economies.”521 It further notes that a shortfall in  
upstream spending arising from reduced revenues would result in considerably tighter markets 
and therefore markedly higher prices for oil.522 It could also result in short-term supply 
interruptions ballooning into prolonged outages.523 Ultimately, such an under-investment 
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could be harmed if the revenues of traditional producers are reduced and insufficient 
investment in production occurs. 
7.5.3 Oil Transport  
In the IEA’s NPS, the volume of oil transiting Indian Ocean SLOCs will further increase, in 
part due to the aforementioned growth in energy flows to Asia. This is in line with the view 
widely shared by experts that these SLOCs will continue to grow in economic and strategic 
importance. Increased trade flows will result in more pressure on chokepoints within these 
SLOCs; oil transiting through the Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain at substantial levels, 
while oil transiting the Strait of Malacca is expected to increase markedly.525 Any impediment 
to shipments through either chokepoint could significantly tighten markets,526 and will 
therefore remain a risk to New Zealand’s security of oil supply. The IEA warns that growing 
trade volumes and increasing geopolitical risk relating to key chokepoints means that 
policymakers must continue to be vigilant regarding oil security, and that emergency oil stocks 
will remain vital to respond to disruptions.527 Direct shipments from the Atlantic Basin to New 
Zealand could avoid these chokepoints altogether, but as previously noted shipping distance 
and duration is longer from this region. This increase in delivery timeframes inherently limits 
flexibility when handling transport emergencies and therefore raises additional oil security 
challenges for New Zealand and other net-importers in the region.528  
7.5.4 IEA Effectiveness 
The continuing trend of a growing proportion of demand moving from developed to developing 
countries may also have implications for New Zealand’s mix of oil security policy instruments. 
The stagnation and anticipated decline in developed countries’ oil demand will mean an 
eventual reduction in vulnerability to supply disruption. However, this will also mean that the 
group’s relationships with suppliers and the efficacy of international energy institutions like 
the IEA that have been structured around industrialised western economies may be negatively 
impacted, particularly as consumption grows concurrently in other regions.  
Assuming that IEA membership remains the same, the proportion of global oil demand that 
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decline accordingly. In fact, the IEA’s current cumulative stockholding is expected to halve to 
around 11% of total global demand by 2040.529 Transparency in the oil market has also been 
highlighted as a possible issue. Market coordination mechanisms may become more difficult 
to implement, as oil consumption continues to grow within countries whose energy data is 
unavailable or unreliable. 530   
7.5.5 State Responses 
Although some of these energy mega-trends are fairly straightforward to discern, it is less clear 
how countries will respond to these changes in the oil markets. The anticipated impact on New 
Zealand’s oil security is therefore uncertain as the policy choices of other states will be a large 
determinant. While such questions are not pursued in-depth here, two uncertainties that could 
impact New Zealand’s oil security environment are of note.  
The first uncertainty relates to the continued stability of relations between producer and 
consumers states. For example, it is unclear how the US might respond to becoming a net-
exporter, both in regard to its willingness to coordinate with other oil exporters on oil prices531 
and whether this will ultimately affect the country’s engagement in the Middle East.532 In 
contrast, while the US may disengage from the Middle East, Asia’s anticipated demand growth 
is expected to continue to drive major importers in the region into closer political and economic 
ties with the Middle East and other exporting regions.533 However, there is related uncertainty 
regarding the interactions of large consumers in the Asia-Pacific region, who as mentioned 
earlier have a history of competing to secure supply. The heightened level of import 
dependency may result in increased competition between these large consumer states, or 
alternatively force cooperation between them to ensure stable and secure supplies. Similarly, 
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Ocean, and whether this trajectory arcs toward cooperation or competition between the major 
regional players.534   
Another uncertainty relates to the trajectory of the large oil exporters that New Zealand relies 
upon. As the gap between production and domestic consumption shrinks within OPEC 
countries, they will become increasingly vulnerable to loss of income from reduced export 
prices as a greater share of oil revenues are required to maintain domestic subsidies.535 If 
sustained downward pressure on prices forces subsidy cuts, these cuts could lead to political 
instability and possibly regime change in OPEC countries.536 Instability within major oil 
producers would threaten oil flows, negatively impacting New Zealand and other consumer 
states. Conversely, some observers posit such a change might provide some benefit to regional 
security. Non-democratic oil-fuelled states like Iraq, Iran, Russia and Libya have a history of 
being involved in interstate conflict over recent decades. Overland suggests the reduced oil 
revenues for authoritarian countries might result in less capacity for interstate conflict in the 
world,537 which may provide some benefit to security within the region and for oil production. 
7.6 Summary 
Assuming current trends continue, oil will almost certainly remain a vital energy source for the 
world and New Zealand to 2040 and beyond. This will be characterised by increased global oil 
and gas consumption, greater importing of the resources, and concentration of supplies in a 
few countries. Oil’s share within the global energy mix may decrease, but is unlikely to be 
replaced by alternative fuels to any large extent over this timeframe. Moreover, it is possible 
that New Zealand’s oil demand may become even more inelastic as oil consumption is reduced 
first within the sectors in which it is easiest to do so. New Zealand and others in the Asia-region 
are anticipated to become more heavily dependent upon Middle East exporters for oil supply. 
While other sources from the Atlantic Basin will begin to constitute a greater proportion of oil 
supply to the region, this will take time as refineries adapt to new feedstocks. Moreover, these 
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including Africa and Southeast Asia. Anticipated trends, including increasing tight oil 
production growth and decreasing demand growth, may introduce even more challenges for 
ensuring stable global oil supplies. How other states – particularly large ones – respond to these 
changes will also influence the extent to which New Zealand’s oil security is positively or 
negatively affected, and in turn will have implications for the effectiveness of New Zealand’s 
current approach to maintaining oil security.  The forecast changes in global oil markets are 
unlikely to make New Zealand’s current oil security concerns less relevant to any meaningful 
extent. Assuming no change to New Zealand’s mix of oil security policy instruments, its 
dependence on certain countries and transport routes appears set to continue and even has the 
potential to intensify. Consequently, security of supply will remain a vital objective for New 
Zealand over the 2040 timeframe, with the efficacy of its oil security policymaking conditional 




8 Geopolitical Storylines and Policy Options 
8.1 Introduction 
This study has so far established the ways that New Zealand’s oil supply chain could be 
vulnerable to adverse geopolitical events, and what policies have correspondingly been chosen 
to maintain security of supply. It has also established that anticipated changes within the oil 
and energy spheres to 2040 are unlikely to minimise this vulnerability, and certain risks might 
even intensify within the region. Establishing the relevance and significance of one further 
variable is central to this study: whether changes in the geopolitical environment can affect the 
risk profile of oil supply and the effectiveness of security of supply policy instruments, and 
thus is a variable that should be considered within oil security assessments and policymaking.  
This chapter uses the two qualitative external scenario storylines introduced in Chapter 2 to 
examine the role of geopolitical uncertainty in oil security. Following Van der Linde et al.’s 
Study of Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics,538  the storylines and the general findings on 
risk and policy instrument effectiveness within them are discussed here, and subsequently 
applied to the New Zealand context in Chapter 9. The storylines are considered here as 
occupying either end of a theoretical geopolitical contextual continuum. The first storyline, 
Markets and Institutions, sees an intensification of globalisation and cooperation within 
international political and economic institutions. The second storyline, Regions and Empires, 
sees the world divided into integrated political and economic blocs with satellite regions, 
competing for markets and resources. These storylines do not imply that every state will behave 
in the same way. Rather, they provide an explanation of general state behaviour within different 
geopolitical contexts.  
8.1.1 Storyline 1: Markets and Institutions 
The core assumption of the Markets and Institutions (M&I) storyline is a multilateral system 
governs international relations, even if one state is dominant.539 The international liberal order 
and globalisation intensifies in M&I. States cooperate in international economic and political 
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of capital, goods and people continue to grow as markets liberalise further, facilitated by 
regional free-trade organisations and strong economic institutions including the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), IEA and OPEC. 
States across the globe are economically and politically integrated, and markets and institutions 
effectively operate in a multilateral world. Collective pressure for good governance, including 
financial institutions, results in more sound and stable government around the world. 
Economic, social and environmental stress is abated somewhat by international institutions and 
economic and political treaties. Religious, ideological and political conflicts continue to take 
place at the international, national or regional level. However, global and regional institutions 
such as the UN and the EU are able to cope with most of these and the global security 
environment overall remains stable. 
8.1.2 Storyline 2: Regions and Empires 
The Regions and Empires (R&E) storyline envisages significant changes in the make-up of the 
international political and economic system. In contrast with the core assumptions of M&I, 
R&E describes a world that has broken up into rival political and economic spheres of 
influence. The absence of effective global markets for strategic goods leads to the creation of 
bilateral supply arrangements and treaties, reinforcing the formulation of more or less 
integrated blocs with satellite regions and exclusive backyards. The international oil market 
becomes more regionalised, although there is the possibility of trade flows between some blocs. 
Oil and gas exporting nations that are part of an empire principally trade within that bloc, with 
minimal flows going elsewhere.540 Some countries move toward having the state play a 
stronger role in the domestic energy market – a few re-nationalise their energy infrastructure 
and companies.541  
Countries use whatever capabilities and endowments they have at hand to achieve energy 
security, which becomes a greater policy priority over environmental concerns.542 Global 
powers act fast to reduce reliance on imports from outside of their sphere of influence, and 
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possible through alternative technologies.543 Rivals use their political, economic and military 
power to compete for markets and scarce resources, including oil.544 
The international system and associated agreements are weakened, with organisations like the 
UN, EU, WTO, OPEC and IEA lacking political legitimacy as a result of countries either 
refusing to participate or trying to dominate within them.545 The decline of the multilateral 
system and increased competition leads to a rebirth in tensions within areas like the South 
China Sea and the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf.546 
Nations and regions are divided on the basis of ideology, religion and political arguments.547 
National and international security concerns, including economic, social and environmental 
security, hinder international economic integration, restricting the flow of capital, goods and 
people. Lack of collective interests in existing international organisations may eventually lead 
to dominant states undertaking military interventions to secure their supplies. Conflicts over 
natural resources are more likely to emerge in this scenario. 
8.1.3 Storylines in the Present Context 
As has been noted, there is growing evidence to suggest the world is moving from a period of 
relative geopolitical stability towards a new phase of geopolitical uncertainty. It is therefore 
difficult to discern which storyline the world will more closely resemble in the future. While 
an in-depth discussion of possible trends within the geopolitical environment is beyond the 
scope of this study, it is nevertheless important to acknowledge that the multilateral rules-based 
order appears to be under increasing strain in recent years. Challenges to freedom of navigation 
principles within areas like the South China Sea; rising tensions between world powers 
including the US and China; and growing nationalism and a seeming retreat from institutional 
multilateralism within some countries – most notably the US and the UK – are just some of the 
changes within the geopolitical environment that suggest a future more closely resembling 
R&E is a distinct possibility. 
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storylines, as the risk of disruption to supplies was present at the time of publication and not 
sometime in the future. However, they do note that the risk of instability would become 
somewhat lower in M&I.548 Acknowledging recent events within the region, including those 
having directly interrupted the region’s oil supply chain, this assumption is also adopted here.  
8.2 Storylines and Supply Disruptions 
As described in Chapter 3, the ways that oil supply may be disrupted can be broadly categorised 
into two types: sudden disruptions; and, supply gaps that emerge slowly over time.549 Van der 
Linde et al.’s findings regarding the likelihood of these two types of disruption occurring within 
each storyline, and how their impact differs, is examined next.550  
8.2.1 Sudden Disruptions  
Markets and Institutions 
In M&I, a disruption of oil flows from whatever capacity is available is certainly possible.551 
Given supply arrangements are through markets, a disruption will result in market reactions 
and reallocations through price. Prices therefore increase to reflect the scarcity of the oil or 
products involved in the disruption. The IEP and other emergency schemes may be required to 
reduce the impact of oil supply shocks through alleviation of temporary shortfalls. Emergency 
responses are likely to be implemented in coordination with OPEC in instances where 
disruptions are not where the organisation’s spare capacity is located. Higher prices reward 
producers for their ability to provide oil to the world market. Eventually, there may be a 
collective decision, or less likely a unilateral action to regain access to blocked production 
capacity via military means. 
Regions and Empires 
Under R&E, a sudden disruption is also very much possible.552 This has the potential to cause 




548 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 122-27. 
549 Correlje and Van der Linde, "Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A European Perspective," 538. 
550 As noted in chapter 2, this study uses the findings from the WEC’s ‘Hard Rock’ scenario to update the Van 
der Linde et al.’s Regions and Empires storyline to a minor extent. Areas where the storyline and general 
findings have been updated with elements taken from the ‘Hard Rock’ scenario will be highlighted. 
551 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 101-02; Correlje and Van der Linde, 
"Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A European Perspective," 538. 
552 Van der Linde et al., Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, 101; Correlje and Van der Linde, 
"Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics: A European Perspective," 538. 
 
 125 
the lack of surplus production and transport capacity that would allow for the rescheduling of 
deliveries. Countries or regions particularly dependent on supplies from one exporting region 
or country such as the Persian Gulf can face severe impacts if they cannot find supplies from 
other sources. The price mechanism’s coordinative effect is weakened due to prices mainly 
being set within bilateral contracts; rigid bilateral trade structures may make oil trade flows 
inflexible to meet required adjustments.  
With the absence of a market and prevalence of bilateral agreements, there are significant 
difficulties in implementing the IEA’s IEP due to the conflicting interests of the countries 
involved. The unreliability of this collective system - and others like the EU emergency 
schemes - means countries must hold relatively larger strategic oil stocks as the collective 
schemes cannot be relied upon to effectively come into action. In the event that a major OPEC 
supplier suffers a large disruption, a lack of agreement between OPEC suppliers renders the 
organisation’s ability to manage production less effective. As a result, generally higher crude 
and product prices are induced. Disruptions may eventually invite military intervention to 
ensure access to oil production capacity. 
8.2.2 Slowly Emerging Supply Gaps 
Markets and Institutions 
A slowly emerging supply gap as a result of a poor investment climate is unlikely to occur 
under M&I.553 Past spare capacity shortfalls suggest that the international institutions IEA, 
OPEC and IEF have not been fully effective and that a market-based approach has yet to be 
implemented in some parts of the international system, but “…once all producing countries 
have adopted a market-based approach such inefficiencies disappear.”554 Global markets 
remain liquid and react efficiently to changes in supply and demand through shifts in futures 
prices, which in turn leads to the reallocation of supplies and investment into new production 
and transport capacity. The IEA and EU market schemes and a number of commercial agents 
continue a system of information sharing. Governments and industry work together to establish 
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There is the possibility that religious or ideological unrest in local areas reduces the appetite 
for investment. These circumstances gradually develop, and the market reacts to scarcity 
through efficient shifts in prices, which in turn supports investment in production and transport 
capacity in other unaffected areas. 
Regions and Empires 
Slowly emerging supply gaps as a result of poor investment in various producer economies is 
possible under R&E.555 A poor investment climate for production or transport facilities in 
certain regions or countries could result in slowly emerging supply gaps. The poor investment 
climate could be caused by general political or economic instability or motivated by religious 
and ideological choices of groups within the producing region. Either alternative supplies will 
have to be utilised to fill the gap, or the shortage will drive up prices curbing demand in the 
long term. Should a large exporter like Saudi Arabia decide to turn away from the market after 
a radical regime change, other suppliers would have little hope of filling the supply gap, and 
OPEC would be rendered ineffective at market regulation. 
A reduction in production or transport capacity may result in increased competition between 
consumers and suppliers trying to bilaterally secure exclusive investment and supply contracts. 
This may result in increased involvement of NOCs and consumer states in the oil market, 
politicising the market further and reinforcing the problem. The increased prevalence of 
bilateral trade structures may hinder the flexibility of trade flows. IEA and also OPEC will find 
it progressively difficult to calibrate oil market management schemes, information systems and 
strategic stocks. 
International conflict may develop over the exclusive relationships between oil producers and 
the several regions and empires and their related NOCs. In addition, there will be unilateral 
attempts to open up alternative areas for exploration and production,556 or there may be a 
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8.3 Storylines and Security of Oil Supply Objectives   
The relevance and effectiveness of various policy instruments varies under each storyline. This  
 
Figure 10: Security of Oil Supply Analytical Framework  
is discussed below using the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 2 and reintroduced in 
Figure 10. In the different storylines, the four security of oil supply objectives of prevention, 
deterrence, containment and crisis management are unlikely to be achieved in the same 
manner. For example, prevention policy instruments structured on international cooperation 
are likely to function in M&I but unlikely to do so in R&E. The policy avenues that would be 
open or closed within the storylines according to Van der Linde et al. are examined below, 
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including which instruments are likely to be used by other states and how these choices might 
affect the security of supply of other nations.  
8.3.1 Prevention 
Prevention policy instruments seek to create a political environment where there are fewer 
grounds for oil supply disruptions. 
There are higher quality prevention instruments available in the M&I storyline, because 
governance of the international political and economic system is dependent on stronger 
international institutions and international cooperation in general.558 
The market is given more space within the political and economic climate of M&I. Any 
mismatches in supply and demand are largely addressed by the market. Import dependency is 
less of a strategic issue as oil is made available through the market, strongly supported by 
multilateral cooperation through institutions such as the IEA and IEF, and others like the World 
Bank an IMF. These institutions facilitate the development of policy that supports and protects 
the value of investors’ assets. 
Within other spheres, the UN Security Council (UNSC) could intervene in regional conflicts 
through the use of sanctions or other mechanisms, thereby reducing the risk of failing state 
power in producing nations. Strategic national interests are softened by the growing number of 
strong international governance structures. The strength and coherence of these institutions 
overall is expected to increase in M&I.  
Significantly higher levels of coordination between large consumer and producer countries 
advanced through economic cooperation and trade policy would also necessarily appear within 
M&I. All producers have open access to FDI and to sell their supplies on trade and consumer 
markets. This reduces the likelihood of producing regions falling into turmoil. Security of 
delivery rather than security of supply becomes the concern relating to import dependency, but 
policy measures remain in place to respond to operational, technical or market failures. A 
minimum price for oil may be utilised to minimise the impact of market fluctuations and limit 
investment uncertainty. 
In R&E, bilateral political and economic cooperation and strategic alliances dominate, rather 
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and empires strategically serve their domestic interests by pursuing trade agreements that are 
bilateral in nature. Distrust among nations is a prominent feature, and international institutions 
are likely weakened. It is probable the Middle East is contested among large consumer states, 
resulting in an intensification of regional conflicts. R&E sees horizontal and vertical integration 
of NOCs as a key strategy to access and secure resources. Competition between consumer 
countries for scarce resources is unlikely alleviate conflict, resulting in a high chance of 
strategically important producing countries or regions falling into turmoil.  
Consequently, the current international oil market becomes more state-governed in R&E. 
TNOCs and NOCs, supported by their respective countries, compete to secure access to 
strategic resources and help to establish spheres of influence in the regions. Trade in oil 
becomes more structured within regions and between allies. The oil industry is not coordinated 
by the market but by long-term contracts and bilateral agreements. Long-term supply contracts 
strengthen producer-consumer relations and support further investment in oil and gas 
production.  
Reducing import dependency is key to reducing vulnerability in R&E. Domestic production of 
any available petroleum sources will be promoted by states for security of supply reasons, 
rather than solely environmental ones. Energy technology research and development to reduce 
import dependency through energy diversification or increase energy system flexibility will be 
supported for the same reasons.  
In M&I, instruments that aim to establish good multilateral relations fit well. In R&E however, 
these instruments are limited in both scope and use. Market participants are encouraged to 
invest in supply security as it aligns with economic interests, resulting in more efficient 
solutions than arrangements made by states or international institutions. In R&E, governments 
will need to set terms of security of supply more actively where there is increased politicisation 
of markets.  
8.3.2 Deterrence 
Deterrence policy instruments seek to prevent or deter producer states from disrupting oil 
supplies for political reasons. 
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Deterrence is less relevant within M&I than within R&E.559 In M&I, the UNSC is a competent 
and effective deterrence option, implementing interventions such as sanctions and 
peacekeeping efforts where needed. Other multilateral institutions like OPEC also have 
established and credible frameworks for dealing with economic conflict resolution. 
Under R&E, security policies of states play a larger role. The ability to intervene within core 
producing countries will depend on the military strength of an aggressor, and the level of 
deterrence that the producer country has or is able to arrange through strategic alliance with a 
competing empire. Political and economic instability could therefore be commonplace in 
producer states or regions that have not been brought under a large power’s sphere of influence. 
Another deterrence policy instrument could be the unilateral use of political and economic 
sanctions. The effectiveness of sanctions would be governed by the degree to which a 
producer’s need for security of demand is asymmetrically higher than the consumer’s need for 
security of supply. The strength of this approach would therefore depend on countries’ levels 
of import dependence.  
8.3.3 Containment 
Containment policy instruments seek to reduce the impact of an oil supply disruption on a 
country’s national security and the economy.  
Containment policy instruments are less effective in M&I than R&E, as market forces 
effectively coordinate supply and demand.560 In R&E however, these instruments are highly 
important as they can reduce supply disruption impacts. Governments would likely need to 
take an active role for most of these instruments to be implemented, for example by 
encouraging energy system flexibility through the use of different fuels or technologies. The 
government could also enter into standby arrangements with producer countries, although such 
options would likely be limited to the alliances within the country’s respective empire. Market 
relations are only moderately important in R&E.  
8.3.4 Crisis Management 
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Crisis management approaches stay essentially the same between storylines; both using 
security of supply instruments like strategic reserves, demand management and pricing 
controls.561 However, where M&I would see stockholding implemented under the umbrella of 
the IEA or similar organisation, in R&E countries would establish strategic reserves 
individually or within their empire. Generally, the greater the participation, and the greater the 
consensus on policy objectives and when they are to be used, the more effective and easier it 
will be to employ these instruments.  The lack of collective strength of the IEA arrangement 
within R&E may therefore require importing countries to increase their stockholding to account 
for reduced effectiveness. Conversely, coherence would likely improve under M&I given the 
lesser politicisation and polarisation between market participants.   
8.4 Summary 
Security of oil supply unfolds in the geopolitical environment of the day. Geopolitical 
environments are in a constant state of flux, such that policymaking in the present may not 
deliver an optimal mix of policy instruments for different geopolitical environments in the 
future. Imagining and exploring different geopolitical contexts over long time horizons can 
inform more adaptive policy mixes. Future possible geopolitical environments can be 
conceived as lying somewhere on a continuum between two extremes of Markets and 
Institutions, and Regions and Empires. The former foresees an intensification of globalisation 
and cooperation within international political and economic institutions, while the latter 
foresees a polar opposite world divided into integrated political and economic blocs competing 
for markets and resources. Supply disruptions are a feature of both futures, but differ in their 
likelihood, impact on oil security and the form they take. This difference results from varying 
degrees of multilateralism; stability of institutions; information sharing and credibility; the 
level of trust between nations supporting collective action and international agreements; 
investment climate; and economic and technical flexibility of energy systems.562 Achieving the 
four security of oil supply objectives of prevention, deterrence, containment and crisis 
management necessarily demands a different mix of policy instruments according to the 
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along with the veracity of assessments, also a function of the degree to which geopolitical 





9.1 Implications of Storylines 
The storylines in the previous chapter clearly demonstrate that the geopolitical environment is 
an important determinant of New Zealand’s security of supply and the effectiveness of 
associated security policies. Unsurprisingly, the geopolitical environment can influence the 
risk of a disruption within New Zealand’s oil supply chain occurring. Some risks to New 
Zealand’s supply, notably disruptions to production from the Middle East, are likely to persist 
over the next 20 years regardless of the geopolitical environment. However, exposure to other 
disruptions appears more likely in some geopolitical environments than others, particularly 
disruptions within the midstream sector and slowly emerging supply gaps from a poor 
investment climate. Thus, changes within the geopolitical environment can not only alter the 
exposure to potentially disruptive geopolitical events, but the type of disruptions likely to be 
experienced.  
The connection between the strength of market mechanisms and geopolitical risk is also of 
note. The storylines show it is likely that the ability of related markets to effectively manage 
supply disruptions is negatively correlated with this disruption risk; a more competitive 
geopolitical environment would likely increase the risk of disruptive events, and at the same 
time decrease the power of market mechanisms to respond and reallocate scarce supply as 
countries pursue non-market means to maintain oil security. Investment can still occur in the 
upstream sector within a competitive geopolitical environment, but the storylines would 
suggest it is more likely to be in the form of exclusive supply contracts, dislocated from the 
market. The likelihood of disruptive events, the form they take, and the capability of related 
markets to respond to them can all be impacted by changes within the geopolitical environment, 
and each concurrently in ways that can make the task of maintaining security easier or more 
challenging. Following from this, the more competitive the geopolitical environment, the more 
relevant the structure of a country’s oil supply chain becomes for security of supply.  
The storylines also demonstrate that the impact on disruption risks inevitably results in impacts 
on policy instrument effectiveness, as does the level of cooperation or competition among 
consumer countries. As a result, certain policies are more appropriate in some geopolitical 
contexts than others, and this is directly relevant for New Zealand’s current security policy 
settings. Most notably, the storylines suggest that the IEA’s IEP would become a less effective 
policy instrument if multilateral approaches weaken, with the IEA perhaps insufficient on its 
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own to maintain New Zealand’s oil security at a desirable level in such an environment. 
Similarly, New Zealand’s ticket-based approach to stockholding obligations may be less 
appropriate in such an environment because of weakened market allocation mechanisms, and 
less certainty that IEA members will meet their stock transfer obligations in a crisis. In this 
regard, New Zealand’s approach to oil security is more closely aligned with a world resembling 
Markets and Institutions – or a comparatively stable and cooperative geopolitical environment 
– rather than a geopolitical environment more closely resembling Regions and Empires.  
9.1.1 Impact on Current Security Assessments & Policymaking  
The findings above have notable implications for New Zealand’s approach to assessments of 
its security of oil supply. As has been explained, the framework of New Zealand’s current 
assessments is predicated on two notions: that the market is highly capable of reallocating 
supply and thus dispersing the impact of a disruption among market participants; and, that the 
IEP is an effective tool to mitigate the effects of a supply shortfall and ensuring that the burden 
of a shortfall is shared equitably among member states. However, this study has found these 
notions to be somewhat of an oversimplification. 
In addition, the storylines show that geopolitical context can have a strong influence on the 
strength of the market and the IEA agreement. More specifically, the responses of states to the 
geopolitical environment can influence the size and strength of the oil market and the 
effectiveness of IEA membership as an insurance policy, thus influencing the level of supply 
security provided. The effectiveness of energy security policy instruments and approaches thus 
not only depends on international oil market dynamics and New Zealand’s domestic energy 
supply and demand, but also the geopolitical context. As Correlje & Van der Linde conclude, 
“…energy policymaking cannot be seen in isolation from what goes on in the international 
system.”563 This study therefore finds that the utility of New Zealand’s current assessments and 
policymaking are limited in their efficacy by not accounting for geopolitical uncertainty over 
the long-term.  
The above has important implications for New Zealand’s long-term oil security. The storylines 
approach demonstrates that changes within the geopolitical environment have the potential to 
markedly change New Zealand’s oil security calculus, particularly when considered alongside 
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examination or absence of these variables within current security of supply assessments means 
that considerations of present and future oil security may differ markedly from what would 
otherwise be the case.  
9.2 Improving Oil Security Assessments 
Effective policymaking requires accurate and relevant information being available to 
governments. Given the current limitations of existing assessments identified above, there are 
a number of ways that New Zealand’s oil security assessments could be changed to improve 
the information provided to New Zealand policymakers. The improvements discussed below 
relate to the general understanding established within this study that the current level of oil 
security and the effectiveness of the existing policy mix can be affected by changes in the 
external supply chain and geopolitical environment.  
9.2.1 Allowing for Complexity 
Oil supply chain realities 
New Zealand’s oil security assessments should frame their external disruption scenarios upon 
the actual structure of the country’s supply chain and its sector dependencies, rather than global 
supply disruption estimates. This could, for example, include a scenario where transit through 
the strait of Malacca is disrupted. These scenarios should not only account for the expected 
scale of the disruption, but the anticipated capability of the market to respond to varying 
disruptions given upstream, midstream and downstream constraints identified in this research, 
including the expected impact on product suppliers. Similarly, the expected time delays for 
New Zealand to receive emergency supplies from unaffected IEA members should also be 
accounted for. This will provide a more accurate measure of risk and risk preparedness. 
Furthermore, New Zealand’s oil security cannot be determined in isolation. Assessments 
should also account for the disruption vulnerability of other states that source their oil supply 
from the same countries and regions. A country’s level of import dependence, diversification 
and stockholding will affect each country’s ability to provide relief to New Zealand during a 
disruption. This will also affect the level of supply shortfall in the region over the short-term, 
and by extension the level of stress placed on nearby unaffected sources while a disruption is 
being resolved. 
Implementation of such improvements could be enhanced with further research of the supply 
chain. Australia is currently developing comprehensive supply chain modelling and 
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information sharing requirements for market participants to improve responses to 
disruptions;564 New Zealand should do the same. Modelling should include establishing what 
economically viable alternative sources of crude are available should current sources be 
disrupted, taking account of New Zealand’s refinery blending and product volume 
requirements. Where possible, this could also include examining supplier flexibility for the 
overseas refineries from which New Zealand sources refined product. Having accurate 
information regarding the supply chain not only allows for more effective responses to 
disruption, but also allows for a more accurate determination of supply vulnerability. This is 
confirmed by New Zealand’s existing security assessments that note better knowledge of the 
country’s ability to second-source in the event of a disruption of supply from regular sources 
would be beneficial for this reason.565  
Market realities 
This study has found that market conditions can impact oil security, in addition to the state and 
structure of New Zealand’s supply chain specifically. A more accurate assessment should 
account for levels of tightness, concentration and flexibility within associated upstream, 
midstream and downstream markets, and the extent that supply is being traded through open 
market channels. These factors may become more relevant should concerns about peak demand 
lead to investment within these sectors falling to insufficient levels.   
Geopolitical Realities 
It is clear that the geopolitical environment can affect the level of disruption risk, and the 
effectiveness of various policy instruments and mix thereof. This variable therefore needs to 
be accounted for within existing assessments. Global geopolitical trends are relevant for 
determining security, as are specific situations within areas like the South China Sea and 
Persian Gulf that are directly relevant for New Zealand’s supply chain. Part of this approach 
should not only include identifying what geopolitical events are occurring within supplier 
regions, but also being aware of the approach large consumer countries are taking to secure 
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9.2.2 Time Horizons 
Finally, security assessments should examine over longer time horizons. Long-term 
assessments allow for forecasts of risk given anticipated changes in the above factors, including 
in the energy markets, the geopolitical environment and New Zealand’s oil supply chain. In 
addition, the use of long-term forecasting also allows for policy instruments with long 
implementation times to be assessed as possible responses, thereby introducing a more diverse 
range of policy options for the government to consider. This allows for development of a more 
coherent strategy for maintaining long-term energy security. Such an approach is not unheard 
of within New Zealand policymaking; accounting for geopolitical realities and longer time 
horizons have been part of the nation’s oil security assessments in the past.566 As the WEF 
concludes, “…the world has moved into a new and unsettling geopolitical phase… assessing 
and mitigating risks… will require careful horizon scanning and crisis anticipation by both 
state and non-state actors.”567  
9.3 Policy Responses for Long-term Security 
As already noted, policymakers must balance energy security objectives with other - sometimes 
conflicting - objectives when determining an appropriate energy policy mix. Determining this 
mix is beyond the scope of this study. However, the findings of this research suggest that new 
policy options warrant consideration.  
As long as New Zealand remains dependent upon external supply, no mix of policy instruments 
is capable of eliminating geopolitical risk to supply entirely. As BEC notes, the country’s 
domestic economy will continue to be exposed to changes in the international oil market as 
long as it continues to participate within it.568 Moreover, New Zealand is too small to pursue 
certain security improving policies. Barton concludes that many of the country’s energy 
security issues will exist no matter what legal provisions or policy mix is in place, as oil imports 
are largely out of the control of a small country.569 Pathways to improve flexibility of oil 
consumption are also likely to remain limited given the few fuel alternatives available for use 
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in addition to the ones currently adopted cannot be utilised to improve supply security and 
manage vulnerabilities.  
New Zealand can use a range of other policy instruments to improve oil supply security and 
minimise the impact of a disruption, particularly when long time horizons are considered. 
Given the high level of uncertainty regarding the future geopolitical landscape, the New 
Zealand Government’s best strategy is likely to be one that keeps numerous policy instruments 
viable for adoption if required while working to limit vulnerability to sector disruptions over 
time. With this in mind, the following section discusses potentially viable policies or strategies 
that the government should consider implementing to improve oil security or could be 
implemented should changing circumstances require it. 
9.3.1 Retaining & Modifying Existing Policies 
IEA 
This study has shown that IEA membership does not guarantee oil security, nor is the IEP 
guaranteed to operate as intended in all circumstances. Other policy instruments may therefore 
need to be adopted to ensure a satisfactory level of security into the future. Nevertheless, this 
is not to assert that New Zealand’s IEA membership is not highly beneficial to the country’s 
security of supply. As noted earlier, the question of whether New Zealand needs to remain 
within the IEA to maintain its current level of supply security has been raised in previous 
assessments. This questioning stems from confidence that effective market allocation of supply 
will ensure New Zealand benefits from an IEP stock release irrespective of its IEA 
participation. However, as has been shown, this notion of market allocation is an 
oversimplification of market and supply chain realities. In a situation where a significant 
regional disruption occurs or where New Zealand’s regular supply lines are disrupted, having 
IEA members both within and outside the Asia-Pacific that are obligated to directly supply 
New Zealand would be highly beneficial. Moreover, the IEA remains an important 
counterbalance to supplier ambitions. The benefits provided by IEA membership and more 
broadly by the organisation’s existence mean that New Zealand should be attempting to 
strengthen the IEA where possible, not weaken it through the country’s departure. New 
Zealand’s best approach to maintaining oil security over the next 20 years will therefore almost 
certainly involve retaining IEA membership, albeit supplemented with additional security 
policies where necessary.  
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Given the change in market dynamics to where many of the largest consumers are not OECD 
countries, it has been suggested that the IEA should consider expanding its membership 
qualifications to allow for these large energy trading countries to transition from observer status 
to fully-fledged signatories of the IEP.570 For the reasons above, New Zealand should support 
such actions. By the same token, New Zealand should encourage Australia to meet its IEA 
stockholding obligations, which it has failed to do for quite some time and by a significant 
margin;571 furthermore, that such stocks be held in-country. This is not only to strengthen the 
institution and its emergency measures, but also because Australia is one of the closest IEA 
members –  both in proximity and relations –  that could provide assistance during a disruption 
to New Zealand’s oil supplies. While this research does not examine the broader national 
security implications of oil supply security, it should also be highlighted that in a more hostile 
security environment Australia would likely be an important security partner to New Zealand. 
It is therefore in New Zealand’s security interest for Australia to have the necessary oil supplies 
available to effectively operate economically and militarily. 
Strategic Reserves 
The WEC notes that stockpiling will become a less popular oil security policy instrument as 
the energy system decarbonises.572 It may be tempting to act on the view that oil – and therefore 
security of supply instruments like strategic reserves – will become less important for New 
Zealand. However, as has been shown, a secure oil supply will remain vital for the country for 
at least the time horizon of this study. As long as supply security is a key national objective, 
strategic reserves will therefore remain an important policy instrument to weather any supply 
disruptions. Furthermore, the importance of stockholding is likely to become even greater 
should New Zealand’s dependence on Middle East suppliers increase and supplier 
diversification decline. 
Not all stockholdings necessarily provide the same degree of security. Off-shore stock ticket 
contracts have provided a cheaper alternative than physical stocks to maintain New Zealand’s 
IEA stockholding obligations. However, this approach has some shortcomings to domestically 
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with the accompanying uncertainty of whether bilateral commitments to ensure stock delivery 
to New Zealand will be honoured in all circumstances. The New Zealand government should 
therefore reconsider its ticket-based approach to meeting its IEA obligations. Strategic reserves 
in the form of physical stocks held in-country would not only deliver a concrete level of 
insurance against physical disruption, but also provide the government with more time to 
determine the severity and length of a disruption, and the viability of options available to 
respond.573 Additional stockholding capacity will necessarily require capital and time to create; 
the government should not wait until such capacity is needed in order to build it. 
Another way the security provided by stockholding could be increased is by allowing for the 
various factors discussed within this study when determining the optimal level of stockholding, 
rather than simply adopting the IEA 90-day net import stockholding target. Accounting for 
refining capacity and petroleum grade requirements, the required levels of each oil product, 
and the viability and transport distances of alternative sources in stockholding calculations 
would provide a better determination of appropriate stockholding targets. Where necessary, the 
government should also consider placing minimum stockholding requirements on refined 
product, similar to the EU.574  
Finally, over the long-term it can be expected that oil consuming sectors that can easily convert 
to other energy sources will do so. This will likely result in a more concentrated demand within 
sectors such as transport that cannot substitute demand or easily reduce it in the short-term. 
New Zealand might therefore consider adjusting its stockholding mix and volumes to reflect 
the relative importance of meeting different domestic consumption demands, rather than 
focusing on generic consolidated consumption quantities alone.   
9.3.2 Import Substitution 
Increasing domestic production has been highlighted in earlier New Zealand oil security 
assessments as the main non-storage security of supply policy instrument for improving energy 
security.575 It has also at times been promoted by the New Zealand Government as a way to 
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potential for further development of petroleum resources within New Zealand that could 
eventually make the country a net exporter.577 However, despite establishing regulatory 
regimes designed to encourage oil exploration,578 this net exporter scenario now appears 
unlikely. To the contrary, New Zealand’s domestic oil production has declined noticeably since 
2011. MBIE states the drivers of this decline in recent years are twofold: firstly, as a result of 
natural field exhaustion;579 and secondly, due to the absence of any new major field 
discoveries.580  
Furthermore, this decline in oil reserves looks set to continue. International oil companies have 
decreased their investment in New Zealand’s upstream oil sector amid a low oil price 
environment,581 resulting in oil exploration and permitting in the country being at historic 
lows.582 Beyond the influence of oil price, in general New Zealand’s attractiveness to oil 
exploration companies is somewhat limited by the country’s geographical isolation; 
exploration and mining companies operating in New Zealand must bear the associated costs of 
getting equipment to and from the country, with seismic vessels and offshore drilling rigs costly 
to mobilise if not already present within New Zealand.583 Further reducing the country’s 
attractiveness is geology broadly inconducive to large oil reservoirs.584 In 2017, the IEA 
concluded that “…all in all, the production outlook for [New Zealand] is rather limited,” 585 a 
sentiment echoed within the BEC forecasts examined in this research. Reducing import 
dependency to any significant extent via promoting domestic production therefore appears not 
to be a viable policy instrument. Nevertheless, despite the anticipated continuing decline in 
production, adopting this policy may still represent the best opportunity to achieve oil security 
objectives. As BEC notes, New Zealand’s remaining domestic oil and gas resources may 
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9.3.3 Reducing Oil Dependence 
Diversifying away from consumption of imported oil to more secure alternative domestic 
energy sources could lead to significant improvements in national energy security. Reducing 
oil dependence is also likely to be a more viable approach over the long-term compared to 
import substitution, given the abundance of alternative domestic renewable and non-renewable 
energy sources at the country’s disposal, and because transitioning to renewable energy sources 
also supports other government objectives including reduction of domestic greenhouse 
emissions.587  The current New Zealand Energy Strategy already has reducing oil dependence 
through promotion of diverse energy sources as a key objective,588 and the New Zealand 
Government and others have also pointed to alternative fuels use in the transport sector as a 
method to improve energy security.589  
Reducing oil dependence can be bolstered by government policies but constitutes an expensive 
undertaking that would take time to implement. Significantly, for the transport sector to 
transition from oil dependence would require an alternative energy source that can either be 
used within existing combustion engines, or in the case of electricity require new vehicles 
entirely. In 2016, the New Zealand Government adopted an EV programme which targets the 
doubling of the EV fleet every year to reach around 64,000 vehicles by the end of 2021.590 
While the Government has encouraged EV uptake to some extent,591 it should be noted that 
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support this strategy.592 If the Government wished to further increase the pace of this transition 
to meet energy security or other objectives, it would likely require additional and aggressive 
policies to be implemented. The IEA notes that carbon price is unlikely to drive energy sector 
transformation on its own, including within transport.593 Additionally, the New Zealand 
Government may also need to provide additional support to the domestic energy industry in 
order to meet the energy requirements of this transformation. The country’s state-owned 
electricity transmission company, Transpower, notes that in a scenario where significant 
electrification of industrial and transport sectors takes place, the electricity requirements of 
New Zealand would be expected to almost double by 2040, requiring significant investment in 
the generation sector.594  
New Zealand’s oil dependence relative to other friendly nations is also of note here. The 
country needs to keep pace with global trends in energy technology and alternative fuel 
adaptation to maintain reliable energy supply, particularly in transport, otherwise risk finding 
itself left behind with potentially more limited oil supply.595 At the same time, however, it must 
be noted that security of supply risks are also present for alternative energy sources. The New 
Zealand electricity sector has highlighted a number of issues and uncertainties that will need 
to be addressed should renewable electricity become a larger proportion of the country’s energy 
mix. Some of these risks include: intermittent generation from renewables and related energy 
storage issues; vulnerability to adverse hydrological conditions and potential for climate 
change to affect renewable generation capacities;596 and cyber-vulnerabilities of 
infrastructure.597 Furthermore, unlike many countries, New Zealand’s geographical isolation 
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domestic grid is therefore vital as the country cannot procure electricity supply from abroad in 
the event of an energy crisis.598  
There may also be geopolitical risks relating to renewable energy technologies. Certain rare 
earth elements are widely used within renewable energy technologies, and the processing and 
reserves of some of these critical materials are concentrated within only a few countries.599 
Trying to rush electrification of New Zealand’s energy sector without accounting for these 
risks would not only be economically costly but may also undermine rather than bolster New 
Zealand’s energy security. In the same regard, the New Zealand government should not make 
its energy strategy entirely reliant on technology advancements within the renewable electricity 
sector. Technological uncertainty in the renewable energy sector is significantly higher than in 
the oil sector because it involves several separate types of energy source, energy generation, 
transportation and storage.600  
New Zealand’s best option to maintain energy security may therefore be to hedge its bets and 
not rely solely on one energy type or technology to meet its future energy needs. As BEC 
remarks on New Zealand’s energy future: “…we cannot afford for policy to be based on a 
single ‘pathway’ – as soon as a narrow set of choices and technologies is relied on, we 
immediately lose our resilience to different futures… The policy which supports [New 
Zealand’s energy] targets needs to strike a balance between being grounded in today’s known 
technology, while not being heavily reliant on assumptions about future advances.”601 It should 
also be noted that while New Zealand is not capable of deciding the future global energy mix, 
it is not restricted to simply being a bystander to alternative fuel development. New Zealand 
could therefore support improvement in its oil security through diversification via alternative 
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9.3.4 Diversification of Oil Supply 
In the more immediate term, encouraging greater diversification of suppliers could be a viable 
option to improve New Zealand’s oil security, particularly if dependency on certain suppliers 
grows even further or if dependence on certain transport routes becomes a greater concern. The 
New Zealand government could enact subsidies to incentivise supply from other sources. 
However, as Korea has learnt, the success of this approach is conditional upon the capabilities 
of domestic refining infrastructure.602 Where increasing diversification of supply sources is not 
viable, New Zealand’s domestic stockholding levels should adjust in response to the country’s 
concentrated supplier base.   
It is worth noting the importance of domestic refining capacity and capability in relation to 
supply diversification and to New Zealand’s oil security in general. Domestic refining capacity 
allows for reduced dependence on other states for supply of refined product, but also improves 
flexibility by allowing the country to meet demand from crude supplies. A decline in domestic 
refining capabilities and increased reliance on overseas refining would therefore limit supplier 
options and potentially concentrate supply or transport routes. A reduction in domestic refining 
would also limit crisis management options given that crude oil accounts for a large portion of 
the country’s IEP strategic stockholding.603  
It is noteworthy that in Australia three refineries have closed in the past 10 years due to 
competition from larger more efficient refineries in Asia, leaving only four refineries 
remaining;604 New Zealand’s sole refinery is facing the same challenges to its 
competitiveness.605 Should domestic refining become commercially unviable, the New 
Zealand Government could implement policies that ensure continued domestic refining 
capacity in order to maintain oil security. The range of oil crudes that domestic refining can 
process also influences diversification options. Should the Government choose to support 
supplier diversification initiatives, implementing policies that incentivise or improve refining 
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9.3.5 Strategic Transportation Capacity 
Creating emergency tanker capacity via creation of a state-owned or controlled fleet is another 
diversification policy that may be viable, though whether this approach would provide 
sufficient benefit in most circumstances relative to the cost required to implement it is less 
clear. For New Zealand to acquire a merchant navy or establish a fleet of nationally-owned 
tankers would likely require significant government involvement to implement, although there 
is precedent for this with the establishment in 1973 of the Shipping Corporation of New 
Zealand.606 Given the current effectiveness and efficiency of the international tanker market, 
such a policy would likely be unjustifiable unless the country’s security environment were to 
change significantly, or where the tanker market became markedly tighter or less effective at 
capacity allocation to the point where security of supply was threatened by lack of tanker 
availability.  
9.3.6 Foreign & Security Policy 
As importing countries like New Zealand source a greater share of their demand from a 
decreasing pool of suppliers, it is likely that foreign policy will be an important policy 
instrument for maintaining oil security over the long-term. In line with this consideration, the 
IEA recommends that Asia-Pacific countries collectively develop long-term strategic ties with 
large energy exporters in the Middle East as a means to support energy security.607  Consistent 
with this observation, the New Zealand Government should continue to cultivate its 
relationship with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).608 
Barton argues that New Zealand’s size and power precludes it from developing bilateral special 
oil security relationships with suppliers like those pursued by larger states; furthermore, the 
country’s policy approach favours free trade over such special relationships.609 Consequently, 
developing special relations with supplier countries is an approach that is unlikely to be pursued 
given the current structure of the domestic market and present-day geopolitical context. 
However, this does not mean that favourable arrangements in exchange for ensuring oil 




606 New Zealand Government, Shipping Corperation of New Zealand Act 1973,  (1973). 
607 IEA, Energy Security in ASEAN+6, 16.  
608 MFAT, "NZ - Gulf Cooperation Council FTA," accessed 5 May, 2020, 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-
force/gcc/. 
609 Barton, "Reaching the Limits of What the Market Will Provide: Energy Security in New Zealand," 378. 
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small states have in the past successfully used bilateral agreements to secure additional oil 
supplies or diversify their supply base.610 New Zealand has also successfully used this approach 
in the past, securing a $150 million oil-for-lamb barter arrangement with Iran in 1982,611 and 
establishing an arrangement with Australia to supply New Zealand with oil during the 1973 
crisis.612 Pursuing and maintaining positive relations with current and potential suppliers is 
therefore likely the best approach for New Zealand to keep policy options available. Bilateral 
arrangements with consumer countries outside of the IEA scheme may also provide avenues 
for improving security of supply. For example, Mitchell highlights that Korea and Japan’s 
physical stockholdings well exceed their IEA commitments, and suggests there is potential for 
bilateral agreements between these two countries and countries like New Zealand to ensure 
continued supply of refined product in the event of a disruption, provided legislation allowed 
for it.613  
Ensuring the security of New Zealand’s maritime oil transport routes and the continued supply 
from refiners in Asia and major crude exporters in the Middle East will remain vital. This is 
reflected in New Zealand’s Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018, which explicitly 
highlights protection of the nation’s critical lines of communication as a key objective.614 
However, New Zealand does not have the military capabilities to unilaterally maintain supply 
route integrity and must instead rely on larger powers or multilateral initiatives - a reality that 
is unlikely to change in the future. Nevertheless, this does not mean that New Zealand should 
solely rely on other more militarily powerful states to maintain security of SLOCs, particularly 
in times of increased risk to supply.  
Determining the extent to which New Zealand needs to participate in security initiatives 
relevant to maintaining oil security depends on whether New Zealand could ever be excluded 
from receiving the security benefits (or elements thereof) provided by the security initiatives 




610 Per Högselius and Arne Kaijser, "Energy Dependence in Historical Perspective: The Geopolitics of Smaller 
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could avoid participating in such initiatives provided that other indirect costs of freeriding are 
tolerable. On the other hand, should some security benefits be excludable, militarily dominant 
states may not allow New Zealand to freeride on their costly foreign and security policies if it 
does not contribute. The need to avoid the perception of freeriding is recognised in the Defence 
Policy Statement, which expressly identifies the objectives of maintaining a credible 
contribution to regional and international peace and security initiatives, and the international 
rules-based order.615 The New Zealand government will need to determine the costs and 
benefits of participation within current and possible security initiatives on an ongoing basis.   
New Zealand will require sufficient military capacity to allow meaningful participation in 
maritime security initiatives. Australia is working to strengthen its maritime forces in response 
to growing challenges to the security of its long and vulnerable SLOCs.616 Given that New 
Zealand faces the same challenges, the current prioritisation of investment in enhanced 
maritime capabilities and inter-operability with Australia’s armed forces is favourable for oil 
security objectives.617 Maintaining and improving these capabilities would allow for 
participation in maritime security initiatives generally, and for unilateral tanker escort 
capabilities which would provide additional policy options in the event of SLOC disruption. 
9.4 Summary 
An examination of variables impacted by changes to the geopolitical environment finds that 
New Zealand’s current oil security assessments do not adequately account for geopolitical 
uncertainty over the long-term. This means that considerations of present and anticipated oil 
security could be markedly different from what is actually the case, particularly when 
considered alongside other supply chain and market-related variables identified throughout this 
study. As a result, current assessment limitations impact both the conclusions regarding what 
policy instruments and strategies are required to maintain adequate security, and the which of 
those policies and strategies that are actually available to New Zealand. Applying these 





616 Sweijs et al., The Maritime Future of the Indian Ocean, 28; Australian Department of Defence, 2016 
Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016), 
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efficacy of security of oil supply assessments and policymaking could be improved to enhance 






Oil remains one of the most important resources for the operation of New Zealand’s economy 
and society. Having an accurate perception of the country’s oil supply security and the 
effectiveness of security-improving policies is therefore vital. Noting this importance, the aim 
of this thesis has been to determine whether geopolitical uncertainty over the long-term is 
appropriately addressed within New Zealand’s current oil security assessments and 
policymaking. It has done so by answering the following research question: 
How might changes in the geopolitical environment affect the efficacy of New 
Zealand’s current oil security assessments and policies out to 2040? 
Through document analysis and utilising a scenario-based approach, this research has found 
that New Zealand’s current oil security assessments and corresponding policy 
recommendations do not adequately address geopolitical uncertainty. Furthermore, this 
research has also identified a number of related variables that are also not adequately addressed. 
Current security assessments use a cost-benefit analysis process to determine optimal oil 
security policy settings and use existing estimates of global supply disruption likelihood and 
size from the literature to represent New Zealand’s external disruption risk in their analysis. 
These quantitative estimates of present-day disruption probabilities offer a usable metric for 
assessments to derive average risk to New Zealand’s supply over time. However, by relying 
on present-day global disruption estimates the current assessments do not account for important 
qualitative variables related to New Zealand’s supply chain structure, market dynamics and the 
geopolitical environment within their analysis. The limitations of such demand estimates 
become particularly stark in the event of ‘black swan’ events. Thus, as has been explained, 
there is a wide range of variables that can have notable impacts on calculations of supply risk 
and policy effectiveness. 
In Part I of this study, it has been shown that each segment of the oil supply chain can be 
exposed to geopolitically induced disruptions, particularly the upstream sector. In line with 
perceptions of an integrated oil market adopted by current assessments and many theorists, 
whether a country experiences a disruption as a crisis will largely depend on the global supply 
shortfall that a disruption creates and the length of time over which it occurs. However, a 
review of the literature revealed that characteristics of the resource, market functions and global 
oil supply chain limit the market’s ability to allocate supply, at least over intermediate time 
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periods. As a result, the structure of a country’s external supply chain, where a disruption 
occurs, and what form it takes will also determine the disruption impact experienced by a 
country. An examination of New Zealand’s supply chain shows that the country is no different 
in this regard, with the greatest challenges to supply security being the risk of a large supply 
disruption from Middle East producers or a disruption to key oil transport routes that pass 
through the strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca. By failing to account for these other 
variables and instead using percentages of cumulative global oil market disruption, current 
assessments oversimplify calculations of risk, potentially leading to incorrect perceptions of 
New Zealand’s level of supply security. 
This research has also shown that the limitations of existing assessments impact the perceived 
effectiveness of oil security policies and the policy options considered. An analysis of the 
literature reveals that there are a number of oil policies and strategies available to states to 
maintain or improve security of oil supply, particularly when approaches that take longer time 
periods to implement are included. These policies can prevent or deter geopolitically induced 
disruptions or contain and manage the impacts of them. It was also shown that some of the 
policy choices of other states can impact broader levels of market participation, and thus the 
strength of the market to allocate scarce supply during a disruption.  
Many such policy options are available to New Zealand, and yet the focus of current 
assessments and policymaking has been solely on the country’s IEA membership and meeting 
the associated stockholding and crisis management obligations. Existing assessments’ present-
day focus and aforementioned limitations guide their potentially incorrect conclusion that IEA 
membership is the only policy necessary to maintain New Zealand’s security, and that IEA 
membership is one of the only oil security-improving mechanisms available to the country. 
Recommendations are also guided by the assumption that IEA emergency response 
mechanisms – most notably overseas-held stock repatriation – will operate as intended, 
regardless of context.  
Having established the approach of current assessments and shown that potential changes 
within the geopolitical environment is not a variable that is addressed, Part II of this study 
aimed to determine whether changes in this variable over the next 20 years could affect risk to 
supply or policy effectiveness. This study first examined forecasts from leading international 
and domestic organisations to identify likely changes in domestic and international supply and 
demand for oil, and then discussed how these changes may impact the risk of disruptions and 
the effectiveness of security policy options in the future. Findings showed that the importance 
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of oil in New Zealand’s energy mix was almost certainly going to remain high, as was the 
country’s dependence on oil imports. Moreover, anticipated changes to the international oil 
market were not going to lower the risk of disruption, and in fact may add further challenges 
to maintaining supply security.  
Next, the research examined the potential impacts of a changing geopolitical environment on 
security of supply using two contrasting future storylines adapted from existing oil security 
literature. The storylines demonstrated that the geopolitical environment can markedly impact 
a country’s oil security, through altering the likelihood and form of supply chain disruptions, 
the effectiveness of security policies, and also the strength of related markets to allocate 
unaffected supply as other states change their oil security policies in response to the 
geopolitical environment. Failing to account for geopolitical uncertainty within current oil 
security assessments therefore impedes the accuracy of oil security assessments and the 
appropriateness of associated policy recommendations.  
10.1 Recommendations 
With the identified limitations of current assessments in mind, this study has identified a 
number of ways that New Zealand’s oil security assessments could be improved. These 
recommendations include:  
i. Framing their external disruption scenarios upon the actual structure of the country’s 
supply chain and its sector dependencies, rather than global supply disruption estimates; 
ii. Modelling for different scales of disruption, and supply line sector and market failure; 
iii. Modelling supply chain disruptions to include anticipated delays in receiving 
unaffected supply from alternate sources, including from IEA members;  
iv. Evaluating the vulnerability of other states that share suppliers and supply lines with 
New Zealand, and their ability to respond to the stock-sharing component of IEP where 
applicable; 
v. Entertaining higher levels of uncertainty with respect to market and IEA emergency 
response failure under different scenarios; 
vi. Maintaining an up-to-date schedule of alternative crude supply sources that meet New 
Zealand’s specifications, and integrating this information into risk assessments; 
vii. Evaluating risk of disruption on sector-by-sector basis, accounting for levels of 
tightness, concentration and flexibility and investment within associated upstream, 
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midstream and downstream markets, and the extent that supply is being traded through 
open market channels; 
viii. Maintain an ongoing review of geopolitical developments to feed into modelling, 
adopting an ‘adaptive management’ approach to oil security planning and 
policymaking; 
ix. Adopting a long time-horizon for policymaking, likely at least 10 years given 
constraints on energy system transformation.  
This study has also highlighted a number of oil security-improving policy instruments and 
strategies that should be considered if New Zealand’s supply security is found to be at an 
unsatisfactory level. This most notably includes modifying the country’s stockholding 
approach, utilising foreign policy instruments to provide additional options in an emergency, 
and reducing oil dependence entirely through working to increase the country’s adoption of 
alternative energy technologies.  
10.2 Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research 
This research entailed a comprehensive examination of relevant and publicly available 
literature to provide an accurate critique of existing oil security assessments in relation to 
geopolitical risk and uncertainty. However, as has been noted throughout, there are a number 
of areas relating to New Zealand’s oil security that warrant further examination, or areas where 
the methods and findings of this research could be applied further.  
10.2.1 Expanding Findings 
Alternative Supply Information 
While this research has discussed New Zealand’s current oil supply chain thoroughly, the 
limitations of this study and existing research leave unexamined in detail the viability of 
alternative petroleum sources potentially available to New Zealand in the event of a disruption. 
Further research should therefore be undertaken to determine what crude grades can be utilised 
within New Zealand’s sole refinery, the impact on product output if usable but sub-optimal 
crude grades are used, and, should refinery reconfiguration be required, the cost and timeframes 
required to use these grades. This research could also be expanded to encompass the overseas 
refineries that New Zealand currently relies upon. Doing so would allow for a more accurate 




This research has been limited to the use and examination of two storylines, which somewhat 
restricts its findings. Other storylines could be developed and integrated into this research to 
improve understanding of supply security and policy effectiveness. One storyline that could 
have particular merit would be a situation where demand peaks and declines much sooner, 
potentially as a result of greater pursuit of emissions reduction initiatives. Such a storyline will 
allow for a better understanding of what the anticipated decline of global demand will mean 
for New Zealand’s oil security. 
There is also opportunity to improve the storylines used within this research to attain a better 
understanding of risk to New Zealand’s oil supply and policy effectiveness within different 
geopolitical environment. The storylines used in this research were created in the mid-2000s 
with a focus on EU oil and gas security. The storylines were thus used in this research to derive 
expected state behaviours that would be witnessed in different geopolitical environments, 
rather than attributing an action or strategy to any country in particular. Updating these 
storylines to have a New Zealand focus and outlines of anticipated behaviour of states relevant 
to New Zealand’s oil security would allow for more robust policy recommendations. 
Supplementing this research with alternative scenario-based approaches, including predictive 
scenarios, may also be beneficial in this regard.    
10.2.2 Expanding Research 
A New Oil Security Assessment 
Perhaps the most obvious avenue for expanding research would be to undertake a new 
assessment of New Zealand’s oil supply security that adopts in its approach the improvements 
this research has recommended. Doing so would provide an up-to-date and more robust 
assessment of New Zealand’s oil security, allowing for related policy changes to be made if 
required.  
Non-geopolitical Risks 
The specific focus of this research has been geopolitical risk to supply. However, large 
disruptions can result from other non-geopolitical events, including extreme weather events. 
The risk to supply posed by such events should also be accounted for in risk assessments for 
an accurate determination of New Zealand’s oil security. 
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Examining Other Energy Sources 
Another focus of this research has been on New Zealand’s oil security into the future. However, 
the security of other energy sources, particularly electricity, are also extremely important. 
Opportunities for further research could include applying the same strategic approach to other 
parts of New Zealand’s energy system. Findings could then be integrated with this research, 
allowing for a comprehensive risk assessment of the energy sources the country relies or is 
expected to rely upon. 
Cost-benefit Approach 
When determining appropriate recommendations within security assessments, the risk of a 
disruption needs to be compared against the cost of mitigating that risk. However, it should be 
noted that the current cost-benefit approach taken in existing assessments is not the only 
approach available, and there may perhaps be more appropriate means for determining the 
correct balance between security improving actions and the cost of their implementation. 
Were New Zealand to experience a significant disruption to its supply, the impact on the 
economy and society would likely be significant, going beyond those which can be easily 
measured monetarily. The cost-benefit ranking approach is used in normal economic 
management to compare a number of resilience-improving options against other spending 
options. However, for high impact-low probability (potentially intergenerational) events like a 
significant oil or product supply shortage, a more risk avoidant approach may be more 
appropriate. Other means of determining the ideal level of response to low probability-high 
impact events include the ‘minimax regret’ approach (“minimise the maximum loss”), which 
may suggest paying above cost-benefit values to avoid low probability but unacceptable 
risks.618 An avenue for further research could be therefore be an examination of whether 
alternative cost-benefit weightings are more appropriate.  
10.3  Final Thoughts 
The domestic and global energy system is undergoing profound change, bringing new 
alternatives to oil within the energy mix. And yet, the issue of maintaining oil security is not 
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decisions on which security policies to implement need to be carefully balanced against 
conflicting policy priorities, just as other decisions regarding other energy policies should 
account for impacts on energy security. This is also relevant for policies where less 
consumption of oil is an objective, for instance to meet emission reduction targets. New 
Zealand must be realistic and pragmatic with policies relating to these other energy goals. 
Should the government wish to pursue policies that may potentially complicate maintaining oil 
security, then these policies should also be complemented with policies designed to reduce oil 
dependence over time - for instance, subsidies for EVs or commitments for infrastructure 
projects to ensure low cost electricity.   
It also needs to be acknowledged that as the energy balance changes, the dynamics of 
maintaining energy security will change with it. Long-term stability of policy will be necessary 
so that energy companies have confidence to invest correctly. New Zealand should be cautious 
sending signals of where it is going if it is unable to get there. The government should only 
send signals of what it is able to achieve so that the market does not respond in the wrong way 
and harm energy security inadvertently. Luciani echoes these sentiments; policy indication 
must not entertain policy objectives that are unlikely to be reached, as oil supply chain 
participants will respond to announced policies through their investment choices inevitably 
affecting market dynamics.619 
Security of oil supply will remain a vital objective for the country for years to come. New 
Zealand cannot afford to become complacent about its oil security as long as the resource 
maintains such a vital position in the national energy mix, and the country remains almost 
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